disclosure of previous grievanve for Employment Tribunal

This was the point at which I provided the new Dean – for the first time - with a full copy of all the controversial material contained in the grievance dossier submitted in 1998 to the VC. It clearly had the effect of alienating him further against me; to the extent that, on the basis of its contents, he later described me as ‘poisonous’! Thus, the potential for trouble on my part - suggested by this dossier – ultimately proved to be a significant turning point in the Dean's attitude and the evidence indicates that this was the most direct reason that he started to move against me over the next few weeks and months! In addition, however, in order to launch the new ‘Marketing Masters’ programme, I also had (unwillingly) to become involved in the management politicking which was then taking place. This was especially the case in relation to the promotional developments surrounding B851. In the context of the launch of a course supposed to teach marketing, these were embarrassingly incompetent. The outcome, though, was not any criticism of those responsible for the failures but was the Dean falsely accusing me of ignoring the facts!

35. In retrospect, for I had forgotten the key role Roland Kaye himself had played in initiating the earlier events and promoting the associated slanders, my giving him the full dossier of my 1998 grievance was a serious mistake. It certainly reinforced the view – which he would have also obtained from the preceding School Board meetings - that I was a 'dangerous' whistle-blower; or, as he labelled me later in his email to OU Personnel Department, ‘poisonous’. In particular, this was at a time when the OUBS was under rigorous scrutiny from the OU Establishment Review to which I was submitting controversial evidence about OUBS management and this may in turn have later led to its especially damning criticism of such management practices within OUBS. The Dean made specific references to the content of my 1998 grievance in his immediately subsequent, 26 October 2000, referral to the OU doctor; and its existence in OUBS – open to all (with confidentiality breached) - was later divulged in the OU Grievance Brief. This was despite the Dean’s claim to the Tribunal that he had never read the contents of the dossier; even after the importance of the contents were brought to his attention in this way. Most important of all, it later also featured, in his crucial email to OU Personnel, as a main reason for thinking I was ‘poisonous’ and wanting to destroy me financially. [Despite this evidence, and the highly controversial contents of the dossier itself (which it would have been out of character for even the most naïve Dean to have ignored, let alone the very politically involved Roland Kaye), the Dean insisted that he had never even opened the dossier, but had put it straight on the shelf, or - as later amended – straight into my Personnel file; which was, however, never shown to me or to the Tribunal!]

36. A health referral form was issued the next day, not on the basis of my diabetes or even my recent cardiac condition, but on the basis that I was suffering from psychological problems! In any case, it is without any doubt clear, from the Dean’s later email to Philip Marsh, that he was very angry with what he saw as ‘poisonous behaviour’ on my part, and my ‘questionable mental state’. He again clearly linked this to the dossier, saying that – disregarding the previous VC’s less biased view that my whistle-blowing had been justified – my “behaviour had been unacceptable for many years.”

37. At around the same time, in the context of the work on the ‘Marketing Masters’ programme, my status report summarised the major problems I found when asked by the Dean to investigate the situation, and clearly described what I found out at the time about the promotional activities. As minuted previously, despite requests for information on the progress of the promotional campaign, I had not been kept informed about developments on this. When I finally was allowed to explore the situation, in essence – despite the comprehensive brief previously agreed with the Chartered Institute of Marketing - I unearthed (as shown in the report below) an embarrassing catalogue of farcical errors that should not have been made by the most inexperienced marketer; ranging from spending only a fifth of the planned budget, through sending the largest part of the mailing to the only group of marketing students in the UK who could not possibly be qualified to start the course, to providing no means whereby students could register even if they wanted to, and indeed not informing the call centre (who would register them) of the existence of the course – so that almost all genuine applicants were turned away. Fortunately, my design for the programme had deliberately minimised the resource exposures and, in addition, a key secondary objective had been to test the viability of the approach in other disciplinary areas - so not all the benefits of the pilot should have been lost.

MASTERS IN MARKETING - STATUS REPORT David Mercer 13 September 2000

Yesterday you asked me to consult with the manager concerned to determine what the situation was. Regrettably. for reasons you should by now be aware of [the manager had resigned], this has not been possible. If the informal reports are to be believed, in the one day she will be in the office before she leaves she is fully committed in other meetings. Indeed, you should by now be aware that the position, or at least our understanding of the position, has had to be drastically revised on the basis of the new information. As we have been able to find nobody else in marketing who knows what is currently happening on the MA (Marketing), or indeed what has happened previously (since we are told that she handled this personally and did not discuss it with anyone else), we cannot be certain of any of the facts. Indeed the only 'facts' which now seem clear are:

1) Communication Failure - the key factor was that, due to the splits in responsibility between marketing and the rest of the School (and possibly due the changes within marketing), there was an almost total lack of awareness amongst management that the promotional programmes had not been undertaken. Prior to the final plenary 'handover' meeting, at CIM in January, we (Mo Vernon and myself) had been intimately involved in all that was going on - and, indeed, had in effect initiated and then managed the programme up to that point. At that meeting, however, it was made clear that, in line with normal OUBS practice, marketing would take over management of both the promotional cam al- and contact with CIM- specifically managed by the manager concerned, but with the course team kept in the picture. When, subsequently, we were not kept in the picture we assumed that this was a combination of business as usual - whereby marketing did their own thing and did not recognise the need to communicate - and the fact that the programme liaison responsibility had been taken over by the Masters team. We had confidence in both ends of this chain indeed we still have total confidence in Richard Wheatcroft but in retrospect our confidence in others (who seemed to be very competent) possibly was misplaced. In any case we, the product champions who had previously been driving the process, found ourselves cut out of the loop; even - in early summer when the course team started demanding that the manager concerned attended CT meetings to liaise - having to accept that, despite considerable pressure from us, we could not get any information at all (and that which we did get was of questionable accuracy - enquirer numbers had, for example, varied between 300 to 450 to 600 and back again - hence my comments yesterday!). That we felt we had to accept this position, as being normal in OUBS, may be indicative of a major communications problem across this part of the School; the result of which, in this case, has been that major failure (potentially losing income, in the shorter term, of several hundred thousand pounds) was not even detected before it went critical!

2) Launch Failure - whilst the detailed facts are not yet known, and may never be (since we are told that only she has these and is likely to take them with her), it seems clear that there was a near total failure to conduct a professionally managed marketing launch for the programme. This was partly due to the failure of CIM to initially deliver their mailing list numbers, though when we were made aware of this we agreed (with them) a revised plan which allowed for this. This was partly clouded by the understandable suggestion by the Regional Manager that the target numbers be revised down to 30 (to allow much needed attention to be focused on the Certificate launch). On the other hand, the intent even then was still clearly to undertake a successful launch campaign using the traditional set of indirect marketing tools. The lower numbers mailed being compensated for by heavier advertising. In particular, inserts - giving much more information (much as the mailings would have done) - would have been included in, Marketing Business (to cover the 6,000+ PGDips who had otherwise opted out of mailings) in addition to the existing bookings; and new ads placed in the rest of the trade press - very much in line with our much smaller competitors' activities. It is now clear that the requisite activities simply were not undertaken. As far as we can see, the only activity undertaken to plan was a run of 4 insertions in Marketing Business; at a total cost of £11,500, with an ad which was in line with the subsidiary brief for 'shared OUBS brand advertising rather than a launch! We have not been able to obtain information on the mailing (though it could not be to much more than 4,000), not even a copy of the content, so we cannot comment on this (or even establish if it took place. OUBS did not even manage to deliver any significant PR; even the long article which CIM had promised to publish (for free), and I had agreed to write, was not taken up. This means that the total launch spend - apart from the prospectus which was not part of the plan (and again did not contain suitable launch promotional material, and indeed was inaccurate in key respects in terms of what it did contain) - was almost certainly below £20,000; compared with the £100,000 written into the budget, and the much larger sums which would normally be made available for a launch of a product expected to deliver in excess of a £1 million per annum profit (and even of the OUBS guidelines which would have required a figure of £250,000). Even had the content, the 'product messages', been up to, scratch - which they clear weren't - this level of spend clearly was a joke in terms of a launch campaign!

WHAT DO WE DO NOW?

Clearly, though our course production is well on target, we have signally failed to undertaken an effective marketing' launch What is worse, we have even failed to obtain any reliable information as to whether a successful relaunch might be possible in the future. The 'market research' quoted by Karen is largely meaningless as a basis for projecting numbers; none of the control data required for valid research is provided. The sample size (of those contactable) at 100 is well below any limit for producing statistically significant figures, and the obvious level of skew - on the basis of what is provided - cannot be meaningfully allowed for! All we can deduce is what we already knew, that the promotional launch was an abject failure! It tells us almost nothing about what the true potential might be.

The one bit of good news might be that, of those contacted if we include diplomates in general, the level of serious interest overall might be in excess of 50%; and, apart from the skew of the population, this is the one fact which might be meaningful. Coupling this with the overall numbers of approaching 100,000 CIM qualifiers worldwide, this might indicate a potential of up to 50,000 students; without adding in our own entry point based on CDNext. But, of course, due to the failures of the research as much as of the launch, this a hope not a fact - we are not much further forward than when we took the original decision! It is now possible to see why the manager concerned was recommending a deferred launch; this might allow marketing to do the much better job needed.

In fact, assuming we do not wish to back out of the programme (with the very embarrassing publicity which might ensue), the problem may be much less than it might first glance appear; except that the hoped for large-scale boost to OUBS income at this critical time will not be forthcoming. The whole plan (detailed in the Blueprint) was - fortunately - designed to minimise risk; albeit that we never expected that the risk would be from our own incompetence! Thus, the programme is designed to run at a profit even on very low numbers (though the decision then is whether it is worth the diversion of management attention). Accordingly, we could adopt the following series of actions:

a) Current (2000) Cohort - It looks as if, despite the dramatic failure of our marketing launch, we might still get close to the small number of (30) students which the Regional Manager wanted to work with as a pilot. This will also help with the problems of induction which have been worrying us - since this level would enable us to give almost individual attention. Since there would be no impact on courses overall, accepting these students onto the 2000K programme would have almost no financial impact (except, even on these low numbers, to boost long term income by something like £150,000 - easily covering all the investment in the programme to date) and would avoid any damage to our image (and indeed would enhance it -'OURS stands by its students').

b) 2001 E Cohort - due to the errors, and confusion, in the promotional material, it is possible that some students may be choosing to start with B825; since this is the obvious entry point for marketing students. Accordingly, we should be prepared for a few students to join at this stage.

c) B851 - as you will be aware, this is the one dedicated course. On the other hand, it has been designed as a low-resource course; with all of the expensive elements removed - no residential school, no audio-visual etc. Accordingly, the direct costs of development to date - where most of the course is already at D2 - has been little over £10,000. To this should be added some part of the time of Mo, Judith, Andrea and myself - though all of us have also been working on other projects - and the cost of text editing. Thus, the overall (sunk) development costs are minimal by OURS standards; and even then might also allow us to offer an ecommerce elective in V3 MBA if needed. In addition, it will be a very cost effective course to run; even with small numbers, since no residential schools are used, and indeed it has been designed to be electronically delivered and tutored.

The other significant development comes with the idea that the entry point to the programme should now be B851, since this allows us a better control of these students, who are unused to distance-learning. If we adopt this principle we can, indeed, relaunch the programme rather more professionally in a year's time, claiming (with some justification, albeit unintended) this year as a pilot presentation. At the same time we could also accept the interim students - and hence avoid embarrassment - at no extra cost; since they will also join the new students on the first, 2001K, presentation of B851 !

This is the approach I would recommend, since it causes us the least embarrassment, brings in some extra revenue in the shorter term and - most important - allows us to test the whole concept (which is what we were supposed to be doing this year!).

As a final footnote, however, I would also suggest that - assuming the modularisation of CDNext works - we should be starting to look at the idea of assembling our own marketing entry course (paralleling B800), so that this is under OUBS control; with the added benefit that we could open it up to entrants who (at 22-23 years of age) are one or two years into their post-university careers - without degrading the MBA (which would still have the 27+ age requirement). More simply, we should allow the existing Diploma graduates entry into the programme - thus allowing those who are barred from the MBA a route to further development.

38. Regrettably, these facts clearly were not welcome to OUBS management, for the immediate response to this was the same day critical response from the then Regional Manager who angrily accused me of making ‘inappropriate’ allegations about the professionalism of those involved. At that time, before she left, she was the main player involved in the political battles with the rest of the university, but was also the partner of the academic whose Certificate launch, taking place at the same time, was in competition with B851 for the promotional effort and a close friend of the manager I believed was largely responsible for the failure of the promotional activities, who also left, though I carefully did not accuse her of this in my original communication. The Regional Manager had also been campaigning previously for the numbers of students being recruited for B851 to be minimised, in order to reduce the other stresses emerging in the regions as a result of the structural changes she was trying to implement – which were designed to give OUBS management greater control over the OU’s regional activities.

39. These factors may help explain her somewhat intemperate response. On the other hand, her rebuff was closely followed by an equally intemperate, potentially libellous, email from the Dean falsely accusing me of ignoring the facts. My own more measured response to this was provided following day.

40. The Dean’s increasingly intemperate treatment of me in meetings continued (unrecorded) over much of the following year; though I did eventually report this treatment to OU Personnel and, since I left, I am authoratively led to believe that a number of OUBS academics [who I personally know and whose word I trust] have lodged similar complaints; though the Dean insisted, on oath, to the Tribunal that (apart from one well documented case) he had not received a single such complaint. In view of the way minute taking in OUBS is normally limited to the decisions taken, it was only informally put on the record as my own transcript of the two centres meeting and, again by me, when he spoke to the first OUBS ‘Forum’; though both my witnesses at the Tribunal supported this view – and indeed one of them quite specifically stated that the Dean was a bully. Both also described a ‘climate of fear’ which was present in OUBS; and the OU never chose to rebut this with evidence other than the Dean’s own word and his counsel’s claim that he was merely a strong manager. Indeed the Dean even seemed to take pride in suggesting that his harsh treatment of staff was necessary for such ‘strong management’. The unusual level of anger he publicly concentrated on me at the latter meeting may, though, have also been more directly due to the fact that he seemed (quite incorrectly, but in line with his view of me being a ‘poisonous’ whistle-blower) to blame whistle-blowing on my part for the very embarrassing decision by the newly appointed Professor of Strategy not to take up his appointment. He angrily reiterated this view publicly at the Tribunal, despite my protestations that in my discussion with him I had in fact commended the OUBS to the new Professor, and said it was my action in particular (along with twenty others, later reduced to five others, who made similar scurrilous comments) which he thought was poisonous.

In his summing up, OU Counsel tried to paint a picture of the Dean not as a bully but as a strong manager tightening up control over the School.