FUTURES
RESEARCH
6005 Chapter 5 - Society’s Winners
INDIVIDUALISM & ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY A_DIFFERENT_EQUALITY_
NEW LIFESTYLES HRS LIFESTYLES_ LIFE-LONG EDUCATION
INVESTMENT_IN_EDUCATION_ NEW WORK ROLES GROUP BREAKDOWN
NUCLEAR BREAKDOWN HOUSEWIVES THE_NEW_POWER_OF_WOMEN_
WOMENS_POTENTIAL_ WOMEN_AS_THE_NEW_MANAGERS_
These days it is very easy for us to talk about the technological changes occurring around us. We have become accustomed to science delivering ever more advanced technology on an almost daily basis. We have, indeed, become nonchalant - even complacent - about these changes, and would feel something was wrong if they did not regularly feature in the news media. On the other hand, having already initiated the massive changes which are under way, these technological marvels no longer represent the main drivers for the changes to come. Now the main forces at work are social. It is the structures of society which, above all, are being torn apart around us - to be replaced by very different frameworks[1]. We feel much less comfortable about these changes, for they represent the true frontiers of change.
As we will see, later in the chapter, the most obvious signs of these changes are not the increased levels of material greed promoted by politicians of the right, but the intangible freedoms - to decide our own futures - now being grasped by individuals. Across much of the developed world these new freedoms are, for the first time, being made available to most of the population. Above all, the largest ‘minority’, that of women, will not merely achieve equality but will attain some degree of advantage - not least as society overall is progressively feminised. We are entering upon what may come to be described as the ‘women’s century’.
The changes described in this second part of the book are, in many ways, almost diametrically opposed to those in the first part. The most obvious of these contrasts is that between the hard realities of technology and the soft values of the individual[2]; but there are others. Thus, most importantly, those in the first part are largely incremental in nature - and in many respects quite predictable in terms of their impact - where those in this part are likely to progress from one major discontinuity to the next - leading to considerable uncertainty. Such 'fractures' are not usually predictable, and in general their outcomes are as yet largely unknown - though our new research techniques now allow us to detect at least some of these[3]. Indeed, as we will see, this is the part of the book which contains the largest number of unanswered questions. At all levels it is, therefore, characterised by uncertainty. This is one reason why so many people are worried about the future, about the new threats which seem to be hanging over us; the unknown always seems much more menacing.
Even so, though the detailed outcomes are unknown, they are likely to be optimistic ones; since the general message of this part is the empowerment of the individual.
Indeed, the major social force is now encapsulated in a powerful idea - that empowerment of the individual.[4] Some 70% of our individuals expected this to be a dominant force in society within twenty years; though, reflecting their general underrating of such structural changes, they still only gave it a rating of 7.2 in importance.
Some might say that this development first started, in the 1980s, is part of the search for personal affluence.[5] It is this form of 'individualism', in the shape of personal greed as the major motivator of the electorate, which many politicians - especially those of the right (who often seem to gain a perverse form of joy in unearthing the less savoury motives of the masses) - have seized upon; and encouraged. It surely reached its nadir in the belief that the electorate could be bribed by tax cuts to accept anything that self-serving politicians wanted; and for a while it even looked as if this lamentable view of base human nature must be correct. And it has to be admitted that - even now when tax cuts no longer buy votes - there is still an air of confusion surrounding the whole issue. A few observers, indeed, are still quite pessimistic about personal motives[6], and there may be more than a hint of truth in what they observe.
On the other hand, we - and the managers in our research groups - believe that such greed will not be the most important aspect of this in the longer term. Almost two thirds of individuals, for instance, believe that materialism will be replaced by ethics within twenty five years, and three quarters think that organizations in general will stress ethical values within twenty years. Perhaps the most direct evidence for such a shift in mood came, not from the political swings in this direction to be seen around the world, but from the members of the largest 'building society' (non-profit bank) in the United Kingdom who - in mid-1997 - voted to remain non- profit-making despite the prospect of receiving an immediate cash handout (bribe?) of more than £2,000 each! Thus, despite the general cynicism of our age and the even greater cynicism of the politicians exploiting the greed which has often accompanied these changes in individual lifestyle, we believe that the emergence of (what we would call) true individualism - a search for personal fulfilment largely untainted by selfish avarice - is the most important social trend at work[7].
This may be seen, for example, in a new definition of equality; the right - the freedom - to be different, not the demand to be the same. Almost two thirds of individuals expect there to be a universal bill of rights by 2030. This is a new development, where there had formerly been a tension between the rights of freedom and of equality. Previously, an improvement in one usually led to a deterioration in the other. The battle cry of the French Revolution - Liberté! Egalité! Fraternité! - has often been seen as hopelessly idealistic. Now, with the benefit of the IT Revolution, which allows us to deal effectively with individuals not just the masses, both Liberté (freedom) and Egalité (equality) can improve simultaneously. The new battle-cry will, therefore, be seen in terms of the individual's basic right to fulfil his or her full potential and aspirations; Equality in Freedom.
It is often claimed that such individualism is inevitably at the expense of group cohesiveness, especially that which holds communities together. It is true that the individual is no longer subservient to the will of the group; and, indeed, the new power of the individual is often best demonstrated in terms of the stark contrast with the previous dominance of the group. This is though, if taken literally, a fundamental misconception of the new developments. After the current phase of uncertainty and confusion about such relationships, a new relationship between the individual and the group will emerge. Three quarters of individuals expect new communities and values to emerge by 2025; the same result as is recorded for personal values. It is not yet clear exactly what form this will take, but it seems likely that it will be based more on peer to peer relationships - rather than the hierarchies which typified the previous regimes. It is also likely that this will be a richer relationship, a pluralistic one which is allowed to take the form best suited to the specific situation[8].
Thus, over the longer term, full flowering of this individualism will represent nothing less than a quantum leap in social organisation. Its essence is that each individual - for the first time, in the case of the great majority - has the right, and practical means, to fulfil his or her own life in the specific way that he or she wishes.
One possible starting point, for exploring the subject of individualism, is the academic debate about post-modernism. There is so much confusion surrounding the debate about this, however, that I was tempted to avoid the subject altogether. On the other hand, it is supposed to encapsulate the dramatic social changes [9]which are under way and so many academics use - or more often misuse - the term, that I felt I must attempt some form of explanation; no matter how inadequate it was!
The immediate stumbling block is that the term is used by different people to mean so many different things; usually with very specific connotations and too often in impenetrable academic jargon[10]. Judie Lannon - formerly director of research at the advertising agency, JWT - quite simply suggests that post-modernism may be no more than a modish piece of jargon, a suggestion with which I rather sympathise. Supernatural 'mystery' seems to be the ingredient most at work in the area of post-modernism; rather than natural science[11]. Perhaps that is understandable, when so many revolutions are in collision with each other, and so few of us have any real notion what the future holds, but there does seem to be an unnecessary degree of theatrical posturing in many of the academic contributions!
Indeed, perhaps the real problem is that we are only at the beginning of the revolution - so it is very unclear exactly what post-modernism might ultimately become. What we do now know, and I personally choose this as my starting point, is where we have previously been; the broad characteristics of the period we are leaving. Thus, it is agreed, at the heart of modernism was the depersonalising move from the country into the city; to work in the new factories which were the power-house of the first industrial revolution. With this move gradually came secularisation, a Catholic God was replaced for many by the Protestant work ethic - which had to be demanded of those working in the increasingly machine driven environment of those factories. Many of these developments are reflected in the dominant social science of that age - economics (in which I was trained).
Post-modernism, therefore, represents - at least in terms of its starting point - the breakdown of this system of values. The factory system required that the workers followed their instructions exactly - and physical labour, along with the discipline needed to ensure effective organisation of its application, was the essence. The processes of that era, which in too many organisations still hold sway, had the worker service the machine - so that this might be productive. Now, in the knowledge society, intellectual effort accompanied by creative interpretation of the rules - if any exist - is becoming the norm. The demands of the system are, therefore, changing dramatically - as are the expectations of the participants.
Indeed, the process of social change can, perhaps, be best seen in the work-place, where the change can be summed up by the move to the Human Resource Strategies (HRS) we looked at in the previous chapter. When we are moving from a surplus of workers to one of a scarcity of skills (in the West at least), this is most clearly encapsulated in the recognition that the prime investment is now made in people rather than in machines; and the whole production process, in offices as much as in factories, has increasingly focused on making individual workers more productive. This has reached its latest peak, at the dawning of the information age, in terms of the increasing debate about ‘intellectual capital’ - the value of the intangible knowledge assets held by the organisation, typically in the heads of employees.
Beyond the work-place, relaxation of the more excessive demands of the industrial system - leveraged by the rise of consumer power - has been reflected in changing individual lifestyles. Indeed, some sociologists see the most important aspect of post-modernism to be such a move from a society based upon the acquisition of physical goods to one which places a greater emphasis on such intangibles. This is sometimes described, in their academic jargon, as the signs and symbols (encapsulated in 'brand images') the individuals use to define and, in particular to communicate to others - their chosen lifestyle[12]. Such a is a key driver for change; but perhaps - as post-materialism, yet another social revolution (this time being tracked by marketing academics) - which is developing in more complex ways than some of these sociologists allow for.
The role of the group - whilst declining in social power overall - is still inherent in such views of post-modernism; at least in terms of its supposed cultural control over the behaviour of the individual. Indeed, at work, employees - increasingly now knowledge workers - might determine their own, informal contract with the organisation, but this is still typically placed in a group context. At home, their geographic neighbourhood, or class group, may no longer determine their behaviour, but they commit instead to new groups - based on interests, such as football, or single issues, such as Greenpeace. Even so, each individual is now free to pursue his or her own lifestyle; and an increasing number are doing so - in ways which diverge markedly from those of the groups to which they would have traditionally belonged.
Surprisingly, perhaps one of the most useful explanations came from Herman Kahn writing almost twenty years before the debate became fashionable, and a number of years before the term post-modernism even came into use - which may be why his contribution is more sensible than most. He described what he expected post-industrial society to be like "...more and more people will do things for their own sake..."
If, after this section on post-modernism, you feel confused, welcome to the club! As yet, even the so-called experts, myself included, display symptoms of confusion. All I would suggest is that you read on, and approach each of the revolutionary events separately - as I describe them in turn.
The most important formally organised force for change in personal circumstances, and hence for genuine empowerment of the individual, is that of education. More than half our research groups stressed its importance. Indeed, it can be argued that the exponential growth of education, around the world, has often created the social revolutions now taking place. This is not just my own opinion, as an academic at one of the leading educational institutions (the United Kingdom’s Open University) I could quite rightly be accused of bias, nor is it just the parochial view of those in our research groups, it is the view held by most governments across the world; and more than two thirds of our individuals expected there to be global mass education by 2030. The problem is, as we will see, governments largely do nothing to follow this belief!
To date, almost all increases in education - as formally applied - have mainly taken the form of ever higher levels of basic education, being delivered to an ever greater proportion of the population. The Far Eastern Tigers and, especially, Japan - which has put its money where its mouth is - have pursued this process further than other nations; and have reaped the benefits. There now seems irrefutable evidence that not merely does the investment in education already represent by far the greatest proportion of existing overall (capital) investment made in most countries, but that it is now also - by far - the most productive.
The difference, in this context, is not between those nations which educate their populations but between the levels to which they educate them; between the leaders, in the Far East, and their more conservative erstwhile competitors in the West - such as the US and UK - which, largely for reasons of market ideology, are less committed to the human infra-structure. Even these laggards, however, are increasing their investment in basic education - that education which takes place (at school, college or university) before an individual enters the work-force. To put this in context, Peter Drucker[b] documents the enormous scale of this investment "Formal schooling - schooling of young people before they enter the workforce - takes about one-tenth of GNP (up from 2% or less at the time of World War I). Employing organisations spend another 5% of GNP on the continuing education of their employees; it may be more. Around 3 to 5% of GNP are spent on research and development, that is, on the production of new knowledge. Very few countries set aside a similar portion [up to 20%] of their GNP to form traditional [that is, money] capital."[13]
As already indicated, the difference between nations is the rate at which such investment is being made. The indication is that a high rate of investment is needed to support a high rate of change within an economy; though, as an academic myself, I once more recognise that I can be accused of special pleading. Even so, the relatively puny efforts of many nations will put them at considerable disadvantage in the future - especially as skills shortages emerge towards the end of the 20th century. This is a mistake that is easily avoidable - since the level of investment can now be significantly reduced, by the use of new technologies. Using these, for example, we, - at the Open University (OU) - are now able to teach hundreds of undergraduates, even in the developing nations, who otherwise would not be able to afford conventional education. When discussing the topic in more detail, almost half of the general groups saw such distance learning - the technique where the OU leads the world - having a major role to play. It may be, therefore, that in future the most likely location for mass higher education - especially that concerned with on-going education - will be in the home (or in the office) rather than in a college; and 80% of individuals foresaw this happening within twenty years, and more that two thirds predicted the demise of the traditional school by 2025.
Indeed, one particular reason for the dramatic changes in location and in teaching styles, which will almost inevitably come about over the next decades, arises from a less obvious educational requirement; which few nations - with the usual exception of Japan - are taking seriously. This is the impact of on-going education. Most educational systems are still happy to see their responsibilities end once the individual is accepted into the work-force. And, for the mass of the western population, those individuals are even happier to put their schooldays behind them! As a result, life-long learning still remains a pious aspiration with little serious policy backing.
The emerging requirements, of the knowledge society, demand rather different solutions, however[14]. Thus, the rate of change is now so great that an individual will have to take on a number of 'trades' over his or her lifetime - they will have no choice - and, unless they are regularly retrained (indeed almost continually re-educated) to take on each new trade, they will become almost unemployable. This is now well recognised, 90% of our individuals expected this to happen within the near future. For many of us this dramatic change has already happened. Where my father had just one job, lasting almost fifty years through the whole of his working lifetime, I have had - so far - no less than ten full-time employers (and many more 'part-time' ones); and within these ten I have had more than seventeen quite different jobs - eight of which required me to retrain completely from scratch, to acquire a new set of skills and knowledge! Mine is, obviously, an extreme example - but it does give a flavour of some of the lesser changes which will soon affect most workers. Indeed, Rosabeth Moss Kanter - one of the leading gurus at the Harvard Business School - makes the point that, where (according to her main thesis) individuals will no longer have the benefit of lifetime employment, “If security no longer comes from being employed, it must come from being employable....Continuing upgrading of skills and pursuit of opportunities is a lifelong proposition even inside a single corporation."
The truth of this predicament has now become obvious not just to the Japanese but to the leaders of most other nations. Unfortunately, the dilemma this poses is who pays? Should not the employer, or the employee, pay; for will they not be the main beneficiaries? In Japan, where both of these parties already have a sound understanding of what is needed to create a better future for all, this poses no problems; and the re-education is happily undertaken as part of the normal working environment. In the West, however, few employers - and even fewer employees - see the point of such retraining or re-education; and almost none of them are willing to pay for it. There are a great many social - and economic - arguments why they should invest in such retraining[15]. Unfortunately, such arguments are unlikely to swing the minds, let alone the stony hearts, of avowed market capitalists. Like it or not, therefore, governments will usually have to take the first step[16].
Regrettably, despite the many promised retraining schemes, there is surprisingly little evidence that most Western governments are planning to intervene in this important new sector of education. Even amongst our individuals, although 70% of them expected on-going education to happen, they rated this only 5.3 in terms of importance and requiring thirty years to become operational. More surprisingly, perhaps, there seems to be almost as much apathy amongst the establishments of higher education which might be the main beneficiaries. Just when the requirement will become so urgent that it at last overpowers this inertia is questionable - but the odds must be that it will; for those nations which do not address the problem will rapidly fall behind their international competitors.
Indeed, as education is so fundamental to so many other aspects of the development of the individual, it is arguable that it is becoming the most important of the fundamental rights. As a result, on-going education will probably become the largest single industry across the globe.[17]
What we have not yet looked at, in detail, is how the organisation of work has already changed. This is even more dramatic than the move to investment in the individual rather than in the machine would imply. ‘Fordist’ - assembly line - work was determined by exact rules; encapsulated in the Taylorist theories of scientific management and, especially, in the discipline of work study. Here, the optimum action, for every step of the production process, was determined; and the worker required to repeat those few steps over and over again - possibly for years on end. One of the most vivid memories of my early career was that of a worker, at the end of a steel strip mill, whose job was only to watch the strip as it sped past him to hit the end of the line. At this point he would press a button so that shears cut off a sheet, which dropped onto a stack below, and the next piece of strip would also run on to the end of the line - for the whole process to be repeated, twice a second, eight hours a day, for the rest of the worker's life. It was clearly a soul-destroying job. On the other hand, combined with an emphasis on strictly hierarchical structures of management, it enabled relatively unskilled, untrained workers to carry out almost every task needed.
On the other hand, the new knowledge workers - rapidly growing in number, to become the great majority of the overall work-force - are required to handle such a variety of different tasks that it is becoming impossible to set similar rules for these. Even the few workers who remain on production lines now have to be multi-skilled, so they can switch from one task to another at a moment's notice. From the point of view of the work-force, especially those who are unskilled or semi-skilled, the change has been dramatic. The demand now is for fully skilled, and even for fully educated, workers. If you visit the Toyota assembly lines near Nagoya, in Japan, you will find few assembly-line workers who have not completed at least 15 years of education - sufficient to qualify them for a university place (perhaps even a degree) in the West - and even after that they have then been continuously trained by Toyota itself. The result, is that - reflecting the professional grace with which the workers have learned to undertake their tasks - the scene is more reminiscent of a classical ballet than of a Western factory.
The down-side is, of course, that the unskilled and semi-skilled are fast becoming not just unemployed but unemployable. Since 1980, in the US at least, the demand for labour has only increased amongst the top 10% of, most skilled, workers - for all other sectors demand has dropped off. In the West, where far less attempt has been made than in Japan to extend education to this group, this is seen as an impossible problem - dignified by the term structural unemployment. This implies that it is an unavoidable sign of the times, which (as Japan shows) it is not, and not a failure by the leaders of society (in particular its politicians), which it is!
One result of this multi-skilling process has been a dramatic increase in the degree of self-management. It has also resulted in a greater level of team-working, largely based on peer-to-peer relationships, with the manager now working as a team leader. The ultimate development of such self-management, now being implemented, for instance, by consultancies (which, one way or another, are accounting for a growing proportion of the work-force), is the emergence of the collegiate form of organisation; which we academics have been privileged to enjoy for many years. In such a system, within limits, we are free to ourselves manage all aspects of our work life. Needless to say, this has major implications for management - not least that there is effective recruitment of the correct personnel, who can and will manage themselves.
A less obvious trend is that the general nature of each individual's set of tasks will change over time. The definition of the individual's role, and that of the team within which he or she operates, is therefore becoming increasingly flexible and variable. No set of rules, nor any hierarchical management structure, can cope with this. One informal outcome, which I first described a decade ago in the context of how IBM was then managed, is the cellular organic structure. In this form of - lower level - management structure, the relationship between members of the team, and between the team and other parts of the organisation, is constantly shifting; being re-negotiated almost daily. Even the boundaries of the team, of the ‘cell’, change - taking in other members of the organisation for example - as the circumstances change; in much the same way that other living organisms do. In this context, no less than 85% of our individuals expected to have ‘multiple careers’ within twenty years, and this was reflected - in a more specific context - by a similar number who expected contract-working to be general; a much more radical departure.
Traditional forms of rules are clearly unworkable in such situations - so control is exerted (often by default) by the culture; of the organisation, and of the parts of it closest to the ‘cell’ (team), in much the same way that DNA governs what happens to the living cell. A more general form of this wider set of linkages has often been referred to, in recent years, as 'networking[18]'. Such culture-driven organisations are already particularly evident in the high technology sectors - indeed IBM was the original model - but the form is spreading to more and more organisations as the rapid rate of change demands ever more flexible management[19].
In changing times, those workers who are not trained to meet the changed needs will be unemployed; and unemployable. This is not, though, an inevitable process - since it merely requires that suitable training be provided; and it is likely that the rest of the world will eventually follow the lead of Japan - and unemployment will slowly reduce to the levels seen in the 1950s and 1960s.
Although team-working will remain, and may actually grow in importance, the flexibility implied by the new organisational forms mean that long-term group identities will be weakened. The individuals may appear to be just as intimately involved with those around them, from day to day, but their fellow team members may be different people to those they worked with a year ago - or perhaps even to those of just a week ago. Again, my own - albeit rather unique - experience is that the team around me changed almost completely every two to three years; and, again, the people my father worked with scarcely changed over as many decades. Group solidarity, in these new circumstances, will change its nature[20].
This represents an important development since - for the past century - groups, in one form or another, have been the building block of society. Individuals, in this societal context, have been largely seen in terms of their group membership; and typically saw themselves in these terms. For 15 years, I was an 'IBMer', and proud to be so. Indeed, the group to which people belonged, and whose behaviour they were culturally bound to follow, was often the same at work as at home. Thus, in earlier decades, the factory was often surrounded by the houses where its workers lived - as a tightly-knit community. For much of his working life my father - and our whole family - lived on just such a work’s village. Son followed father into the same job and into the same community. My family, including my uncles, all worked for the same company; until my generation - since when none of us have!
This represented, in many respects, a continuation of rural society; where relationships with neighbours accounted for almost all the contacts made by an individual - and lasted life-long. Relations in the new industrial villages were perhaps not quite as stable, but they still revolved around close-knit communities. In this environment, the linch-pin of society was the extended family; brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, cousins - and often the neighbours as well - all sharing a very strong common identity[21].
In the years following the Second World War, however, the structure seemed to change dramatically - with the widespread emergence of the nuclear family. As people moved, and were moved - not least in ambitious slum clearance schemes - the old communities fragmented. These moves were not just the result of changing work patterns, though the increasing mobility required of labour played a part, but were also the outcome of the consumer society. This demanded that families, now father, mother and just two children, moved from the less desirable accommodation inhabited by their parents to better homes. They also developed more sophisticated aspirations, which added social distance to that of geography. With increasing affluence, and better education, families - in any case - became smaller; so they were inevitably less extended than before. Whatever the reason, it became generally accepted that the nuclear family was the new ideal[22].
Now the ‘model’ is changing yet again. Helen Wilkinson - reporting results from the Demos 'Seven Million Project', which is researching the 18-34 year old population (men and women) in the United Kingdom - says that, amongst this group, "...there has been a long-run swing away from traditional concerns for security, authority, rigid moral codes and a belief in the centrality of the family, that dominated the value map a generation ago."[23] Even the, seemingly sacrosanct, nuclear family is splintering[24]. The family is, according to some, under the pressures arising from a number of well-recognised changes in society. Helen Wilkinson again, for instance, reported (in 1994) that "Over half today's 25 year olds have cohabited with a partner compared with 1-2% 25 years ago." [25]
What is rarely discussed, however, is the extent to which the nuclear family itself was an (artificial) construct.[26] Crucially, it depended upon the idea that the only role of the wife in this family was that of home-maker and, in particular, mother; looking after the needs of the (two) children and husband. Where the previous role of women had primarily been to work, often alongside their husbands - with the children looked after by other members of the extended family (especially, the grandmother; in retirement) - the new affluence allowed the luxury of the wife staying at home. There, she took on the role of the servants, who had by then become un-affordable for middle-class families, or emulated it in the lower classes. This concept, of the nuclear family, did not become a widespread model until after the Second World War[27]; when the jobs, which many more women had taken on as part of the war effort, were required for the returning service-men. Even then it still did not apply to the worse-off majority; who simply could not live on a single income.
Although it was then accepted as the natural way of things by my parent's generation, and - to start with - by my own, the new role started to become dispensable when, after the 1950s, home appliances increased their penetration of households. At the same time, the growing pressures of the consumer society meant that most families found they needed ever higher levels of income, which could only come from a second earner. Paralleling this was the growth of the service sector, with its urgent need for part-time female labour - and an offer emerged which few women could resist.
The core structure of the nuclear family, the wife as dedicated home-maker, had thus disappeared long before commentators began to notice any disintegration[28]; less than a generation after the model had become accepted as the natural order of things[29]! In any case, the idea - indeed the romantic ideal - of a perfect match, interest by interest and lifestyle by lifestyle, between two individuals - becomes less and less likely as they progress through the years of ‘marriage’. As this can now add up to more than half a century, and they will each mature in different ways - developing new interests, and new lifestyles - perhaps the reality never lived up to the myth[30]. Perhaps it was just a blip on the long history of the extended family, as it made a more natural transit to a different form[31]. Indeed, if we compare our much criticised modern family lives not with those of the nuclear ideal, but with those implicit in earlier extended families, many of the criticisms - essentially those arising from the idealised values - become much less valid. What is more, the newly emerging ‘extended’ version is now just as likely to comprise the families inherited from previous marriages, step fathers and mothers rather than aunts and uncles[32]. Perhaps this emerging new form of the extended family will ultimately provide the same level of support as the more traditional version. Let us hope so, for the breakdown of the nuclear family has significant consequences for society in general, as well as for the individual[33]; if nothing else such a breakdown undermines many of the myths which recently have come to underpin Western society.
Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the real changes taking place in family life and the widespread media comment on this, only just over half our research groups addressed the issue - though these groups did then identify most of the problems, especially in terms of the breakdown of values. When questioned directly, however, individuals did recognise the probability of the ‘changed marriage expectations’ in the near future (80% rating this likely), though surprisingly they thought this was relatively unimportant (at only 4.2), but even here only 60% expected a widespread breakdown in the family (by 2015), though this was rated only 6.3 in importance.
The changing role of the housewife may be central to this breakdown. Even so, it is not clear, despite the benefit of hindsight, if feminism drove some of the changes leading to the breakdown of the family. Maybe it merely occurred at the same time - driven by much the same forces - and I tend to favour the this view. Whatever the reason, the drive for gender equality - across all parts of society - irretrievably changed the position of women; in the West at least, and by example elsewhere as well. There was ultimately to be no distinction between men and women; which finally destroyed what little was left of the unique, if artificially constructed, position of the mother at the centre of the nuclear family. Even use of the term housewife was to be expunged from polite society (or, at least, from politically correct society); and with it went the, myth, of, the nuclear family.
As it was as much myth as reality, the lamented demise of the nuclear family - and of its values - is possibly less important than at first sight it might appear; though, as a symptom of the changes in society, it may indicate some significant trends - not least the emergence of new, extended family, relationships.
Perhaps one of the most distinctive features of the 21st century may, in general, be the growing power of women. Two thirds of individuals expect gender equality to be global by 2030 - and rate this at 6.2 in importance (once more on the ten point scale) - but only 24% thought ‘female power might dominate’ (and even then only in 2040)[34]. More important, perhaps, a surprisingly high proportion (70%) expected a ‘notable rise in feminine values’ by 2015 - though this was rated only 5.3 in terms of importance. Indeed, I would argue that the most successful new political movement of the last half-century has been that of the feminists. Their impact upon the Western world has been much greater than is appreciated - even by the most earnest of their bra-burners. In many respects they, almost alone, are now setting the truly revolutionary agenda for the future. Helen Wilkinson points out that "Women have been at the forefront of changes [in society]: their values have changed most and have come to define the overall shape of British values." She continues "As a group their values are becoming androgynous: they are much more willing than men to think flexibly about gender roles." On the other hand, it is fair to say that these views - no matter how well grounded in research results - are not yet universally accepted[35].
In view of their historically weak position, in terms of their power to influence the future of society, the dramatic nature of the rise will largely reflect the very low base from which it is starting. Although I have, in my time, probably promoted almost as many women as men under me, I have only ever reported to two women. In both these case this only happened because I deliberately chose to do so - for I knew they were excellent people managers. Even so, the real shifts in power resulting from the coming changes will have significant impacts on the development of society as a whole, not just women's' position within it[36]. Warren Wagar, for instance, explains one key aspect "Their characteristic leadership style, most often the 'beta' mode of leadership identified by SRI International researchers, focuses on acquiring and wielding power for the good of the organisation rather than for purely personal gain. It will give pacesetting women the edge they need to displace men as the dominant force in the economy and in government."[37]
It is difficult to positively predict what will be the final outcome. It is, though, quite easy to suggest that most women will at last start to fulfil their real potential; and that this potential will be defined by them, not be men. The new individualism gives you, be you man or woman, the power to shape your own future as you want it. The problem is exactly what this potential might be. It will probably take several generations before women can fully escape from the cultural trap which society has set for them. For centuries women have been shaped from childhood by society; it is seen as only natural that they will want to play with dolls, preparing them to be the home-maker. The result is that even women who have managed to break free from the adult stereotype sometimes feel guilty - that they are not fulfilling their natural role as mothers. What should really be seen as their childhood, and adult, models unfortunately is not yet obvious. It clearly is not - despite the strident calls from some of the more aggressive proponents of feminism - to become surrogate men. Maybe it will turn out to be not too different from the softer feminine virtues traditionally described; except that these will now show a much harder edge - reflecting the real power which women now hold.
My own prediction is that the new woman will ultimately end up with an image fairly close to the ‘feminine values’ now being adopted by the whole of society; by all of us, men (grudgingly) as well as women (naturally). These emphasise co-operation rather than competition, with a softness of touch which hides a real grasp of power. Indeed, the real power of the new women will derive from the fact that they are naturally at the heart of the new society; where many men, especially those mindlessly committed to machismo, will be peripheral to it.
It even arguable that, over the next century, the traditional position may be reversed; with women holding marginally more power than men - leading to tensions within some parts of society. As we have seen, one of the basic building blocks of society - the nuclear family, is fragmenting. Where this happens, the one strong tie which remains is that between the mother and her children; legally, and practically, the ex-husband has few rights in this respect. Even where the family does not break down, the position of the mother, as having first claim on the children, has been significantly reinforced by the changes which are taking place.
Now that there is the genuine alternative of divorce, where the law now recognises this as a right in most western countries (a relatively recent development), and there is increased prosperity (backed in many countries by some form of welfare state), this means there is now a real choice for women. They can now consider courses of action which were previously not affordable, and could not be considered even in the most disastrous marriages[38].
The growing power of women will not be limited to their traditional role in the home. Although their recent advances into the world of work have been in lower-paid positions, it is already evident that they will increasingly take on their male counterparts for the best jobs - especially those in the lower levels of management. Whilst they may yet be held back by the traditional barriers to their progress - the infamous glass ceilings - they will ultimately crash through these in ever-larger numbers, as the 21st century progresses.
Indeed, it is arguable that they are now better placed than men to answer the new challenges to management posed by the changing environment. The evidence is that on average women are more intelligent than men (at least in terms of measured IQ, whatever that might mean[39]), albeit marginally so, and this is an important factor in the new knowledge industries. This effect is magnified by the fact that girls are more willing than boys to devote their energies to basic education; where the latter often under-achieve in their teens[40]. The net effect is that women leave education, and enter the work-force, with better track-records[41]; and are accordingly more attractive as employees - especially as potential high-flyers[42]. Further, in the new atmosphere of management, where co-operation rather than competition will be wanted, their traditionally less aggressive approach will also tend to make them better managers than their male counterparts[43]. I suspect that the reduced levels of aggression, which may ensue, will be better for all of us; for men just as much as for women.
It is likely, therefore, that there will be a growing proportion of women managers - eventually, perhaps, leading to more female than male managers in some sectors; possibly even leading them to a majority, overall, amongst junior and middle management. This will inevitably result in some tensions with the male managers who see their positions being weakened; and their career prospects destroyed - where, in any case, the total number of junior management positions is decreasing as self-management is emphasised.
It is not clear how such tensions may be resolved. Perhaps we will see the status of junior management decline, and that of the remaining male bastions of power - such as high-level professionals - grow.
The last management roles to succumb are likely to be those in senior management. There may be some justification for this where the argument on IQ is reversed; the distribution curve for male IQ is broader than that for women, so there are proportionately more men with a high IQ (and proportionately more with a low IQ, another blow to the male under-classes). Perhaps more important is the belief - held by the combatants at least - that higher management positions demand more aggression than women tend to deploy. This is certainly the case at the moment and my own experience in senior management, across a number of industries, confirms this; though whether this is a good thing , and whether it will still remain so in the longer term, is an altogether different question! Above all, though, the establishment, which is predominantly male (and proud of it), is likely to close ranks; thus creating tensions amongst women managers, growing to a majority at the lower levels, who are excluded by this very high level glass ceiling[44].
As a footnote, it should be noted that the relative brevity of this section, about women, comes about because, for once, the issues are clear cut; and, in terms of future development quite predictable. It should not be seen as reflecting any lesser importance for these topics - the importance of the growth in power, and especially of influence, held by women in the 21st century cannot be overestimated!
So far I have not addressed the problems traditionally encountered by the other minorities; even though these have seemed, over recent decades, to offer one of the greatest threats to global stability. These many minorities have long been persecuted for their religious differences, or for their racial origins - or just the colour of their skin. Discrimination in general, and racism in particular, have disfigured societies around the world - and led to the deaths of millions and suffering for many millions more; hence the historical expectation that such racial tensions might continue for ever. It would be foolish to say that these problems will disappear overnight. Bosnia and Ruanda indicate just how serious these may become locally, and Northern Ireland shows how they can last for centuries.
Yet, surprisingly, the evidence is that the stresses which lead to the worst excesses seem to be reducing; apart from the growth of fundamentalism, our groups placed no significant emphasis on specifically ethnic problems. It is worth noting that most of the current crop of problems which are supposedly ‘ethnic’ in nature, are in fact most closely associated with a history of ‘colonial’ exploitation; the English in Ireland, the French in Ruanda and Algeria, both the USSR and the US in Somalia. The race or clan, or religious, excuse has - in these cases - often been cynically used, by both the external powers and the local leaders, to justify continuing sectarian domination. It is not surprising, therefore, that those disadvantaged in this way would - given the chance - wish to overturn their oppressors. Indeed, possibly the main reason for the resulting stresses breaking out in violence at this point in time is that the Cold War, which indirectly funded many of these episodes of exploitation, is now over. The covert forces of the USSR and the US no longer need to buy allies in this way - and, without their support, the local regimes are at last being forced to, literally, come to terms with those who they have previously suppressed with impunity.
The one remaining danger is that the Western allies, especially the US, feel that they must intervene; and in the process once more bring their own conflicts into the process. The more they get involved - in Bosnia, for instance - the worse the problems become; as their own remote equivocation gets the better of local diplomacy. My own personal experience, in Ethiopia, was that - given the right level of support - the (quick) local solutions are by far the best. I was the go-between for the Western ambassadors, and the government there, when the civil war flared up again; with something like 100,000 troops fighting each other - far more than in Bosnia, say. Yet I was able to satisfactorily resolve the matter in less than three weeks. The key was that the Western ambassadors agreed to keep their governments out! Indeed, the real key was their brief to me that their governments should not even be aware of what was happening! The real success, therefore, lay in the fact that you have never heard about this war, where you will still be very aware of that smaller conflict - at the same time - in Bosnia!
Thus, the fact that these events are occurring now, no matter how regrettable they are individually, should paradoxically be seen as a hopeful sign. It indicates that the forces of repression are actually being rolled back across the globe; and - if the Western power bloc can avoid the temptation to force its own solutions (and problems) on the participants - we should see fewer and fewer outbreaks in future. More important, within mixed communities the tensions should also reduce. One of the less obvious results of the growth in individualism, and the resulting breakdown of group identities and loyalties, is that differences between such groups will become less evident. They will be seen as just another aspect of the many lifestyles which will flourish. In particular, ethnic lifestyles will no longer be seen as a challenge to the host culture - in many respects there will no longer be any such thing as a single host culture! This amelioration of ethnic tensions will allow such groups to develop their own lifestyles unhindered - even if this does result in a voluntary form of ghettoisation. On the other hand, it will, eventually, also dilute such ethnic groups; as their members - no longer motivated by shared adversity - are in turn infected with the desire to develop as individuals. The result will be a new form of cultural absorption; one which is potentially much more positive in nature, since its converts will be free for once to take the best of their ethnic culture into the new melting pot with them.
The most surprising revelation, even to me (where I was one of the founders of the anti-apartheid movement), is that racial (and religious) divisions can now be largely discounted as major features affecting the future of society. As little as a decade ago, such thoughts would have been inconceivable, and even now many politicians - especially those at work in the worst trouble-spots - still live in that past. But, the most important point of all is the remarkable speed with which even such seemingly irreconcilable differences can now be overtaken by events. The breakdown of group identities, and with them the disappearance of many group loyalties, may prove to be an even more important force for change than we have allowed for. So far, indeed, we - and especially our politicians - have only talked about the problems this is causing. Perhaps we should instead look at some of the major opportunities it offers. A world without racism will surely be a better one.
Racial and (purely) religious divisions can now be largely discounted as major features affecting the long term future of society.
Of course, on the global scale, by far the biggest group of underprivileged now are located in the developing world. As an aside, it is worth noting the change in terminology itself. These nations used to be collectively known as the Third World, a term I still prefer to use - since it nicely conveys the historical attitudes which still can be important in understanding Western approaches. The implication, then, was that these benighted nations were consigned - by history - to be forever excluded from any of the riches the West enjoyed. Now, as developing countries, it is assumed that they are already on the ladder of development - no matter how low is the rung they occupy - and will ultimately enter the club of developed nations; at a speed which, even now, surprises me. Indeed, the accelerating pace of development is quite startling. Britain needed more than half the nineteenth century to double its real income per head; as did America. Japan took the first third of the twentieth century. But South Korea and, more recently still, China have done it - on the grandest scale possible - in a decade. We may thus see most of the Third World becoming relatively prosperous in much less than our lifetime.
In this context, the really big change in the distribution of global wealth, and power, will be the emergence of these ' Third World' states - to ultimately become the dominant economic and political force. It has long been claimed that there should be a convergence between nations. Quite simply, the poorest - with more to gain - will naturally grow faster than the richest; and the gap between them will narrow[45]. In practice this has not happened, until recently, not least because of deliberate destabilisation; by, for example, the CIA and the KGB - but also by their Israeli and South African counterparts. This was one particularly regrettable aspect of the Cold War which significantly undermined the progress of the poorest nations. Now, however, this convergence is being observed.
Above all, though, is now basically a matter of demographics. I have already discussed the changed expectations, in terms of both political and consumer power, created by the much promoted, Western, concept of ‘one man one vote’; and the impact of these new expectations amongst Third World populations should not be underestimated. Unfortunately, as yet, few in the 'West' have even considered that their own days as 'top dogs' are numbered, and even fewer - if any - have worked out strategies to deal with this sea-change. The reality, when it arrives over the next few decades, may come as a considerable shock to many of its leaders. Though it is unlikely to affect our comfortable standard of living, it may come as a shock to us personally. It will undermine the pride we still have in our nation. You have only to watch the crowds at international sporting events, not least at the Olympic Games which are supposed to celebrate the universal virtues of sport, to see that flag waving still has a very emotional appeal! I suspect that even you may find a tear in your own eye when the local hero wins!
The Pacific Rim countries have already made their dash for growth, to emerge as major challengers, in economic terms at least, to the 'West'. For instance, China’s Guangdong province, helped by Hong Kong management, finance, technology and marketing has achieved an average annual real growth rate - over the past quarter century - of more than 12 per cent. The South American countries also seem to be some way along the same road; now that the US has reduced its destabilisation campaigns in the region - and, with the creation of NAFTA, is making encouraging noises. This leaves Africa, which is only now starting its own climb out of the abyss; and still seems, at times, perilously close to falling back into it. Of its two main potential economic super-powers, South Africa is, at long last, on its way to full economic development, The other, Nigeria - which is potentially by far the richest on the continent - is, if not quite in a state of civil war, still tearing itself apart economically and politically. When both these governments get their act together, Africa - too - will become a powerhouse of change.
We will see, in a later chapter, just how momentous these changes will be on the global political scene. Here, though, I will conclude this brief section with the observation that this particular aspect of income redistribution will have by far the greatest impact on the world as a whole. Western politicians continue to ignore developments in the Third World, but increasingly they do so at their peril. If there are to be ten billion worthwhile consumers by the early part of the 21st century, rather than the one billion the West now addresses, those in charge of the various Western economies - and those in charge of their multinationals - had better allow for this fact before the twentieth century ends. Only 40% of our individuals, for instance, thought that the Third World might eventually come to dominate politics, by 2025, rating this only 5.0 in importance.
The Third World has, significantly, become the developing world.
In summary, then, 21st century society will offer a much better environment for individuals to flourish. As we saw in previous chapters, it will certainly provide a richer base from which all individuals can develop their full potential. It will also be a much less divided world. But this will come about not because of any ethical considerations, but because the have-nots, especially women, will grasp the power their numbers justify. In the process the rich will, reluctantly, come to accept - and proclaim - the virtues of such fair treatment; not least because they will fear that, as the new minority they will in turn become the subjects of revenge - as have members of the establishment in previous revolutions. In this they will probably be wrong. A new spirit of co-operation, the most obvious sign of the feminisation of society, will be extended to them too. It will, thus, be a world which is based on much more acceptable values, as well as a richer one. At long last, we will be able to have our cake and share it with others - and will probably enjoy the added glow of self-respect that this will bring! Even so, the philosophy of individual empowerment is likely to be the greatest force for change in the next Millennium. Indeed, the essence of post-modernism, which is supposed to encapsulate these changes, now seems revolve around the developing freedom of the individual to create his or her own lifestyle(s) - without regard to the groups which would traditionally have exerted (cultural) control over them. Related to this issue, in terms of the new resources individuals will need to have available to them, basic education will soon extend - world-wide - to on-going, life-long education. This will be especially important where, in changing times, those workers who are not trained to meet the changed needs will be unemployed.
[1] Naisbitt & Aburdene[c]
[2] Rolf Jensen
[3] Karl Steinmuller
[4] The Dutch Central Planning Bureau
[5] Stewart Lansley
[6] Davidson and Rees-Mogg
[7] Charles Leadbeater[b
[8] Hutton & Kay
[9] Shahid Shahidullah, Zygmunt Bauman[b]
[10] Firat (et al), Stewart Lansley, Bernice Martin, Dick Hebdige
[11] Václav Havel
[12] Firat et al
[13] Charles Handy
[14] John Kotter
[15] Leadbeater & Mulgan[b]
[16] Leadbeater & Mulgan[b]
[17] Michael Connors
[18] Amin Rajan
[19] Spyros Makridakis
[20] Faith Popcorn
[21] The Copenhagen Institute of Future Studies
[22] Dick Atkinson, Faith Popcorn, The Copenhagen Institute of Future Studies
[23] The Economist[u], quoting the 1996-97 British Social Attitudes Survey
[24] Polly Toynbee
[25] The Economist[α]
[26] Polly Toynbee
[27] The Copenhagen Institute of Future
[28] The Copenhagen Institute of Future Studies
[29] Stevens & Michalski, Jim Northcott, Dick Atkinson
[30] Joseph Coates[c]
[31] Kurian & Molitor
[32] Joseph Coates[c]
[33] McGlone & Cronin
[34] Shirley Burggraf
[35] John Petersen
[36] McCorduck & Ramsey, Elizabeth Nickle
[37] Helen Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Mulgan
[38] Peter Drucker[b], Polly Toynbee
[39] Daniel Goleman, quoted by Alan Farnham, Howard Gardner (as reported by Karen Pennar)
[40] The Economist [r]
[41] Wilkinson & Mulgan
[42] The Economist [r]
[43] Mary Bateson
[44] The Economist[v]
[45] Michael Connors
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