FUTURES RESEARCH

6035 Chapter 8 - A Shared World

The third part of the book looks at how changes will affect the world as a whole. In particular, it looks at how the 'unlimited' resources may be - and ultimately will be - shared more equitably, to the benefit of all and the greater safety of the whole of humanity. Like the chapters which have gone before, it is generally optimistic; and like the chapters on technology, it describes an incremental future - the trends are already there to be seen. There is, as a result, more certainty in terms of the outcomes; though most of the politicians in the West are as yet blind to these certainties!

Development across the globe as a whole, not just in the West, is proceeding at a rapid pace; but in ways which have not been widely predicted. For most commentators, globalisation has been seen as an important process applying only to developed countries; and most particularly to the 'Triad' - Kenichae Ohmae's categorisation of the US, Japan and Europe. Indeed, most futurists seem to have been seduced by the excitement of the technological developments in the first world. If they do comment on the Third World, and few do, it is usually to commiserate with its inhabitants on their dismal circumstances; and the lack of any positive future for them. In this respect, at least, these futurists could not be more wrong!

Perhaps following the lead given by the media, rather less than half our groups commented specifically upon the  process of globalisation itself - and then usually in general terms - but 90% of individuals thought that globalisation of business would be complete within two decades (though only 55% expected to see a global economy overall - and then not before 2030). The difference the reports in the media are missing, in terms of developments in the 21st century, is that the process will extend to the more than 80% of the world's population, currently in the Third World, which has previously been excluded. The majority of humankind, who are at present barred from the benefits available to those in the First World, will catch up rapidly. More important, by sheer numbers they will come to dominate economic and political developments. The prime driver, in this case, will simply be the size of their populations; where one man one vote now carries as much weight in terms of consumption as in politics! This seems to have been overlooked by most governments - until recently the EU did not even have a policy for Africa, the piece of the Third World effectively on its own door-step - but, somewhat to our surprise, it was well recognised by those lesser mortals taking part in our research!

Above all it will come to represent the ending of the hegemony of the western nations - the very opposite of most predictions! But, in reducing inequality and vastly enriching many nations, it will improve the lot of everyone around the world; including those in the western nations - the gains in international trade will further enrich even those who might otherwise fear it would be to their disadvantage.

As a result of these changes around the world, and impacts of the IT and Communications Revolutions closer to home, the multinationals - the main beneficiaries of the earlier stages of the process of globalisation - will no longer continue to make gains in the way that most pundits are also forecasting. The economies of scale, even those applying to finance and marketing which have favoured these multinationals in recent years, may no longer apply in the same way. The corporate planners in the multinationals who have examined the problem have come to the conclusion that, in the information society, there will be little or no advantage accruing to size[1]. Indeed, the sitting tenants may even be threatened by new entrants taking advantage of the changed conditions.

The bases for national, country, advantage will also shift; offering significant opportunities to the emerging nations - which are building their developments on 'greenfield' sites - and posing major challenges to the developed ones, and to the organisations operating out of them.

During the transition to the new order, before the stability it will offer finally arrives, these processes will sometimes be confusing, and painful, not least for those in the developed world - but the final outcome will benefit all, including those seeming to lose in the short term.

The global society of the 21st century will, at last, include those currently in the Third World and - within three decades - will be dominated by them.

The current leaders in the globalisation process - nations and organisations - will not necessarily benefit immediately from the new forms arising in the 21st century. Indeed, during the transition they may found the processes confusing and painful. But all humanity will eventually benefit.

demographics

The basics of overall population growth - which will drive these changes - are well recognised, and feared, by most politicians and media commentators. Just over half our groups and four fifths of our individual respondents, for instance, saw overpopulation as an issue for the future as well as for the present. The evidence is there for all to see[2]. On the other hand, a similar number of groups (and also half the individuals) warned about declining populations in the future - albeit usually in the context of decimation by diseases such as AIDS. In terms of future projections, The world's population (starting at nearly six billion in the mid 1990s) is likely to reach between 8 and 12 billion (most probably 10 billion) by 2025[3].

The unspoken corollary, which has been around for some 200 years since Thomas Malthus published his 'Essay on the Principle of Population', is that starvation will soon sweep the world; and, indeed, just over half our individuals expect famine to occur (by 2030) after crops fail (before 2020) - and understandably they rate it (at 8.0) one of the most important issues[4]. The counter-argument is, of course, that it simply hasn't happened - even after two. Even so, the latest projections, however, can look alarming; and the fastest growth is occurring in the Third World - with dramatic impacts where it can be least sustained.

It is for this reason that there has been so much emphasis on population control in general, and on contraception in particular - to the great consternation of the Vatican! Three quarters of our individual respondents expect world-wide population control to be in place by 2030; placing an importance level of 7.7 on this. In fact - again according to Geoffrey Lean - the world-wide rate of population increase has in fact been falling since the early Seventies, from more than 2 per cent annually to about 1.5 per cent. This is in part due to contraception, where he reports "More than half of Third World women of childbearing age now use it, up from a fifth in 1960" - a little known success story which surprises most westerners when they learn of it. But he continues, to make the important point "...contraception only comes into its own when parents cease to want big families. In poor societies there are good reasons for lots of children. They are economic assets, doing useful work for the family from the age of six or seven...They provide security in old age [something many westerners might now envy!]." Geoffrey Lean highlights the problem with an anecdote "...when early campaigners in India put up posters contrasting a happy family with two children with a miserable one with six, they found that people came flocking to them to discover how to become like the larger family."

It is necessary, therefore, for contraception to go hand in hand with development and - in particular - education (especially of women). Surprisingly, however, only a quarter of our general groups put any priority on contraception; though, as reported above, three quarters of individuals did - as did more than half of our expert groups did.

The wider availability of contraception will help control population growth, but the improved education of women may contribute more to this process In any case, limiting populations may not be quite as important for the future of humanity as is often claimed by the neo-Malthusians.

resource growth

In fact, Third World food resources may still be capable of more dynamic growth than even the optimists allow for[5]. As one specific example of what might be achieved, Fred Pearce counters the "...dogma [which] holds that [even] desert margins have a fixed 'carrying capacity'" by pointing out that in Nigeria and Kenya "...the opposite has happened. Rapidly increasing populations emerge from these studies as saviours of the landscape..."  Robert Paarlberg also explains that, contrary to popular opinion, farmers do look to the longer term "Hill farmers in some of the poorest countries in Africa have constructed terracing systems and have maintained those systems for hundreds of years."  One of my most memorable experiences was watching a dam being built, in the hills of East Africa miles from the nearest road, by literally thousands of villagers - building it literally with their bare hands. 

Paarlberg  also describes the success of the green revolution "By switching to highly responsive seeds, more fertiliser use and expanded irrigation, India was able to double its total wheat production between the years of 1964/65 and 1970/71."  On the other hand, there are now widespread doubts about the sustainability of the green revolution[6]. Francesco Bray reports, for instance, that "…Monoculture reduces diversity. Large-scale mechanized operations hasten soil erosion..." On the other hand, Robert Paarlberg's is  "Agricultural resource abuse in developing countries reflects power abuse. It grows out of unbalanced power relations among farmers, between farmers and nonfarmers, or between farmers and their own governments." My own experience in Ethiopia largely supports this position. Poverty is, to a great extent, the result of political decisions[7]. Even so, only just over half our individuals thought that there might be ‘food for all’ by 2035 (rating it 5.8).

In any case, mass food production may in future become a factory process; with genetically engineered cells grown in vats[8] - perhaps on artificial islands making use of the three-quarters of the Earth's surface (the oceans) currently under-used. The limits to growth would then be greatly extended; and three quarters of individuals thought use of food substitutes will be widespread by 2030, with a similar proportion believing that vegetarianism will be popular within the next decade or so.

Growth of the basic, food resources in the third world may not be as limited as some pessimists would predict.

Peace

It may not be obvious from the newspaper headlines, but the world as a whole is a significantly more peaceful place than it has been for almost a century. What is more, this peace is generally the result of civilised behaviour between equals; between nation-states which recognise each other's rights, rather than one imposed by the superpowers - as the long peace during the nineteenth century was. As such it should remain; as an even more stable, and enduring, feature[9].

The future of humankind is not, though, automatically guaranteed. Therefore the desire of our research groups to get into space, as one means of obtaining that guarantee, is not unrealistic. There are still thousands of nuclear warheads held ready for use or in arsenals and these all still represent an omnipresent threat - especially those in the increasingly unstable constituent parts of Russia and, almost as dangerously, those in the United States. It only requires one finger to stray and humankind might be thrown back to the dark ages. Our participants worried, in particular, about the proliferation of nations with nuclear capacity. More than two thirds of our individual respondents believe that there will be risky nuclear proliferation before 2020 (and, understandably, rate this development at the high, 8.0, level). Lee Kuan Yew - ex-prime-minister of Singapore - even suggests that Japan may eventually abandon its opposition and join the nuclear club[10].

On the other hand, the reduction in arms, especially those in the old USSR, may mean that the this would no longer result in the whole of humanity being destroyed in a mass exchange of nuclear weapons; and, indeed, only a quarter of individuals consider nuclear war is now a real possibility. The nuclear threat, which has hung over the world since the middle of the 20th century, is now much reduced. Not least, the break up of the old Soviet block has inserted an effectively neutral buffer zone across the middle of Europe - removing the traditional trigger points for conflict between NATO (to which a number of the key nations will soon belong) and Russia. Not only that, but global conflict is now also almost totally absent; of the recent wars, only a handful have even been between nations, where most have been civil wars within nations.

That having been said, the end of the 20th century and the first decades of the next, will be a period of transition - with all the accompanying uncertainties. Global peace has arrived, and a peace dividend is expected, but all the military machines are still in place, and it would be unrealistic to expect them to be dismantled in just a few months. The problems will be resolved over a decade or so; but, until that happens, tensions will emerge from time to time - as the old strategies, and deployments, fail to match the new realities[11]. It is important to note, though, that the saving grace of the on-going improvements in efficiency which are now the focus of the arms race represent a welcome move away from weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction.

In global terms, at least, the world is now more peaceful than it has been for a century, and much safer from nuclear destruction than it ever has been since the dawn of the atomic age. The best assumption is that it will become ever more peaceful - with very few wars between nations.

Global peace has caught the military-industrial complexes of the major nations on the hop. Their strategies are no longer viable. This problem will, over a decade or so, eventually be resolved; but, in the meantime, the mismatches will occasionally result in tensions.

Local difficulties

In the short term, however, the number of small wars - within countries not between them - has escalated[12]. This is probably, in part at least, due to the prospect of freedom which has been dangled in front of them by the spectacular collapse of the USSR. In the main, however, this has probably resulted from the release of the pressures, on supposedly independent nations, which were previously applied by the superpowers as an integral part of the Cold War, where both superpowers had their list of client governments. When the end of the Cold War removed the need to underwrite the stability of these client governments, the position of these became much less tenable.

global guerrillas

The technologies now available to dissidents are awesome in potential - including nuclear weapons and germ warfare. Marvin Cetron[b] predicts that "The next 15 years may well be the age of superterrorism, when they gain access to weapons of mass destruction and show more willingness to use them. Tomorrow's most dangerous terrorists …will not [want] political control but the utter destruction of their chosen enemies" This prediction was made before the nerve-gas attack in Japan showed just how easy it was to acquire such weapons[13]. Though only just over half our individuals consider it likely that terrorism will become widespread, we have to hope that the organisation which is necessary to use these weapons on a global scale remains missing; and that 'criminal terrorists' do not start to use this form of blackmail against large corporations and government. Perhaps the most important, and frightening, aspect is that described by Davidson & Rees-Mogg "A terrorist is unlikely to be deterred from employing weapons of mass destruction by the threat of massive retaliation." It was such a counter-threat which maintained the balance, and the peace, during the time of the Cold War - but this logic does not impress the isolated terrorist to the same extent!

Most important, globalisation will enable dissident groups - including terrorists and guerrillas - to gain support, and operational resources, almost anywhere on the globe. This will, of course, make such groups harder to track, and control; and their actions may become that much more theatrical - and correspondingly destructive of human life. As a reaction, an effective global anti-terrorist police network is likely to be created within the next decade - and the power this obtains may cause disquiet in some more liberal quarters, perhaps even in turn reinforcing the legitimacy of the terrorist groups.

destabilisation

From the other end of the spectrum, though often posing as genuine guerrillas, the Cold War saw the emergence of large-scale covert actions by the super-powers - especially by the US - aimed at supporting (small) groups opposing 'hostile' governments, or undermining those opposed to 'friendly' ones and especially in destabilising countries which might give succour to the latter groups. In particular, guerrilla groups were extensively supported; often with the aim of destroying a country's economy, rather than gaining the outright victory which they were not in a position to achieve. Angola and Mozambique had their economies destroyed by South Africa - with covert US help, though these countries themselves in turn became pawns of the USSR. The Lebanon was destroyed by Israel, and Syria - each sustained by a different super-power - as was Afghanistan by Pakistan (once more with the help of the CIA). Perhaps most cynically of all, Somalia accepted arms from the USSR for its invasion of Ethiopia, only to find that the USSR then armed Ethiopia itself - so Somalia turned to the US for its next tranche of weapons.

The majority of these destabilisation campaigns have now ended, but their effects linger on. When, over several decades, you have persuaded factions within a country to hate each other - and have then given them the arms to turn that hate into action - it is naive to expect the situation to stabilise as soon as you change your mind. In general, though, the scale of destabilisation has decreased - and will continue to do so - but it will still be deployed by countries which feel threatened or unfairly treated - such as Israel in Lebanon and Pakistan in Kashmir - with a similarly long-term effects.

The recent surge in civil wars is probably a function of the release of pressures - previously applied by the superpowers to their client governments - following the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the number of such small wars should, slowly, subside.

Global terrorists and guerrillas will have awesome technologies at their disposal, and will  be harder to find and to fight. As a result global anti-terrorist measures may be introduced, which may become oppressive in nature.

Many of the instabilities amongst the smaller nations in the Third World are the legacy of covert destabilisation operations by the super-powers. The scale of such operations has now significantly reduced - though they are still being used by some smaller powers - but their legacy of inherent instability may run for a generation or more.

global (US) culture

The main practical impact of globalism (as opposed to globalisation) has so far been on culture; though less than a third of individuals expect to see a single culture (and even then not before 2040). In practice, whilst the emerging world culture borrows elements from a wide variety of national cultures, it is  above all an American culture; and, especially, a Californian one. As a result, half the world wants to live in down-town Los Angeles - or, at the very least, to imitate its supposed lifestyles. Those of us who have actually visited LA will appreciate the delicious irony of this; for all but those who have been able to retreat into the ghettos of the rich LA is, in reality, one of the most disagreeable cities in the world.

Needless to say, this is not the image conveyed by the Hollywood studios. With satellite television now girdling the world - you see receiving dishes in even the remotest Nepalese villages - its voice has become the major influence in the global integration of culture which is already under way. This basic message is reinforced by the actions of the multi-nationals, whose products and services typically incorporate the same messages. Coca Cola and McDonalds, amongst others, have brought the American dream to nations around the world. Little of this is deliberate; which makes the process that much more insidious - and potent! The brainwashing is not merely voluntary, but is actively demanded by the victims[14].

On the positive side, though, people around the world are now coming to share a common view of the coming world culture; and this knowledge helps to reduce potential conflicts between competing systems. Unfortunately, the process is still essentially a colonial one - US culture is replacing indigenous ones in exactly the same way as the British Empire forced its ways on its colonies. The richness of the national cultures is lost and the global version - so dominated by the all-powerful US culture - is not even enriched by this contact. Further, the model contained in this (US) culture is also now outdated; being based on the family structures, and consumer culture values, of the 1950s.

The social changes now under way, in the developed countries if not as yet in the Third World, call for totally different social structures in general, and family structures in particular. There is no longer just one perfect way of life; one happy family. Instead there are many competing lifestyles, each of which may be just as valid for those individuals who adopt it - which is the antithesis of the Hollywood nuclear family myth. Whatever its limitations, however, there are as yet no other widely accepted models aspiring to become the global culture[15] - apart from those based on religions, preached with missionary fervour by their adherents.

localism

An Economist[d] editorial puts on the record the widespread view that "The cliché of the information age is that instantaneous global telecommunications, television and computer networks, will soon overthrow the ancient tyrannies of time and space". On the other hand, it goes on to point out "...geography still matters,  and to say "... such developments have made hardly a dent in the way people think and feel about things. Look, for example, at newspapers or news broadcasts anywhere on earth , and you find them overwhelmingly dominated by stories about what is going on in the vicinity of their place of publication."  Certainly, this reflects my own experience. On my travels, I have often tuned into the local television news and, especially in the Third World, have been astounded by the parochial nature of the coverage; almost literally so, with a concentration on what seemed to be the minutiae of local events to the exclusion of global ones. It was only when I returned, acclimatised by several weeks stay abroad, that - each time - I realised that the BBC was just as parochial, in terms of its domestic channels at least.

The Economist goes on to make yet another telling point "...even the newest industries are [still] obeying the old rule of geographical concentration...all but one of the top 20 American carpet-makers are located in or near the town of Dalton, Georgia; and, before 1930, the American tyre industry consisted almost entirely of the 100 or so firms carrying on that business in Akron, Ohio. This is why the world got Silicon Valley in a short and narrow strip in California in the 1960s. It is also why tradable services stay surprisingly concentrated  - futures trading (in Chicago), insurance (Hartford, Connecticut), movies (Los Angeles) and currency trading (London). Making general point about (electronic) communications, they add "The most advanced use so far of Internet has not been to found a global village but to strengthen the local business and social ties among people and companies in the heart of Silicon Valley." We, ourselves, have reported that the most successful users of computer conferencing are (so far at least) those who also meet face-to-face; the people who should need the service least![16]

A global culture has already emerged, in terms of the middle-classes world-wide, and almost all classes in the developed world. This is, however, based upon the mythical US - Hollywood - model of the perfect nuclear family (living in an aggressively consumerist culture. This culture is, though, an impoverishing one; and is outdated in terms of the social changes now taking place. It is, however, the only model promoted - and accepted - world-wide.

Despite the impacts of globalism, most issues will still be determined on a local, national basis.

fundamentalism

Perhaps the greatest challenge, in the medium term, to the global culture of Hollywood comes from religious fundamentalism in general, and from Islam "in particular[17]. Half of our individual respondents thought that global religious fundamentalism might be seen by 2020, though rather less thought that - even so - any major power would accrue to Islam. Adopting a rather more positive viewpoint, it is possible to see that these various religions might offer positive (ethical) contributions to a combined culture; where the greatest weakness of the Hollywood version is its grounding in the vacuous ethics of the consumer culture at its. The Islamic approach to business, with its emphasis on the rights of the community, may for instance provide an antidote to the pure worship of Mammon; especially where we are moving to an age of co-operation. In this - very positive - context, fundamentalism could be seen, at one level, to be a valuable antidote to the trivialism and unreality of the Hollywood culture.

As yet, though, much of fundamentalism - especially the Islamic variety - does not just seek to modify the overall culture - but to overthrow it. In addition, for the mass of its followers as opposed to its (often fanatical) religious leaders,  it is frequently motivated by a reaction against Western (US) imperialism[18]. Thus, it often offers a more powerful, and more rigorous, basis for nationalism than mere patriotism - at a time where national patriotism (as opposed to ethnic or tribal versions, which offer another focus) is on the wane. It is, literally, a God-sent opportunity for some emerging nations which have no other easy alternatives. It is paradoxical - in terms of the 'fundamentalist' explanation - that the country which is often seen to be the greatest threat, Iran, has a modern constitution; one not based totally in Islamic readings.  In fact, it is more likely to come from Algeria[19] - largely ignored by the western media (outside of France) - though it should be noted that its is one of the few countries where the underlying struggle is one between classes - the underclasses, an oppressed majority, are Islamic!

This does not mean we can ignore Islam since, in a world largely devoid of meaningful ideology, the one group which definitely has retained - and developed - its identity is indeed that of the members of the Islamic faith[20]. The Islamic religion delivers a very strong core message, powerfully delivered as a certainty - the very word of God written down by Mohammad; which over recent centuries has been reinforced in many of its adherents by centuries of repression - typically by the West. Indeed, its growing political power may come from the fact that it is the only major ideology remaining intact (and vibrant) and certainly the only one to champion the rights of the oppressed in the regions from which its power derives. But Islam should not be seen as the new enemy. Indeed, the senior managers in multinationals operating in the Islamic countries, with whom we have discussed the issue, have expressly stated to us that it is definitely not a threat. In particular, they warn that we - in the West - are creating false enemies; which then can become real ones.

ISLAM

Like any other modern religion, which much of Islam is struggling to become, there are many different approaches within its boundaries; and the West ignores these differences between the various parts of the Islamic world at its peril. The one major danger which Brian Beedham [b] sees is that "...most Muslims are still willing to leave interpretation to the little band of self-appointed experts.."  It is the bleak, religious conservatism of this small group of isolated (male) religious fanatics to which the secular west objects; its own similar fanatics of previous times - remember the Salem witch trials - have long since been forgotten[21]. On the positive side of the equation, Islamic economists would point to the moral superiority of concepts such as 'zakat', the word for charity by which rich men improve themselves by giving to the poor[22]. This economic morality also extends to 'riba'; which is generally seen as an alternative to interest and which is banned - in much the same way as Christians approached the problem when usury was prohibited. The result is that Muslim bankers have been forced to develop devices which get round this ban. One solution, known as 'madaraba', is significantly different from practices in the West. It requires the bank to in effect buy shares in the company borrowing money. If it performs well the bank gets an agreed share of profits; but if it fails the bank also loses. This is too often true, literally by default, in the West; as a bankrupt company defaults on its loans. The Islamic approach, though, formalises the shared risk. The most important practical point is that this is a principle which applies to all such loans. Japanese banks have long had cosy relations with their favoured customers, which is often claimed to be one reason for Japan's success, but these are voluntary; where madaraba is, in effect, compulsory.

Christian fundamentalists

Putting another spin on the issue, Henry Louis Gates also suggests, for instance, that "...growth of Islam will fortify the side of faith - the side with which many cultural conservatives in the West have allied themselves. In this sense, the Muslim from South Asia or the Maghreb has more in common with his God-fearing Christian opposite from the Home Counties than with his secular counterpart."  In more general terms, Brian Beedham[b], again, highlights the many points on which Islam and Christianity agree; not least on a single God and individual responsibility. In the short term, at least, it may indeed be the Western Christian fundamentalist sects which pose the real threat of anarchy - albeit on a very local scale - as they adopt the Millennium as the likely date for Armageddon. Ted Daniels - editor of the Millennial Prophecy Report, quoted by Simon Hatterstone in The Guardian - estimates that "...there are around 350 American organizations that predict the millennium will bring some form of Armageddon". More alarmingly, some of them, such as the Sons of God, seem to even think it is their God-given role to create Armageddon themselves! This view was reflected by some of our own groups which suggested, for instance, that the 'second coming of Christ' should be added to their lists - and, as a Newsweek survey in 1994 reported, 61% of Americans still believe in the literal truth of the bible that Jesus will return to Earth. In view of the increasing instability of the US as a whole this cannot be discounted as an indirect force on the future.

Even so, less than half our individuals foresaw a resurgence of mass religion, and less than two fifths thought major new religions might emerge[23]. But almost all our groups (especially the experts) were worried about religious fundamentalismXE "religious fundamentalism" XE "fundamentalism "in general, and Islamic FundamentalismXE "Islamic Fundamentalism" in particular.[24].

In the political context, fundamentalism - especially that espoused by some fanatical Islamic groups - can perhaps be best seen as a reaction against the inequalities arising from Western imperialism. It offers more power, and righteousness, than mere nationalism. It may spread, as the reaction against such inequalities grows, unless the developed nations address the disease of inequality rather than the symptoms of the jihad it provokes.

Islam will be a major force; but not for the evil which some Western leaders would have us believe.

It might be possible to obtain the best of both worlds, Islamic and Western - especially in terms of financial activities, if we do not overreact to the imaginary threats.

Fundamentalism in general is seen to pose a threat, but the greatest threat of anarchy may appear from Christian, rather than Islamic fundamentalists; though it is likely to be confined to regions rather than spread globally - unless cross-border, and cross-religion, 'holy' alliances develop.

Global Diffusion

A rather different aspect of global developments is demonstrated in the dramatically increased speed of diffusion of new products and, especially, of ideas. Thus, knowledge of an important new product innovation may travel around the world in a matter of weeks and copies can be on the market within a month or so; crudely pirated or, with more sophistication, reverse engineered to avoid the new laws of intellectual property. Before this reduction in timescales product developers could test - and debug - a product in their home market, and then gradually introduce it world-wide. Now they have to launch immediately on a global basis if they are to gain the full profit from their innovation. Such global launches are, though, very expensive; and the risks are high - as Intel found with a bug in its initial Pentium chip, which cost it hundreds of millions of dollars to rectify around the world. Indeed, the international, multi-national, players now have to be very well-heeled. They increasingly protect their investment - their position in the market - by branding ('Intel Inside', for instance) which is more difficult to bypass, rather than by pure innovation.

This increased speed of diffusion does, however, offer much greater opportunities to suppliers in less developed nations; where the investment now needed can be that much lower, and the multi-nationals have less incentive to protect their rights. Where a large scale integrated steel plant - in which such nations invested in the 1970s - might have cost tens of billions of dollars, production of even quite sophisticated software might now cost only a few millions.

Perhaps even more important is the speed of diffusion of ideas. If changing the overall global culture is problematic, individual ideas can develop a global potency almost overnight. Thus, the agents of social change, perhaps even revolutionaries, can rapidly learn from developments on the other side of the world. Where Marxian ideas took decades to disseminate, similar developments can now hit the headlines in as many hours. As one example, terrorist tactics may now be global; though, fortunately as yet, few terrorist organisations are. The emergence, though, of such organisations (especially those relating to the most emotive single issues, such as Greenpeace) which operate across national boundaries is a development with which the international organisations are, as yet, remarkably poorly equipped to deal.

At a more universal level, people watch - live on television - the emergence of new philosophies wherever they are first propounded. Possibly the most influential television pictures, delivered live to hundreds of millions of viewers around the world, were those showing the destruction of the Berlin Wall - which took place before even the political leaders in the Kremlin realised it was happening! This delivered, not least, the lesson that even the most authoritarian governments can be defied and overthrown - a lesson which is now being put into practice in many parts of the world outside the former communist bloc.

In this way, new ideas, new social concepts and political philosophies, diffuse very rapidly - without regard for physical distance, or even the social circumstances where they arise or are received. In this sense, at least, the global village is now open to all ideas - only their intrinsic power as ideas now matters. In this vein, it was reported by some of the participants in the Rio summit on the environment, with whom we have since talked, that Greenpeace carried more weight than most nations!

Diffusion of new products and, especially, new ideas has now become much more rapid - in effect instantaneous - and the subsequent investment needed for their exploitation locally much lower. As a result, inequalities around the world may be ironed out much faster than expected. In particular, though, powerful new ideas - social concepts and political philosophies - may now develop their global potency within a very short time - in weeks and months rather than in decades - and without regard to distance (either physical or in terms of the social circumstances) between the originators and the exploiters. This may lead to greater cross border alliances on single issues, with the emergence for the first time of some genuinely international terrorist organisations.

global economics

So far, I have had remarkably little to say about the economic forces which are traditionally seen as having major impacts on the future of humanity. This seeming neglect is, not least, because most of those taking part in our research tended - to our surprise - to downgrade the importance of economics, in whatever form, as a primary driver; and half our individuals even thought there would be a change from market forces as the major economic driver. The groups, indeed, indicated that - as a discipline - it had become too far removed from the real events. The only groups which did discuss it at some length were the expert ones, which - in view of their 'professional' involvement in the subject - was not surprising. Thus, although, almost all the groups mentioned economic forces, apart from the experts they had little to say about them; at least not in the terms traditionally employed in economic theory. Indeed, their comments (even of the experts) were largely limited to three issues; economic collapse, mentioned as a possibility by half the groups (and by two thirds of individuals, who rated it 7.5 in importance and predicted it would happen by 2020), tariffs and taxes, again mentioned by half, and economic imbalance between the trading blocks (especially between those in the West versus those in the Far East), mentioned by two thirds; with two thirds of individuals expecting some form of protectionism to emerge by 2020, compared with only half who saw the World Trade Organisation (WTO) exerting effective control.

Perhaps this is not just a matter of perception. Perhaps it is a reflection of the dramatic degree to which economists themselves have now downgraded the power which they claim to hold over the future of even economic developments. When Keynesianism dominated economic theory, it was generally accepted that governments (advised by wise economists) could intervene to control their national economies - and, indeed, they did so successfully for several decades[25]. The immediate replacement, Monetarism, soon fell out of favour to be replaced, after a flirtation with exchange rates (cut short by the ERM fiasco), with a simple reliance on 'market forces'; and a simple objective - of low rates of inflation[26]. Since Keynesianism, the main economic argument has thus been to the effect that governments could not intervene successfully. As governments became mere bystanders at the economic events which determined their destiny, their economists, paradoxically (since they had initiated the process), also descended from power[27]!

FAILURES OF ECONOMIC THEORY

Perhaps the most fundamental problem, however, may be that traditional ‘economics’ is irretrievably tied to the age of ‘physical’ production. Its basically simple ‘laws’, developed soon after the first industrial revolution, understandably revolve around the exchange of tangible products; classically described by Adam Smith in the context of a factory manufacturing pins. It has recently faced immense difficulties in adapting these to the different, often more complex, behaviour of the intangible services which are now coming to dominant trade. Not least, where economics - perhaps correctly dubbed the ‘dismal science’ - is typically concerned with the rational (price) mechanisms for sharing out the diminishing quantities of scarce (physical) resources, the resulting theories offer few useful insights an economy which is, as we have seen, now based upon effectively unlimited (and, in economic terms, unmeasurable) resources which are quintessentially intangible, bought by consumers who are often less than (economically) rational in their decision-making.

The problem was, for me, highlighted recently by the justification given by one eminent economists for rejecting a paper I had submitted to a leading journal: "…economics is the study of rational behaviour with limited resources…" On both counts this seems to very nicely encapsulate how out of touch with the real world are  such economists! As a trained economist myself, and one who has long been fascinated by the intellectual challenges the subject offers, it grieves me to admit that the whole discipline may be so closely linked to the previous era of modernism (and, in particular, to Fordism) that it may be in danger of being superseded, in the new age of post-modernism, by disciplines (such as sociology and marketing) which offer much more practically useful concepts for describing the behaviour of society.

Whatever the reasons, it is certainly true that economics is now often seen - in my view (again as a trained economist) more accurately - as an essentially theoretical discipline rather than a practical one[28]. This fact highlights the problems caused by government economists' recent focus on the rate of inflation - around the world - to the exclusion of almost all other economic measures. If you think about it, there is no obvious reason why economic health and low rates of inflation should necessarily be linked in this way. From 1950 to 1973, consumer prices rose by an average of 4.1 per cent a year in the sixteen leading OECD nations[29]; and yet this was the most successful period, in economic terms, since the second world war. From 1973 to 1979 they did unfortunately average 9.5% - setting the scene for the subsequent obsession - but this should not justify the level of obsession (which excludes every other factor)[30].

Keynesianism and Bretton woods

Even so, Keynesianism did work remarkably well in its time - even coping with inflation - and the deployment of the theories of demand management may well have led, in part at least, to the long-lived post-war boom. It is popularly believed that it was undermined by the advent of Monetarism. On the other hand, an equally important - but less reported - factor was the breakdown, slightly earlier - in 1970, of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement; which may have led to the developments which destroyed the Keynesian consensus[31].

The original agreement had been one of the great economic landmarks. It created the World Bank and the IMF - both of whose roles changed significantly, however, after the debacle in the 1970s; indeed, both have recently functioned as though unrelated to the UN (whose Secretary General is no longer even invited to their annual meetings!). Above all, it had created a stable system of fixed exchange rates; which worked well for more than two decades. The destruction of these was probably Richard Nixon's most deplorable, if also least known, legacy[32]! Once the global financial markets had subsequently emerged, Keynesianism on the national scale became impossible[33].

At this point it should be noted that something important really did happen in the early 1970s. There occurred some form of watershed which separated the optimistic post-war boom years from the pessimistic end of century uncertainties. In addition to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements there was, of course, the oil-price shock of 1973. The massive redistribution of currency flows associated with this, together with the effective deregulation of the global financial markets, certainly destabilised governments' economic policies around the world. The actual impact of the higher oil prices was, in the longer-term at least, more or less minimised. Energy conservation became the byword and demand fell - so that prices returned to reasonable levels. The psychological impact of all these changes, however, was much greater - and this still remains with us. The doom and gloom surrounding the Millennium is a pale imitation of that which followed that oil-price shock. For many, especially government economists, it was the end of the world as they knew it. It is easy, now, to laugh off the views of these alarmists. Yet it really was the end of the world as we then knew it[34].

In the context of the 'theory' behind this book, at that time the expectations slowly changed; from optimism to pessimism. Paul Krugman says "It wasn't until 1978 or 1979 that the public began to develop a really deep sense of unease about the economic future...and the psychological change in the end reached deeper than the numbers themselves can convey." The beginning of the age of psychological doom and gloom was bad enough, but, as Krugman adds, "...the 1970s saw an astonishing rise in the influence of strongly conservative ideas in economics (as well as in other areas) a rise that was only certified by the 1980 victory of Ronald Reagan."[35] Is it surprising, though, that - in an age of doom and gloom - a conservative viewpoint (a return to safe traditional values) came to the fore[36].

Economics has declined, markedly, in importance as a major practical force determining the future of humankind - to be replaced, perhaps in the short term only, by market forces which are not susceptible to government intervention.

The death knell for Keynesianism probably came with the demise of the Bretton Wood agreements; which led to the financial markets' destabilisation of any such national planning. It may return, as a viable alternative, when it can be implemented on a global scale.

The Global casino

Despite the problems which emerged after the end of the Bretton Woods system, until quite recently the financial markets were claimed - by Western governments at least - to be the embodiment of all that makes free enterprise such an all-conquering ideology.  But now the markets themselves have moved on, and the prevailing myth today hides another great and growing industry - that of professional gambling on a global scale. The pensions of teachers are wagered alongside the earnings of the multinationals - and this is starting to worry even the most conservative governments. At the most basic level they no longer operate as the major source of external capital for new ventures[37]. That role - for the relatively small proportion of corporations that do not now fund all new developments from their existing cash-flows - has been largely assumed by the banks. Neither do the markets now generally seek to act as a lever for shareholders to maintain control over their wayward charges. That role has been largely subsumed by the legislators. The scale of operations which the new technology allowed meant that the resulting surges of money, micro-second by micro-second - backwards and forwards across three continents, have come to dominate all money flows. The long term movements originating from the underlying activities that served the real business world, which still existed outside these electronic networks, were puny by comparison, and were accordingly swamped[38]. Even in the global money markets the speculative capital flows dominated the operational flows of money which were needed to finance international trade. Bezanson & Mendes report that "...over US $1 trillion (1012) worth of foreign currencies change hands each day...", adding, with a degree of understatement, that this leads "...to concern in several quarters, including central banks, over market volatility and even meltdown.[39]"

A second significant development was that of the new found freedom to arbitrage over time; now dignified, as a group of processes, with the term 'derivatives'. The importance of the market was no longer to be where it currently stood; a rational, measured reflection of the net worth, for example, of quoted stocks. The importance is now in where it will be; albeit in just a few micro-seconds - in which short time the new computerised trading systems will be able to turn a profit. The blinkered focus is, in this way, always on trends and never on what underlies them. All is relative, and nothing is absolute.

The nature of the new markets is, therefore, of vast capital flows surging towards perceived future changes; no longer constrained by any need to reflect actual events. The analogy of the casino is justified; where the obsessive preoccupation of the participants is with predicting how the other players will place their future bets. Keynes described this mentality as 'animal spirits'. Students of poker might use other terms; and, indeed, Keynes also talked about such behaviour in terms of a financial casino. The obvious downside is the possibility of a global financial crash - expected, by two thirds of individuals, to occur before 2020.

trading blocks

Ever larger trading blocks are emerging - including the EU and NAFTA - which potentially have the power to oppose global financial markets; on some issues at least. Javetski & Glasgall predict that "Supercurrencies spanning entire regions may emerge, dwarfing Western Europe's recent quest for one unit of exchange." Perhaps they will even come to have the power to partially restore some Keynesian strategies[40]. More immediately, though, they will distort some aspects of world trade; especially in terms of the exports and import between small and medium sized enterprises. On the other hand, the transnationals and multi-nationals, which currently control most of the trade between developed countries, will see little difference - they will easily balance their trade flows to take account of any changes[41].

At the other extreme, Japan is already recruiting Third World countries on the Pacific Rim into its own trading block[42]. It also seems inevitable that NAFTA will similarly recruit the countries in South America, starting with the (currently) six members of the Mercosur block; this is a logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine. This only leaves Africa, which might seem an obvious target for the EU - which is, as yet, barely mentioned in EU foreign policy, though the European Commission is even now reviewing its position.

The outcome was that, where in earlier times these capital flows might ultimately have reflected the real, operational flows, they took on an independent life of their own. Today the real flows must, in some distorted way, mirror the imaginary.

The global financial markets are now dominated by speculation - making them by far the largest casinos - and this has undermined their traditional functions; and led to the destabilisation of many economic activities. Controlling them will require globally co-ordinated regulation; possibly, in the first instance, by taxing each transaction at a level which does not effect long term investments - but makes speculation uneconomic!

It seems likely that the world economy will be split into three main trading blocks, each comprising major trading nations together with Third World clients. These blocks will be Japan - with the Pacific Rim, NAFTA - with South America, and the EU - with Africa.

redistribution OF WEALTH

I have already stated, at some length, that global wealth, overall, is sufficient to achieve almost anything we might desire. The problem is the distribution within that overall wealth; especially to the under-classes and to the Third World.

Even the much reported fear that development of Third World economies will reduce living standards in the developed world can be largely discounted; despite the politician's rhetoric[43]. As Paul Krugman[a] - professor of economics at Stanford - explains "...fears about the economic impact of the Third World are almost entirely unjustified. Economic growth in low wage nations is in principle as likely to raise as to lower per capita income in high-wage countries; the actual effects have been negligible...When world productivity rises (as it does when Third World countries converge on First World productivity), average world living standards must rise; after all, the extra output must go somewhere."[44] Paradoxically, this is an almost exact reversal of the fears of earlier decades[45]. Indeed, the current debate would have been unthinkable a couple of decades ago. Pam Woodall summarises the position as "...rich countries should gain overall, rather than lose, from the growing prosperity of the third world." She adds the important caveat, however, that "Within each country there will be losers. In particular, as increased competition from low-wage economies reinforces the impact of changing technology, many unskilled workers will lose their jobs or see a drop in real wages."[46]

It seems likely that, by the beginning of the 21st century, this dilemma will have been widely recognised. Economic policy is then likely to focus, in the form of socio-economic policies, on how redistribution may be best effected - to the benefit of all, including the already rich! These new models are likely to revolve around decisions - on a global scale - which may prove to be the forerunners of global economic management; which may, in turn, be the stepping stone to full global government - though, as we have already seen, only just over half our individuals expected even a single global economy to emerge, and then not before 2030. In the shorter term, a single global currency is likely to emerge - predicted by more than half our general groups - which will offer some stability, within which the global changes may take place.

The key economic debates at the beginning of the 21st century are likely to revolve around the redistribution of global wealth. Based upon socio-economic models, the decisions taken then may eventually lead to global economic management. A single global currency - probably a de facto one evolving from the Euro or Yen -  is likely to be a major step towards this.

Management focus

Joseph Coates[b], admittedly coming at the issue from the direction of forecasting the future of science and echoing what many econometricians believe, could not for once be more wrong when he suggests "Applied economics will lead to a greater dependency on mathematical models embodied in computers. These models will have expanded capabilities and will routinely integrate environmental and quality-of-life factors into economic calculations." In reality, the one thing econometric models have in common, apart from holding a fascination for financial journalists, is a propensity for failure. In fact, much as macro-economic theories are coming to be replaced, in practice, with socio-economic ones, those of micro-economics have been largely superseded, again in practice, by management theory[47]. Corporate strategy, in particular, has become the focus of attention - especially where the market is supposedly the only determinant of what is right and wrong[48].

Within corporate strategy theory, the investment in people - best encapsulated as Human Resource Strategies (HRS) - has recently come to the fore; stimulated by the success of the Japanese corporations which have pioneered it. It is true that there was a temporary rejection of, for instance, 'lifetime employment' by western companies (though not by Japanese ones) - when the recession at the beginning of the 1990s forced them to concentrate on short-term cost-savings. Indeed, there were wholesale reductions in their workforces[49]. Perhaps the most depressing result of our questionnaire survey was the finding that only 15% of individuals ever expect to see lifetime/secure employment again! Even so, we still believe stable employment of this kind (albeit now for the parts of the employee's life when he or she chooses this) will be one of the mainstays of future policy. Wherever skills are scarce, as they will continue to be, it makes sense to husband these[50].

Most management theory has, so far, been eminently sensible; as well as pragmatic and flexible enough to help in practice. As a result, the emphasis on management theory rather than economics will probably continue for the next couple of decades - during which time this theory will, however, continue to develop; though, based on the contributions from practising managers as it is, it hopefully will avoid the trap of becoming too theoretical.

The main change, at the end of this time, may be a shift to the social issues involved in supporting the individual - rather than, as now, the group or organisation[51]. Several years ago, we suggested that a new corporate 'accounting' measure - 'Benefit' - should be introduced. This would parallel 'Profit', internally generated for stockholders. 'Benefit', on the other hand, would be externally generated for all the stakeholders. It would include the net gain (or loss) to the community, and to society as a whole, as well as to the workers and shareholders. Many of the new developments may, in any case, be in the public sector. As Clive Crook suggests "With greater wealth come greater demands for public goods that unassisted capitalism may fail to supply."

organisational structures

At the same time, as we have already seen, the challenges of the IT and Communications Revolutions - and especially the need for considerably improved flexibility which they bring - are stimulating the introduction of new organisational structures. Certainly, the days when the typical chief executive (CEO) rules a rigid hierarchy - claiming responsibility for every success (though not every failure) - are numbered for most organisations. This will be partly because the structure underneath is being transformed. It will, though, also result from the abuses which - typically for those holding unwonted power - CEOs are now perpetrating. Their increasingly obscene salaries - voted to them by subservient boards, often reaching 100 times that of lower level workers, compared with no more than 10 times in Japan - are offensive enough; but the fact that these packages are performance related, and hence demand measures leading to maximisation of very short-term profits which benefit nobody but the CEO, is increasingly recognised as a fundamental flaw of western business structures[52].

Some of these new structures, such as the matrix structure (which superimposes, say, a project reporting line on top of a functional one - which is especially useful in high-tech industries), have been around for several decades. Some, such as self-managed group-working, are relatively new introductions[53]. Our contacts among the senior managers in the leading multinationals suggest that the secret now - for governments as much as for businesses - is ‘learning how to make small fixes to small problems’. Some structures, such as cellular organic structures[54] - which are hybrids of the previous two (and in which the cell, the working group, is so flexible that members can come and go, and reporting lines change, as its role changes - and its overall direction mainly comes from the culture (the DNA of this cell!) - are so new that they are as yet only being used by a few organisations.[55]

Whatever their exact form, the structures which will dominate in the first half of the 21st century are likely to be ones which favour relatively independent, peer-to-peer, relationships - such as those which currently apply, for example, in consultancies. They may even become collegial at the extreme - where, as in a faculty of a university, its members manage themselves. This does not weaken the work discipline, rather it changes its nature.[56] There will, thus, be a flux of new structures; which will be tried out over the next few decades - until organisations find the ones which best fit their needs - but still provide the necessary flexibility. It is likely, though, that most of these will give significantly more power to the individual.

Competition or co-operation

The traditional western (capitalist) model of 'business' strategy[57] - or, more widely, of interactions in general between individuals and especially between organisations - has come to be that of 'competition'. It has frequently been developed, in the theory at least, to apply to situations which are reasonably described as 'zero-sum' games; in which the two parties interact on the basis that if one 'wins' the other must 'lose' - so the most frequent outcome, paradoxically perhaps, is that they both choose to lose! In the management field, the theory of competitive advantage, making your own organisation (or even country) more competitive, has most popularly been developed by Michael Porter. His were, indeed, the ideas behind many of the developments in corporate strategy during the 1980s. They are also, in many respects, the key (but often hidden) concept underpinning the emergence of the 'market' as a major political force. Thus, two products, or ideas, face each other - in a parody of a Western gunfight - and fight for the consumer's purchase decision - and the winner takes all, even if the loser does not die immediately![58]

Our own research shows that this has never, in recent years at least, been what normally happens in practice. It is yet another myth - though a very powerful one![59] Almost all organisations conduct co-operative relationships with their customers - they would be foolish to do otherwise -  and increasingly invest in these all-important relationships[60]. What is more surprising, perhaps, is that the majority of the (western) organisations in our own research even indulge in co-operative relations with their competitors![61]  Further, in at least one major market, the European Commission seems to be preparing to positively reinforce this message of co-operation.

Management theory has largely replaced micro-economics as the practical framework for organisational decisions; and the corporate strategies being thus implemented are increasingly driven by Human Resource Strategies. It is likely that such management theory will continue to dominate, whilst continuing to develop, to be probably replaced eventually by a focus on social issues posed by support for the individual.

Organisational structures are in a state of flux, changing to meet the new requirements imposed by the IT and Communications Revolutions - and especially to meet the greater flexibility demanded by these. These new structures are likely to be based upon peer-to-peer communications and self-management; giving increased power to the individual.

Despite the all pervasive hype, most organisational relations are already co-operative rather than competitive. This trend will accelerate over the next decade - so that co-operation will become the accepted model for almost all transactions.

the myth of multi-national power

A final footnote to this chapter; as we have seen, there is a sense in which, at long last, the world is now becoming the global village which has been predicted since the 1960s. On the other hand, the way in which globalism is emerging is rather different to that which has been previously predicted as globalisation; even though 90% of our individual respondents thought that it was already occurring (and rated it at the 6.8 level of importance). In particular, the power of the multi-nationals is much more diffuse, and indirectly applied, than was expected. Thus, for a long time the most pervasive myth surrounding globalisation was that relating to the power supposedly held by the multi-national corporations[62]. Indeed, four fifths of individuals expected them to dominate business life within two decades, where less than two fifths even considered the possibility of the demise of large corporations.

Upon inspection, the coming domination by multinationals turns out not to be true. The largest hundred do control 60% of global assets (worth more than $3 trillion in terms of world-wide assets in 1990). These multinationals, especially the top 100, certainly are powerful[63], as individual corporations, since they already account for more than half the world trade in manufactured goods and services[64]. In terms of changing the lifestyles of people around the globe they also wield enormous influence. The basic myth (of multinational hegemony) is, however, quite wrong; in that it presupposes that they are increasingly working in concert - to become de facto the new world government, with all the power and none of the responsibility.

Thus, one of the more surprising aspects of our earlier research amongst the multi-nationals was the discovery that - as seen by them at least - they had no real sense of being 'multi-nationals'! They shared some sense of identity with their competitors in the same or similar fields, but they saw no relationship with multinationals in other fields. As a result they could not conceive of working together with other multi-nationals in general, even if it meant that they could together control the global environment to their advantage. Indeed, when IBM - at its peak - probably had the power itself (without involving any others) to change the future developments in its own environment, even it did not consider taking such actions. This was not because it was repelled by the prospect, though the constant threat of anti-trust actions would probably have caused it to think twice, but because it never occurred to its management that such actions, shaping the future of society, were the province of a business organisation. My other research comes to much the same conclusion - whatever the world outside may fear, Western organisations are very clear that creating the future of society is the responsibility of government not of business - a very different view from that held by the organisations which were embedded in the different tradition of Marxist economics. The power of the multi-nationals, therefore, is limited to that within the boundaries of the individual organisations; there is no indication, as yet, that they will step beyond this - or that they ever will, or ever could, operate in concert (even covertly)[65]. Indeed, most recently their innocence of most of the charges brought against them seems to have been accepted.

As we saw above, there is another myth which is perhaps even more pervasive, and that is that the large firms in general, and the multinationals in particular, are losing ground to small firms. John Naisbitt[b] even made this theme central to his 1994 book, 'Global Paradox'; a theme which he quite simply summed up as  "The bigger the world economy, the more powerful its smallest players."[66] The apparent buoyancy of the small firms sector, which seems to lie behind his latest theories, at least in part arises from a misunderstanding which Bennett Harrison describes as 'concentration without centralisation'. The changes reflect a concept, described in labour economics[67] as 'core and peripheryX', where 'core workers', those who are essential to the business (and in whose training the organisation has usually made a significant investment), are well-treated - with high salaries and lifetime employment - and those  'peripheral workers', who can easily be replaced on the general labour market, are hired and fired as needed. The latter category are often shifted to sub-contractors; and have, in this way, fuelled the rapid growth of such small firms.[68]

Taking the long-term view, it is possible to speculate that this may be yet another symptom of revolutionary pains. As more and more workers become ever better trained, and as labour becomes scarcer (in the west, at least, due to demographic trends and the demand arising from the long-awaited Millennial boom, the periphery is likely to shrink dramatically. Organisations will have to enlarge their 'cores' to protect their supplies of skilled labour; and ‘lifetime’ (or at least long-term) employment will probably make a come-back in most large organisations.

On balance, therefore, the transnationals and multinationals will continue to be major drivers for change, as individual organisations; but they will operate in a fragmented manner and not in concert.

They might, however, be susceptible to political pressures to become more active in this regard - especially at the global level.