[2018]
FUTURES
RESEARCH
6046 Chapter 10 - Dark Fears
STRUCTURES OF POWER END_OF_HISTORY_ DEMOCRACY
NEW_ALTERNATIVES_FOR_DEMOCRACY_ COMPETITION COOPERATION
PARTICIPATION PLURALISM & CONSENSUS PRESSURE GROUPS
The previous chapters have described what have generally been optimistic views of the future. Indeed, whilst stressing alternative aspects of it - and reflecting genuinely different expectations of it, they could almost be taken as three elements of the same holistic vision of a desirable future. The details may change in practice, there may be more or less emphasis on the colonisation of space say, but the final outcome - a future in which humanity prospers - is never really in doubt. In this chapter, though, we move to a very different aspect; one which is potentially much more pessimistic. It encapsulates the dark forces which have generated considerable pain and anguish in previous transitions. At the heart of these forces lie the power structures, inevitably dominated by the established political parties
It is fair to say that, although the 'optimistic' forces are most likely to dominate society in the longer term, the dark forces may make the transition, in the short and medium term, painful[1]; and, if the scale of disruption escalates too far, they might possibly even destroy the chances of an optimistic future even in the longer term. Indeed, the historical precedents for a peaceful transition are not good. Previous transitions have been bloody; as the then establishment fought to preserve its position, and privileges, against the encroachment of the new, changed society.
This time, however, bloodshed may not be inevitable. As we have seen earlier, it was not just the demise of Communism, and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, which was accomplished peacefully - very much against the previous precedents for such revolutionary changes - but there have been equally far-reaching, but peaceful, changes which have occurred in countries in Africa (such as South Africa) and South America (Chile and Argentina) where right-wing regimes have handed over power to the masses. Just a decade or so ago, when global nuclear annihilation was still a very real possibility, the prospects would have been very different; and the arguments of those pundits who predicted the end of civilisation would have been much harder to counter. Now, however, there is some - considerable - hope that the revolutionary pains may disappear in the medium term, and perhaps may reduce even in the shorter term, and the transition may take place without dramatic bloodshed[2].
A number of other authors have recognised the revolutionary nature of the times in which we live; typically using the previous 'Industrial Revolution' as their model. Alvin Toffler, for instance, has employed phrases such as Third Wave and Future Shock to emphasise the potentially all encompassing nature of such changes. As we saw earlier, technological change is indeed endemic; and will have massive impacts on some aspects of the future of society. On the other hand, again as we have seen, we have now reached the stage where the resources available to humanity can meet almost all its reasonable needs, and in effect are now unlimited. In this context, such technological potentials have become merely the supporting factors for the new revolutions which are in the process of confronting a largely unsuspecting world. Thus, the new waves of revolutionary change, described in the preceding chapters, are to be detected across all aspects of society and, especially, in its social organisation[3].
While the forces we have examined, from technological changes through to the remaking of society as a whole, may be fundamental in the longer term, those operating in the political environment are more immediate in terms of their impact[4]. They determine how, and when, the underlying changes will be allowed to occur. To use the very relevant metaphor of an earthquake, they will determine where and when the stresses building up are to be released - the important point being that the longer they are contained the more powerful the ultimate shock will be. The problem in trying to understand these political forces is that they are often hidden from view - especially in western societies. As a result, the forces themselves are poorly understood, not least by the very politicians who would claim to control them, and the changes which are occurring around them are very much misunderstood![5] Indeed, it is the mismatch between the changed circumstances and the unchanged - or at least inapplicable - policies supposed to deal with them which often causes the worst revolutionary pain.[6]
Governments, in their anxiety to deal with new forces they do not understand, often grasp at 'solutions' which make the problems worse[7]. For just one example, which currently applies to many governments around the world, choosing a strategy based solely on maintaining a low rate of inflation during a time of great change is at best naive - even if all the other simplistic nostrums (from control of money supply to exchange rates) have failed. The precedents would suggest that, all other things being equal, inflation should normally rise to reflect the uncertainty about the future. To deliberately employ draconian measures such as unemployment to reverse this natural process in order to achieve unnaturally low rates of inflation, at a time when the disadvantaged are already suffering from the problems of transition, is inhuman - and ultimately counter-productive. Paradoxically, at a time when Marx is supposedly in disfavour, this is a policy which reflects one of his most famous concepts - The Reserve Army of the Unemployed - which capitalists (in this case capitalist governments) use to force down the wages of the workers by threatening them with competition from the unemployed!
This chapter deals with the most immediate - and potentially most important - impacts of the 'Dark Fears'; those relating to the power structures operating within society. In the short term these will provide the fulcrum around which the other changes revolve.
Due to the cultural context within which they operate, these power structures are, unfortunately, largely invisible to Western commentators and, in particular, to Western managers at all levels. They tend to be incorporated as basic assumptions - hidden underneath management theory as much as that of market politics - where the realms of politics and economics have now come to be - artificially - separated. At one extreme the market is supposed to mediate impersonally (and most effectively) between individuals. At the other, democracy allows those individuals political control over the few remaining aspects of life which the market cannot address. In recent years it is these two pillars - market and democracy - which have been chosen to symbolise most of what is important to Western political systems, rather than the capitalism which had previously been said to distinguish these systems[8].
As a result, those of us in management were able to dedicate our lives to the minutiae of decisions, needed to optimise the performance of our organisations, confident that the wider environment would be run by the impersonal efficiency - the invisible hand - of the market, or by those altruistic individuals who had selflessly dedicated their lives to the (political) service of their fellow beings. Of course, as we all now know, this is bunkum! Yet there is a widespread belief - not least amongst politicians - that, derived from these (false) assumptions, have come the best rules for governing the - modern - society which emerged from the first Industrial Revolution. Indeed, many of them would argue that these are the only (natural) rules; as their victory over Communism (The End of History) demonstrates[9]. Such is the comfortable, if illusory, world in which many governments presently live[10].
Perhaps the greatest change has been the changed demands placed upon the leadership role of government. Where, previously, it was required to give political (almost spiritual) leadership, with a clear vision of the nation’s chosen future, it is now expected to undertake capable management of the nation’s resources. This is now difficult for decision-makers at all levels, where the world has become more complex and the trade-offs between the various ‘stakeholders’ are more obvious to all the participants. A senior manager, describing the situation facing him (which just as clearly applies to all large organisations, including governments), said to us “...we now have to learn how to make many small fixes for many small problems...” Indeed he suggested that we are becoming a ‘self-organising’ society[11]. In this new situation, we find most of the solutions to our problems ourselves; and governments are fooling themselves when they think they are still running a hierarchy which is in control of such changes.
Now that the traditional structures are disintegrating[12] and can no longer offer such comfort, the latest 'industrial revolution' poses very different challenges. Worse, from the politicians’ point of view, we have educated our Western workforces to a level sufficient for them, at least, to recognise that these new challenges exist; no matter how much the politicians might have wished otherwise. The most obvious outcome, where these power structures are inevitably at the focus of the various revolutions which have been described in this book, is that the traditional structures - overcome by the forces of change - are being torn apart. The symptoms are already to be seen around us, and around the world; not least in the marked instability in voting patterns[13].
The tale of the Emperor's new clothes, which offered a powerful parable about a previous political revolution, is just as relevant now. The electorate, across much of the world, is beginning to see that their political masters - no matter how much they bluster - are naked of workable policies to meet the new challenges! As Fintan O'Toole suggests "What characterises our approach to the Millennium is that the ideologies of both left and right are in trouble...the rise of Green thinkinghas drawn attention to the physical limits on progress and to the very real prospect that [it] could lead to oblivion." The Economist[a] also highlights the problems faced by the opposing ideologies, though it ascribes them to more complex causes, pointing out that "...voters in established democracies are showing signs of an increasing readiness to desert the familiar parties of old...for years, political parties in old democracies have been struggling...In America, as in other countries, society has been growing less cohesive, more granulated. Education, switching jobs and moving up the class ladder have made people less inclined to take their politics from their parents and are more inclined to form, and change, their own political opinions."[14] Whatever the reason, the structures are, indeed, being torn apart[15].
Despite the euphoria of the victory over their enemies, most notably characterised by Francis Fukuyama as 'The End of History', Western leaders now need to learn the more basic lesson; and view their own political future with just as much trepidation. The same structural forces - which should perhaps be better encapsulated as 'The End of Ideology' - are now undermining the position of Western governments, as previously they did those of their Communist counterparts.
In addition, this end to the ideological battle between communism and pluralism, each of which was long presented to supporters in stark black and white terms, will make the specific principles of 'representative democracy' - which are now the only real political offering in much of the West - look increasingly unsatisfactory. The supporters of this - now exposed - ideology will in this way be forced to defend their choice with rational arguments rather than the quasi-jingoistic pleas on which they were previously able to rely.
Thus, in the specific context of economics - which is how the choice of 'capitalism' versus 'communism' was often presented - Fred Bergsten - director of the Institute for International Economics - suggests that "The death of [communist] command economics...and with it the simplistic notion that there was some pure alternative called 'capitalism', cleared the way for the real debates...” The Economist[a] adds the important footnote that "In the absence of its competitor [communism], the consequence is a weakening of ideology in general[16]."
Let us, therefore, look at the key assumptions supposedly underpinning much of Western society; and let us start with its proudest boast - that it alone knows the secret of true democracy! As early as 1780, Edmund Burke - in a speech on economic reform - made the definitive statement that 'The people are the masters'. It is, thus, assumed that the Western 'democracies' have long-since found the means for 'government of all the people by all the people for all the people'. Yet, it is too often forgotten that this ideal was first declared - by Theodore Parker - at an anti-slavery convention in Boston in 1850. Parker went on to 'call it the idea of freedom'XE "freedom'", and - indeed - the two concepts, of democracy and freedom, have long been so intertwined in the West as to be almost inseparable[17].
Surprisingly, in view of the hype of past centuries, the United States constitution actually has surprisingly little to say as to the individual's rights in this context[18]; and even the rather more idealistic Declaration of Independence has nothing to say beyond the one, most memorable and so often quoted, sentence seeking the rights of 'Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness'. Even so, this model, of government separated from the people - but held in check (albeit only of the grossest excesses) - still remains a basic assumption of Western 'democracy'. Thus, Andrew Adonis - correspondent at the Financial Times - and Geoff Mulgan - director of Demos - are able to state that "...modern government is exclusive and elitist. It generates unreal and largely ignorant expectations on the part of voters, and encourages political elites to trade simplistic, cut-and-dried solutions to problems as the currency of electoral politics. Political alienation and ignorance are systemic." This became particularly clear, to me personally, when I found myself in the middle of a heated debate between the Ethiopian government and the ambassadors of the Western nations. The former - as part of its move from Marxism to Social Democracy - was trying to write a constitution which genuinely enshrined the rights of individuals (very much along the lines of those declared by Theodore Parker). The latter had been instructed to promote their governments' much narrower versions of representative democracy - based on competition between opposing political parties.
The patterns of power are about to change, however. Alvin Toffler[a] makes the fundamental point - about the new political realities - that "The first, heretical principle of Third Wave government is that of minority power. It holds that majority rule, the key legitimating principleXE "legitimating principle" of the Second Wave era, is increasingly obsolete...In place of a highly stratified society in which a few major blocs ally themselves to form a majority, we have a configurative society - one in which thousands of minorities, many of them temporary, swirl and form highly novel, transient patterns..." He adds his own solution to the problem which "...lies in imaginative new arrangements for accommodating and legitimizing diversity - new institutions that are sensitive to the rapidly multiplying minorities...'semi-direct democracy' - a shift from depending on representatives to representing ourselves...if our elected brokers can't make deals for us, we shall have to do it for ourselves." Therein lies the potential confrontation, between the old and the new, and possibly the greatest danger of a painful transition to come[19].
NEW ALTERNATIVES FOR DEMOCRACY
Most interesting of all, in terms of my experience with the attempts at defining democracy in the context of Ethiopia, was the fact that most of the Western governments involved apparently failed to even recognise that what they were promoting was just one possible approach to democracy. In particular, they were unwilling to recognise that, in practice, it might be less than perfect. They certainly failed to recognise that the Ethiopian version, being written by one of my friends there, was even a valid attempt at defining another approach to the problem[20].
Such absolute government, by an effectively closed elite, might have been justifiable - in practice if not in theory - when most of the population were ill-educated and even worse informed; and might not have been expected to cope with the complex issues to hand. Now, however, the mass of the population - in most countries throughout the world - is relatively well-educated; to a better standard than the leaders in earlier times. A hundred years ago fewer than 2% of Americans went to university, where now more than a quarter do[21]. In addition - through the almost universally available medium of television - they are remarkably well informed (on many issues better informed, indeed, than their leaders - locked in their elitist ivory towers!). The ground has not merely moved, it has been destroyed by a political earthquake of monumental proportions.
Stewart Lansley one further explanation for the strange docility of the electorates in the face of such change: "Politicians are increasingly functionaries rather than ideologues. The potential winners today are those who offer the most effective management of a market dominated economy" This view is echoed by the leaders of the multinationals we have talked to; they too believe that government is now about effective management of day to day events rather than political visions on the grand scale - summarised by the statement (reported earlier in the book) that it is ‘learning to apply small fixes for small problems’.
Despite the many critics of his pragmatic ‘flexibility’ - which many see as a cynical approach to retaining office at any cost - it is even possible that Bill Clinton might be the model for future leaders. He adjusts his position to match the demands of the electorate; more or less exactly as truly representative democracy would - in theory - require. As a result, he has also distanced himself from the traditional party machine; as post-modern politics might demand. Just why he has adopted this approach is not obvious. His critics may be correct in claiming that it is a cynical manipulation of the electoral processes; though it is not clear why giving the electorate what it wants is undemocratic. My one contact who knows Bill Clinton fairly well predicted, during his first term as President, that this is exactly what he would try; but also predicted that the Democratic Party would not allow him to succeed - fortunately it failed! It is also interesting to note that Clinton is the first of the genuinely ‘post-modern’, post-1960s, President. His approach to politics is, in fact, very similar to the few other post-1960 world leaders I know. I am inclined, therefore, to the view that the many critics of his Presidential capabilities are missing the point. Enmeshed in the party political tradition, as apparently he is not, they cannot see what is really happening! Much the same could be said of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom - though he has, at least, taken his party with him - albeit kicking and screaming almost every inch of the way!
For the record, therefore, Western democracy - and, in fact, most forms of government around the world - at best only offers a limited check on what government does; and even then only by seeming to offer the opportunity to reject existing political power at intervals of five years or so[22]. It is, though, that very opportunity - to reject existing political parties - which is now being taken, with some enthusiasm, by not a few electorates[23]. In the short-term, at least, it is this rejection which will be most keenly felt; though - in line with their limited appreciation of structural factors in general - only half our respondents recognised that such rejection of political parties was ever likely to happen (and even then not before 2030), so total rejection may still be some way off.
Less obviously, perhaps, the Western concept of democracy is based not upon the co-operative ideal enshrined in 'all of the people' but upon the contrary notion that politics, along with many forms of public life, demands a contest between opposing ideas - of which only one can be the winner[24]. This concept was previously seen in its purest form in the confrontation with communism; then, at least, western democracy was most easily defined in terms of its opposition to the dark forces of that communism. It is, though, still enshrined in 'party politics'. In the traditional ideal, this has just two equally matched contestants (Democrats and Republicans or Conservatives and Socialists), whose opposing are placed before the people in a perverse form of beauty contest[25].
It turns out, in fact, that the major Western powers simply cannot cope with the concept of co-operative government! As mentioned earlier, I was made very aware of this problem when I was caught between the Ethiopian government - which was trying to make its new constitution as genuinely democratic as possible, in terms of the widest possible popular involvement - and the Western governments - which wanted to impose their own confrontational party system. It may come as something of a surprise to their electorates, but democracy is - in Western (political) eyes - simply defined in terms of the existence of competing political parties. The wider, and more bitter, the divisions between them - even if these are artificially created - the more democratic is the process considered to be! Even more surprising is the fact that, despite their claims at home, the concept of 'government by all the people' seems to play no significant part in the considerations of western governments[26]!
Some years ago, we made the fundamental observation that - in society - 'forces add in conjunction and subtract in opposition'. We believed that this should be self-evident, and still so believe; nothing has happened since to change our minds - indeed the obvious failures of government policy in the 1990s have reinforced our argument. Despite their failures, however, most politicians still claim exactly the opposite! We leave you to make up your own mind on this score.
With the end of the global ideological conflict the one remaining public confrontation, albeit one which has had to be engineered by those who seek confrontation, is that between those -usually of the right - who believe that the most important thing is to make the economy work as efficiently as possible and those - usually of the left - who prefer to concentrate on looking after the unfortunates who get the least from the economy. As we will see, the confrontation between left and right is becoming much less relevant to most of the electorate. In any case, whilst competition for scarce resources in this way - by both sides of the debate - might be understandable - indeed it is seen as being fundamental to market economics (which is, once more paradoxically, now accepted by both sides - left and right) - it makes little sense when such resources are no longer scarce. Instead, it makes much more sense to co-operate with others to create the better society that you, and they, desire; it should be possible to create wealth efficiently and share it.
Indeed, what has been forgotten - especially by economists - is that the 'market' is basically a device for allowing individuals to co-operate! It allows each of us to focus on what we do best, so that society overall works most effectively. Unfortunately, this is an unfashionable view in politics; even many of those on the Left have abandoned it, for supposed electoral advantage in a society which they now see as essentially greedy. Thus, Michael Lerner opens his book “Most Americans hunger for meaning and purpose in life. Yet we are caught within a web of cynicism that makes us question whether there could be any higher purpose beside material self-interest and looking out for number one...People treat one another as objects to be manipulated...” On the other hand, the classic work of Robert Axelrod, on the outcome of competitive activities (encapsulated in games theory as the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'), shows that - outside the unreal world of politics - honesty always pays dividends; as does co-operation. Despite the collapse of the Left's egalitarian instincts, this is a fundamental issue for, as we have seen, there are now sufficient resources for almost everyone to create their ideal environment and lifestyle; without detracting from those of anyone else. Co-operation should, therefore, be the way to future prosperity for all[27].
Fortunately, the linkage between the individual and society is now widely recognised, amongst the electorate at least; if not amongst all politicians. Indeed, it is only the most dogmatic politician, such as Margaret Thatcher, who would consider saying that 'there is no such thing as society'! In addition, our own research shows that even amongst those supposedly most committed to competition - private sector business organisations - co-operation rather than competition is now the rule in the wider community. When confronted directly by major competitors, half of all organisations choose the route of co-operation and, in the acid test, only a third said that they priced their products with competition in mind[28]!
In the face of such wide-spread common-sense, it represented a major triumph of some sort for Western politicians to have persuaded so much of the world that the only acceptable political (and economic) process was (still) that of competition! The strength of this ideology is such that, even in anonymous attitude surveys[29], managers will understate the degree to which they co-operate - because this represents behaviour they expect to be seen as unacceptable by others[30]. For politicians, unfortunately, the effect is even more marked, and it is almost true to say that politics have become the continuation of war by other means; rather than the other way around! It seems that the only time when it is permissible to collaborate with the enemy represented by the opposition parties is when jointly confronted by the worst enemy of all - the electorate!
Having earlier put on record some caveats about the otherwise relatively peaceful move of power from the elites to the individual, it seems reasonable to say that - at long last - the masses (albeit operating as informed individuals using the ballot box rather than an ignorant proletariat storming the barricadesXE "barricades") are coming to demand their rights in government; and, in particular, their rights to participate in it[31].
Participation - often now described as direct democracy as opposed to (traditional) representative democracy, and described in more detail later in this chapter - may be, though, a potentially fraught solution to put into practice, rather than to describe in theory. After all, it is no longer possible to have state decisions directly decided by everyone - as it was, to some degree, long ago in the golden age of Athens[32]; though some might recommend an electronic (Internet) equivalent - and even Al Gore - spoke in this context of 'forging a new Athenian age of democracy’. Instead, there may be a spectrum of opportunities for involvement. At the upper end this consists of the whole panoply of existing political appointments; from members of the inner circle of government down to the lowliest town councillor or school governor and those enjoying the patronage of government as members of non-elected bodies[33]. At the opposite extreme is simply a belief that government is being undertaken on behalf of everyone - to repeat Theodore Parker' words 'for all the people' - though in reality it often governs in the interest of special groups. Clearly the supporters of the winning party - be they businessmen or union leaders - expect to gain something from their support; but there are many other groups which are almost as successful in diverting power to their benefit. The Mafia in Italy (and to an extent in the United States) pull many strings. Surprisingly, considering its small numbers (of just a few per cent of the population), and its constant cries of discrimination against it, the Jewish community in the United States has had a remarkable degree of influence on government there - vastly out of proportion to its numbers - achieved by an equally remarkable degree of unity of purpose (especially in targeting congressmen and senators with threats, bordering on blackmail, of electoral destruction).
Whichever the recipient, it is usually clear - not least to the electorate - that government is biased in favour of a chosen few; and against the majority! In addition, the isolation of the establishment has led to it delivering even greater rewards to those it believes are its supporters (as opposed to the 'traitors' who are not!). This bribery of key supporters might have worked in times gone by, but now it merely heightens the sense of moral outrage experienced by the disadvantaged majority.
On the other hand, the very simple - basic - requirement for participation is that the population as a whole can comfortably accept the often made (but rarely justified) assertion that government really is working on its behalf! Beyond this, fuller participation will come when the political establishment opens its ranks to anyone with the capability, and the desire, to participate in the processes of government. Such a change is easy to make in theory, but almost impossible to make in practice - when all the gatekeepers have a vested interest in maintaining the power of the elite. The forces for such change will come from the demands for legitimate representation of the views of individuals. As, and when, failure to respond to such demands is seen to undermine the legitimacy of government it will act - albeit almost certainly too little and too late!
Probably the most distinctive feature of the Western model of democracy is its emphasis on competition; between powerful (opposing) political parties. Where, with the demise of communism, the only significant competitor has been disqualified this immeasurably weakens such a system. Where the increasing need is for co-operation, rather than confrontation, this becomes a fatal weakness - which will cause much tension before it is resolved.
In the post-war years, the practical workings of western democracy were often based upon processes lying outside of the formal electoral system. Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s it came to be generally accepted that there were many (plural) groups - usually outside of government - which also wielded a degree of political power. More important, the belief then was that it was possible to achieve a balance between these groups; or, at least, to reach some form of consensus. In the 1980s the political scene had returned to a more confrontational - black versus white - coloration; where a consensus was no longer sought - and even a search for consensus was seen to be a sign of weakness. On the other hand, electorates - finally disillusioned by the failures to deliver the certainties they were promised in the 1980s - now seem to be moving back to a pluralist consensus[34].
In the earlier post-war decades an almost essential aspect of such pluralism was the existence of pressure group politics[35]. Thus, each of these groups attempted - outside of the normal democratic processes - to sway the decisions of government in its favour. The process has not disappeared with the change to more extreme politics[36]. Indeed, it is still possible for outsider groups to have a significant impact, if their pressure is well enough managed. In the United Kingdom, the anti-roads lobby, which has been especially successful, brought together a whole range of groups - from the 'Dong Tribe' (of travellers, who demonstrated violently) to Transport 2000 (which published well-researched briefs) - all of whom worked together for the common cause, in the process possibly setting an important precedent for lobbyists and activists in other fields. Elsewhere, the Catholic Church has used the Pro-Life movement to apply political pressure in support of its views. The point is not that such pressures are good or bad, it is simply to recognise that they exist. Paradoxically, however, the main victim of the 1980s swing away from pluralism was the reduction in the efforts being made to regulate these pressures. Now that their existence is largely ignored, their power has actually increased - but it is applied more unpredictably (and arbitrarily)[37].
Indeed, pluralism has - even under threat from the more extreme politics of the 1980s - seemed to re-emerge in an even stronger guise; as the range of single issues on which groups within the population have focused, to great effect. The commitment to such focused politics can be more intense than that given to party politics - since it is not diluted by all the issues about which they, or the individuals within them, feel less strongly. Indeed, the commitment is often much more intense; in terms of the numbers of individuals actively supporting such movements and - especially - in terms of those especially highly motivated activists running the campaigns. Their real power arises from the level of individual commitmennt. It is much easier to give such a high level of emotional commitment to a woman's right to an abortion, or to an animal's right to live without pain, than it is to have the same visceral reactions to the compendium manifestos adopted by the traditional, national political parties. Peter Drucker[b] states the position in stark terms "...parties are in tatters everywhere. The ideologies that enabled European parties to bring together disparate factions into one organization to gain control of power have lost most of their integrating power...Governments have thus become powerless against the onslaught of special-interest groups, have indeed become powerless to govern..."
One result of the disintegration of the traditional social groupings and, accordingly, of the traditional group (party) politics is therefore that single issue politics is now growing rapidly - to fill the hole thus left[38]. Indeed, it would seem that many of the individual voters are now increasingly committing to a portfolio of single issues - which, in aggregate, define their overall political position. The Economist[c] reports "Britons often join more than one pressure group. Amnesty...is not untypical: more than 70% of its 115,000 members also belong to another pressure group."
What have yet to emerge are genuine portfolio parties - probably first emerging as spin-offs of the traditional parties. These would seek to offer - their leaders might hope - attractive combinations of policies for such single issue voters; as did Bill Clinton in 1996, albeit working in opposition to his party, and Tony Blair did in 1997. By this means, such new parties may hope to increase their electoral coverage sufficiently to have the major impact - and possibly even achieve a majority - which may be denied to single issue parties. In the context of portfolio parties the sophisticated marketing research techniques already available[39] - essentially using factor and cluster analysis - could tell the builders of such parties who to appeal to - and how. This does not, however, answer one major potential problem - that the content of the most attractive portfolio might change significantly over time; posing problems for any party trying to establish a unique identity[40].
That significant changes are afoot in the political processes, at all levels and world-wide, is a fact that the electorate is increasingly aware of; though, as yet, they do not appreciate exactly what these changes might be - nor the true scale of them. The one group, blinded by a global version of groupthink, which is determinedly unaware of them is that made up of the various sectors of the establishment; and, in particular, the politicians who are charged with implementing such change.
Thus, a pre-requisite for any evolutionary solution to the emerging problems is that those politicians, at least, are persuaded to recognise the changes which are already taking place around them. Unfortunately, history tends to suggest that politicians will only recognise the facts of life when it is their (political) life which is imminently at risk; when revolution threatens. On the other hand, recent history suggests that this recognition need no longer wait for bloody revolution. When all the various changes will come about, however, is much less predictable. It seems likely that those changes which will apply at the local level will arrive earlier. Those at the global level will take longer, even if they are more obvious: and probably will take much longer, if they are to be meaningful.
The most immediate change, and ultimately the most important one, which will be needed at all levels is simply the recognition that a new model is needed; one which is based upon co-operation, not least between the various layers of government, rather than on confrontation. The essence of this can be encapsulated - in an effectively resource unlimited world, as we saw earlier - in the concept of zero-plus (where both parties in any negotiation can reasonably expect to gain from co-operation) as against that of zero-sum (where one can only gain at the expense of the other) which currently rules. Regrettably, zero-sum confrontation is a model which Western politicians, at least, seem unwilling to relinquish. In addition, current political processes are remarkably unsuited to conveying any message, other than blanket approval or disapproval, to a political party - and a near revolution has to be engineered to bring any other matter to the attention of government.
Indeed, a second pre-requisite is that the information carrying capabilities of these political processes should be dramatically improved. In the days, long ago, when the current frameworks originated - graphically still encapsulated in the rule that the opposing parties in the British House of Commons should be kept two swords-lengths apart - the electorate were literally isolated in their ignorance and the politicians were part of the elite which alone was privileged to know what was happening in the wider world. Now, paradoxically, the reverse is true. We, informed in particular by round the clock, and round the world, television (often across a multitude of channels) cannot avoid exposure to the wider world. Politicians, on the other hand, increasingly live in an artificial world; which often bears little resemblance to the real world of their constituents[41]. Isolated by the barriers they have thrown up, they are the prey of officials - and of their fellow politicians, who comfortingly share their own views. If you have, as I have, encountered the almost desperate attentions of ministers wanting to hear a genuine voice from the outside world, you begin to realise how much they are the prisoners of, rather than the masters of, the system!
There have been many solutions offered to bridge the communications gap between politicians and their electorates; and to offer the latter more influence. The Economist[q], again, asks the rather provocative question "When the public view can be tested so frequently and easily...why have elected representatives at all?", and goes on to pose an even more fundamental one, "...will representative democracy prove to be merely a 200-year intermediate technology, a bridge between the direct voting in ancient Greece and the electronic voting of modern California?" Whatever the answer to these questions, the processes they hint at will, most importantly, improve the legitimacy of government.
Thus, experience - not least in terms of widespread use as part of traditional western democratic practice in Australia and in the western parts of the United States - has already shown that referenda can be used for major, crucial issues[42]. They work - even if politicians do not like to relinquish power in such a manner - as long as the electorate is well informed and not misinformed, as is the wont of politicians. Despite politicians' fears, the evidence again is that, in general, the well-informed electorate will approach such referenda with great responsibility. It seems likely, therefore, that their use will grow - especially as the cost of running them will decrease with the growth in the use of computer technology in this area[43]. Ian Pearson, a futurist at British Telecomm, goes even further, to suggest a 'virtual parliament' which uses on-line computer communications to extend voter participation - to voting in the actual debates.
But referenda are not the only possibilities. There are a number of other devices which could also be used to encourage direct democracy[44]; where two thirds of individuals expect some form of direct democracy in general to be prevalent by 2030. One of these, which has a long record of success, is that of the jury. If we have been willing to entrust the life of the defendant to a small group of his or her peers - and the evidence is that this works well - it should not be impossible to use such processes to deal with lesser issues of public policy. This would be much easier to implement - and, in the more specific form of various commissions of investigation (staffed, however, by experts) has been so in the past; though - apart from Tony Blair's 'advisory' panel of several thousand voters (which is, at least, a start!) - there are no obvious moves afoot in this direction in the major democracies.
Beyond these, the more public use of marketing research could - and eventually should - improve the communications process. It is true that opinion polls have recently earned a rather dubious reputation - not least because of their use as weapons in the political wars - but, properly handled (and once they are respected by those being interviewed), they can give accurate insights into what the electorate in general are thinking. Where you are building a consensus, not least as a means of legitimising actions, such knowledge is invaluable - even if it is only used to map out the changes in opinion you wish to make; and, using the new techniques we ourselves have developed, to establish the likelihood of such changes working in practice[45]. Many of these devices are scarcely revolutionary in nature, and could happily operate within the existing frameworks - and sometimes do - as could a range of other processes. Thus, some of the various forms of proportional representation would allow the voices of almost all the electorate to be heard rather than just the favoured majorities. It seems likely that such approaches will spread from the nations which already use them - with great success - to the laggards (which, unfortunately, include much of the US and the UK).
Despite the emotional objections of the politicians who do not wish to dilute their power, all of these changes are about communication rather than political ideology. Even politicians may seem to agree with this; for they often claim that it is the 'presentation of their policies which is at fault. What they fail to understand, however, is that the most important communication is now that from, rather than to, the electorate. Above all, they must stop talking, and listen! Allowing small groups, and - increasingly - individuals, to communicate with government - indeed encouraging them to do so - is likely to become central to the whole political process. With the advent of widespread computer conferencing, not least on the Internet, it has now become possible for even the most remote community to maintain regular contact with its representatives.
Enacting all of these changes at the same time seems a complex and difficult process - and were they to be unconnected activities that might be the case. The saving grace is that they can, and should, flow naturally from just one change; and that is in the attitude of government. If government wants to listen to its electorate, and if it wants to involve them - thereby legitimising itself, it will positively seek out such changes.
[1] Edward Cornish
[2] Richard Slaughter
[3] John Gray
[4] Brian Beedham
[5] Geoff Mulgan[b]
[6] John Gray
[7] The Chatham House Forum
[8] John Gray
[9] John Gray, Clive Crook
[10] Kooiman & Van Vliet
[11] The Chatham House Forum
[12] Charles Leadbeater, Eric Hobbsbawm
[13] Martin Woollacott
[14] Peter Drucker[b], Campiglio & Hammond
[15] Brian Beedham[c]
[16] Brian Beedham, Peter Drucker[d]
[17] Brian Beedham[a & c]
[18] Lester Thurrow
[19] Geoff Mulgan[b]
[20] Judith Squires, Adonis and Mulgan
[21] quoted by Brian Beedham
[22] Brian Beedham[a]
[23] The Economist[a]
[24] Robert Cooper, The Group of Lisbon
[25] Michael Walzer
[26] Hazel Henderson[b], Stewart Lansley
[27] The Group of Lisbon, Stewart Lansley
[28] David Mercer[g]
[29] David Mercer[g]
[30] The RSA
[31] Newt Gingrich
[32] Harold Linstone
[33] Newt Gingrich
[34] John Gray, Hutton & Kay, Robert Cooper
[35] Mark Tushnet
[36] The Economist[c], Wyn Grant
[37] The Economist[q], Brian Beedham[a]
[38] The Economist[z] ,
[39] David Mercer[j], Czinkota et al
[40] The Economist[z]
[41] The Economist[q]
[42] The Economist[q]
[43] Brian Beedham[a]
[44] Adonis & Mulgan
[45] David Mercer[m], Joseph Coates[b], Adonis & Mulgan
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