revolutionary times, research into the future, futurology, predictions, forecasting, scenarios

This book describes the exciting future which will soon come about as a result of the dramatic changes which are now taking place around us.

As we look around us, at the end of the second Millennium, it might seem as if the end of the world is at hand. All - in the popular media at least - seems doom and gloom. Confusion - if not outright anarchy - rules. For just one typical example, Fintan O'Toole - a columnist with the Irish Times - contrasts it with the widespread optimism of the 'last fin de siècle', at the end of the nineteenth century. Then, "...the future was held by the likes of Sherlock Holmes [and] the application of scientific methods to the problems of the present would allow for a benign outcome in the future". The black pessimism of our own times, on the other hand, has rather different outcomes: "Our equivalents of the sleuth of Baker Street are Judge Dredd, Robocop, Blade Runner and Terminator, mythic figures in whom futuristic technology and mediaeval visions of hell have come together to form a nightmarish anti-utopia." Indeed, we have had mass genocide in Ruanda, intractable civil war in Bosnia, genuine anarchy in Somalia, wholesale unemployment around the world, and the under-classes setting up independent - drug-funded - rule in the inner cities of the United States. The family is breaking up; and more than 300 organisations, in the United States alone, look forward to seeing Armageddon arrive in the near future - at the end of this Millennium. Even Michel de Nostrodame (Nostradamus) forecast, 500 years ago:

Henry Porter - writing in the Guardian - colourfully sums up the position as "...all the forecasts and projections are pervaded with the cheeriness of a Hieronymus Bosch painting."

There is, indeed, some substance to the popular view that the very foundations of our world are being shaken. As we will see, the (IT) communications revolution means that our working lives will never be the same again; the economic effects of globalisation are being experienced everywhere; the social revolutions are rocking whole communities, and destroying the family; the demise of the nation state, and of its political parties, really is posing a threat to all politicians. It is no wonder that our leaders are just as confused as we are, and have no sensible answers to the problems we face. They increasingly retreat into comforting nostalgia about past values, whilst adopting corrupt practices to try - without success - to save their own skins. What hope is there for the future of humanity?

In fact, as this book reveals, the future - even in the relatively short term - should be viewed not with the pessimism we are seeing in the media - and, beneath the superficial gloss, in the speeches of our politicians - but with optimism. Thus, we already have a genuine global peace - with the nuclear threat largely removed - for the first time in half a century; even Southern Africa - with the blight of apartheid removed - is peaceful; the Third World in Asia - including, most notably India and China - is rapidly advancing towards developed status; dictatorships everywhere are being undermined by the new international harmony, and by the 'truths' being transmitted via satellite television; people in almost all countries are earning more - in the West the IT Revolution is making most of us significantly richer - and living longer; and the individual rights of mankind - and especially of womankind - are being recognised and protected. Thus, even though it may never make the headlines in the more sensationalist press, for the majority of us life has never been better!

That the future will be even better is not just my own personal view - or that of my esteemed colleagues - but the overwhelming, considered view of the representatives of more than a thousand organisations, who have worked with us over the past five years, on the research which underlies this book. In this way we have gathered the expectations - of what the future of humankind might be - from managers in most of the world's largest multinationals, as well as from government ministers and leaders of international bodies across the world. These have not been off the cuff comments made in informal interviews, but have been well considered decisions, the subject of intensive sessions lasting between three and thirty hours each. In any case, these represent, in one form or another, the expectations of the large organisations which will decide the future of the world over the next decades. Overall, then, the book describes the optimistic future which will come about as a result of these expectations.

Thus, the justification for the views I put forward - for the expectations about the future which I detail - are not my own, but are those of the many hundreds of individuals who each gave so much time and energy to the work; and for that I am enormously grateful to them. For you, as the reader it is also the guarantee that what this book has to say has the authority necessary for you to confidently use the map of the future it describes; as the basis for your own planning. It is the authority of those hundreds of contributors - coming not least from the fact that the expectations they reported already form the basis of the future planning for those many large organisations - which should assure you that the views reported in the book are genuinely meaningful. You should refer to the long list of acknowledgements, at the end of this book, to see who the main influences have been. If you need further proof, the list - the eminence of many of the contributors not just the numbers - should also settle any remaining doubts you might have! As such, the forces which are described in the book, and whose likely outcomes are mapped, are not just my speculations about the future, they are those which are already shaping that future. In most areas indeed, where there is an obvious convergence of these expectations, most of the individuals and groups involved clearly shared a common view of aspects of that future, so these results almost certainly spell out what will happen in that future. In particular, if these thousand or so key organisations are optimistic about the future - and in general they are - then the prospects for that future - for all of us - look good; and don't let any doomsayers tell you otherwise!

Beyond our own research, the quoted contributions selected from the several hundred other commentators[i] - whose work is again listed at the back of the book - have proved to be important at two levels. First, they fill gaps in coverage, where our groups did not have the requisite expertise to comment. Second, and in practice much more important, the comments made by these other ‘futurists’ also show - upon examination - a remarkable degree of convergence with each other and with the comments made by our own groups. To our surprise, they have demonstrated - with very few exceptions - that the overall picture of the future, seen from a variety of different perspectives, is the subject of widespread agreement.

The sophisticated new theory and research techniques we used are described in the various papers that we have published[ii]; but you do not have to understand them to appreciate the picture which has emerged from them, and which is described in this book.

For, as I said earlier, we live in truly revolutionary times. They are the most exciting - if the most confusing - that humanity has ever experienced. Christopher Farrell - writing in Business Week - succinctly describes the position as "On the eve of the 21st century, the signs of monumental change are all around us. Chinese capitalists. Russian entrepreneurs. Nelson Mandela President of South Africa. Inflation at 7% in Argentina. Internet connections expanding by 15% per month. Fibre Optics transmitting 40 billion bits of data a second. From government dictators to assembly line workers, everyone seems aware that unfamiliar and unusually powerful forces are at work. Says Shimon Peres, Israel's Foreign Minister 'We are not entering a new century. We are entering a new era.' A great transformation in world history is creating a new economic, social and political order". There may not be blood on the streets, but over the next few decades, life on Earth will experience more change than it has in several centuries past. For some, especially 'members of the establishment', these revolutionary changes will create anxiety; and the symptoms of such stress became very evident as the 'Crisis Decades', starting in the late 1970s, progressed. For the great majority, however, these changes will herald the coming of something approaching utopia. At present, though, that majority is - understandably - unnerved by the bewildering lack of leadership being shown by their politicians. One message of this book is, therefore, not just a forewarning of the society-shattering changes which are taking place but of the real hope they portend for most of humanity.

In the West - which will continue in the short-term to lead the development of society - the main changes will effect the very fabric of that society. Unfortunately, in our present age of uncertainty we are as yet aware of only parts of these changes - often, indeed, only the symptoms of the changes being wrought by the revolutions taking place around us - and do not see the complete picture. We interpret the parts, and in particular the more painful symptoms, as being the end of society as we know it; but they are in reality the start of something much more positive - and much more important. Thus, work, leisure, and even the hallowed institution of the family, are not disintegrating but are all metamorphosing into radically new forms; and, above all, we are at long last gaining control of our own destiny. The new form of the community in which we are to be located may as yet be uncertain, but the pain we now feel, and which we find so distressing, is not a symptom of a terminal decline - as many suggest - but is the inevitable accompaniment to progress.

The power of the mature individual will be experienced, at one extreme, in portfolios of lifestyles - allowing each of us to develop ourselves to the full - and, at the other, in portfolios of issues - and of political positions on these - again reflecting the our individual views. It is no wonder that politicians, and their establishment partners in the mass media, face the future with trepidation. The contempt in which they are held is largely deserved, as they try to apply old tricks to these new challenges. On the other hand, the rest of us should welcome what the future offers with open arms.

On the wider, global, scene, the changes will be even more dramatic. The citizens of the Third World are, in ever growing numbers, joining those who are already enjoying the fruits of development. For the first time, the majority of humanity will see a future which promises an increasing quality of life. In a world which now values individuals equally, in terms of their buying power almost as much as of their votes, the shift in power to the masses will itself have dramatic consequences. At the other extreme, however, we will - as the most important collaborative venture of the new age - see the start of the long-delayed colonisation of space; to give impetus to a, literally, ever-expanding future. Nobody may have gone before into these as yet inhospitable domains, but millions will soon do so; and billions will eventually find their home there.

In previous times, such thoughts might have been dismissed as, literally, utopian. Perhaps the greatest change of all is, therefore, that this need no longer be the case. For the first time we can afford to realise even our wildest dreams. The potential resources at our command already exceed anything we might need to create that utopian future. The well publicised fears of the environmentalists are exacerbated by what they see as the inevitably bad behaviour of humanity. This book - covering a much wider range of issues than they focus on, and with a much better appreciation of what expectations others hold - makes the (fully justified) assumption that the long-term future of humanity will, however, be created by its good behaviour. We will positively choose to make the correct decisions about the environment. Indeed, the widely reported fears of environmental catastrophe are, whilst highly exaggerated, a very visible reassurance that we will resolve the problems facing us. Our research results show that they are a positive sign of our determination to take the necessary actions, rather than a negative one of a profound dereliction of duty which really would lead to disaster.

In this context, the challenge is now to redistribute the resources to where they are needed, and then to manage them so that their use might be optimised and not, as at present, squandered. We already have the food, energy and mineral resources which are needed for the immediate future, and those needed for the longer term await development in space if not on Earth. Above all, however, we have now created - even in most parts of the Third World - the ultimate resource needed; an educated population. Given a humankind which does choose to make the correct political decisions, the future is unlimited.

The outcome is that social forces, almost by themselves, will now shape that future. What people want, and - perhaps more important - what they expect, to happen will largely determine what will happen! The great advantage, in the context of this book, is that by capturing people's expectations of the future we can now predict that future - at least in terms of the most important changes to be expected. Where the considered expectations of more than a thousand representatives of the major organisations, which already run our world, have been gathered - as they have been for this book - we can indeed begin to have some confidence in such predictions, even in terms of some of the details.

An even more important message is, however, that the future will now be what we choose to make it! James Ogilvy - one of the founders of the Global Business Network - suggests that “Simply to be a human being is to be a futurist of sorts, for human freedom is largely a matter of imagining alternative futures and then choosing between them.” More conventionally, it is the global debate, in which we should all participate and to which this book will hopefully contribute, which will ultimately decide the realised future.

revolutionary trends

I rather understated the drama about to unfold, when I referred to it as revolutionary. As I also hinted, there are, in fact, a number of different revolutions taking place - which are each due to reach their separate climaxes in the coming decades. Thus, the very title of Christopher Farrell's article - The Triple Revolution - suggests that there are three of these. I suspect there may be even more - it depends upon how you define the overlaps between them - but three is enough with which to get started! Each of these might be argued to be as important as the previous revolutions which have unsettled humanity. Coming together, and being leveraged by the powerful psychological impact of the Millennium, it is not unreasonable that there will be an accompanying, dramatic series of changes in society.

The first of these revolutions is that which has been most widely described, as the IT Revolution, though it might now more accurately titled the Communications Revolution - since it is the wider impacts brought about by the dramatically enhanced powers of individual communication which will ultimately have the greatest effect on society. This is part of a general revolution in technology, which means that we have to hand, albeit not always yet in production, the technology necessary for humanity's development over the next half century. It is very difficult to conceive of any programme of development which might be held back because the technology was not available.

The second set of revolutions are to be seen in the field of sociology. Although they tend to parallel each other, they can be most meaningfully seen as three separate revolutions. The first of these carries the often quoted title of 'post-modernism'. It is fair to say that more has been misunderstood about this subject, usually by those lecturing about it, than has been established by its promoters. In general, the best approach seems to be to take the title literally, since 'modernism' is now quite well established as a phase in development; the form of society which emerged after the first Industrial Revolution - and which has provided the context for most people's lives until recently. In the historical context, Post-Modernism simply is the next stage of development beyond this. I prefer to deal with the phenomenon more simply, and to characterise it above all as the empowerment of the individual.

The second social revolution, which has been promised by some for a number of decades, is that of 'post-materialism'. This takes as its starting point the fact that many individuals have now reached satiation in terms of the goods they own; the usefulness of the third or fourth car must surely be a lot less than that of the first. The expected result is that the focus of their purchases will shift to the non-material; in terms of the hopes expressed by the proponents of this viewpoint, 'towards a more inwardly directed, not to say more spiritual, life'. Whether these hopes of a 'better' society will be realised is questionable, but what cannot be challenged is that society is certainly moving away from the acquisition of physical goods as the prime source of demand. Not least, this is reflected in the shift in patterns of employment to meet the rapidly increasing demand from the service sector.

The third social revolution relates to the patterns of work. It is sometimes referred to as 'post-Fordism'. The symbol of the modernist period was the production line, where dehumanised workers were driven by, and almost became part of, the machine. Now, the move to the information society, and the parallel move to service work, means that the individual - using his or her intelligence flexibly - has become the prime generator of added value. Thus, the individual has become the most important investment, especially in terms of the education and training they have received. This has long been recognised by the Japanese corporations, and is now being emulated by the more advanced organisations in the West.

resources

As has already been stated, the key to these developments will be the fact that, for the first time, the resources are now available to achieve almost all that society might want. Those resources are, though, unevenly distributed and government intervention - on the international and supranational scale - will be needed to rectify this; since this is the definitely not the sort of problem with which any market, even a politically neutral one, can deal effectively.

Subject to this redistribution, in general there is already enough food to feed everyone, enough mineral resources to supply industry and enough energy to power it - albeit not at the sort of artificially low prices which led to the wasteful excesses before the 1970s[iii]. In any case, in outer space there is all of this in abundance; not least almost free solar power.

Above all, there is now sufficient educated manpower to take advantage of these physical resources. It is humanity itself, especially those members with special skills, which now is in the shortest supply. On the other hand, many countries - including some in the Third World as well as those in the Developed World - have invested heavily over recent decades; to educate their populations to the level needed to create the unlimited future this book describes.

An especially important effect, in the West at least, is that the emancipation of women is now going beyond mere equality, to even establish a form of supremacy - so that the beginning of the Third Millennium might be considered to be the age of women. Not merely are the ‘feminine’ societal values coming to the fore, but the new female stereotype - with its emphasis on education - better fits them for the intellectual demands of the new information society - in the new century.

Indeed, the IT Revolution - at long last living up to its popular reputation - is becoming a major driver for change. It is not, though, the technology itself which matters most. Despite all the hype, the appearance of the PC on so many desks has not made a major impact. So far it has been typically used as a replacement for the typewriter and calculator; and has been most often acquired as a status symbol. The major impact is only beginning now that these millions of PCs are being connected to each other. When they connect directly to our brains, as some scientists are predicting, the power of human beings - not just computers - will grow even more dramatically; creating a new stage of evolution - homo integrans!

This form of communication is genuinely revolutionary. It expands the horizons of the individual by an order of magnitude. Much has been made of the ability to 'talk' to people on the other side of the globe, but the real benefit will initially come from the ability to talk simultaneously, and efficiently, to tens of people in the same office as yourself. Even without the direct interface with our brains which is predicted, it still represents a genuinely new form of communication; which will enable many more people to gain access to the discussions which have previously taken place between a few privileged individuals. Much of the language of this new medium remains to be developed, so its power has not yet been really tested; but the potential for widening both the 'senses' of the individual and their knowledge - especially that held personally by others rather than impersonally in libraries - can already be seen to have truly revolutionary potential.

The impact upon society as a whole will be no less great. In organisational terms, the most important new communications flows will be horizontal rather than vertical. This has already started to undermine the traditional role of management, but it will go farther - to demand management structures which are very close to those of the Japanese corporations. This will result in the consequent reinforcement of the view that individuals working in an organisation be recognised as its most important investment.

At the personal level, it will massively reinforce the ability of the individual to build his or her own tailored portfolio of lifestyles. This is where the expansion of horizons may be most adventurous - especially when the new super-highways allow the easy, and cheap, transmission of video material as well as text. The new groups, to which they can belong, may no longer be restricted to members gathered from the surrounding communities; they really will be able to contain members from around the world - without regard for distance. This is already how physicists researching high energy particles operate - they even run their experiments from thousands of miles away - but in future it may be just as easily how champion growers of leeks communicate with fellow aficionados!

I have already talked about space in terms of the effectively unlimited resources waiting there, and that will no doubt provide the commercial incentive, or at least the excuse, for its exploitation. On the other hand, the psychological needs seem to be even more potent. A consistent aspect of the scenarios emerging in my investigations has been a persistent worry about 'disasters'. These typically see humanity wiped out by an uncontrollable event, now more typically a natural disaster - such as a comet hitting the Earth or a new, unstoppable disease - rather than a man made one - global warming or a nuclear war. This is an especially catastrophic version of the range of environmental disasters which have more generally dominated the headlines in the popular press. According to our research, however, the favourite insurance against such threats is now to spread humanity beyond the bounds of Earth; most memorably described by the writer of one of our group scenarios as 'God selects a second Ark - a Space Ark'. The real statistics behind such risks may not justify the development of space, though the large number of deaths caused by such a disaster means that you actually are more likely to die in this fashion than in a plane crash, but the powerful - albeit somewhat irrational - fears of the public still represent a powerful argument for colonisation of other worlds.

At the same time, while humanity is moving towards a global society - and ultimately - to global political union, space may represent a very important unifying focus for this thrust.

global individualism

The emergence of the individual - described earlier - is rapidly becoming a world-wide phenomenon. Empowerment of that individual, especially of women, has become a touchstone of the development of a country's civilisation. Confusingly, it is often described in terms of empowerment of just the individuals in the elite; the friends of the establishment. These are to be freed of constrictions, to make almost obscene profits at the expense of others - rabid capitalism of this type has been the byword of many governments in recent decades. On the other hand, the same messages are - unnoticed by many of the politicians promoting them - just as avidly being absorbed by the many other individuals who would previously have been consigned to a mere role as part of the 'masses'. These new voters are starting to demand the genuinely individual rights which have been, albeit rhetorically, already offered!

The new Right would claim that this growing individualism has removed the need for public provision; the market should, and will, provide all - privatisation is the only solution. Margaret Thatcher memorably summarised this view when she claimed that there was 'no such thing as society'! The result is that, during the crisis decades at the end of the 20th century, much of the role of the community has been dismantled. Some would go so far as to say that the social infra-structure has been more gratuitously vandalised by disoriented governments themselves than by the under-classes which they have created, and which they so fear.

The paradox is that the new individual is in greater need of the community! Left alone, with only the market to mediate his or her aspirations, the result would be anarchy. Chaos would ensue as the billions of individuals demanded their own rights, regardless of those of others. This is, despite the free-market rhetoric of politicians, already recognised by the ever growing number of regulations which seek to constrain the activities of all parts of society. Our research[iv] shows that even the management establishment, which - in a free-market economy - should be leading future developments, looks above all to government regulation to determine its future.

The reality is that a new relationship - a compact if not a contract - needs to be developed between the community and the individuals which it contains. On the other hand, the model of previous generations - whereby the community arbitrarily imposed the views of majority groups on everyone - no longer meets the needs of the individuals involved. What the new relationship will be is not yet clear to see; though the evidence is that it is already emerging, around the fringes of existing society, and it definitely will not be one prescribed by ideological extremes. It will no longer be sufficient to dogmatically provide just one solution to any problem. With the growing complexity of the needs of individuals, there will often need to be almost as many solutions as there are individuals involved. Before the information society this would have been impossible, but the new technology now offers the possibility of a viable outcome. Each of us can now, at least in theory - and soon in practice, have a unique relationship with the community to which we belong.

To a certain extent, however, it is no longer possible to describe just one community to which an individual belongs. In most Western countries the days when a geographic neighbourhood - and a related class or group membership - determined the community to which any individual belonged are long since gone. Indeed, neighbours are now one of the groups with which individuals see themselves as having little in common. Even the community of fellow workers is diminishing in importance, as the workplace loses its place as the focus of the individual's life. Instead, we now typically give a shifting allegiance in turn to each of the multiple groups to which we belong. Depending upon the circumstances, we may indeed see our interests shared with very different, even seemingly contradictory, groups. At work our loyalty may still be to our fellow workers, but it might also be to the profession to which we belong - or to the project group with which we are currently associated. As a consumer we might pose as a figure of fashion, or see ourselves as a protector of the green environment. In our free time we might be a member of a sports club, or a study group, or a local pressure group.

Indeed, the growing political importance of single issue pressure groups most graphically illustrates how complex the process may become. In future we may see no contradiction in supporting a left-wing environmental group while, at the same time, we are an active member of a right-wing local conservationist group. This may offend the main political parties, who have come to depend upon individuals committing their blanket support across all issues. It is, however, typical of the new portfolio approach being adopted by us; we now decide for ourselves, on each separate issue, what is the correct decision and refuse to sub-contract it to the establishment. We are already demonstrating our resolve by adopting new forms of family relationship; and it is these changes - unrecognised and unblessed by the establishment - which, rather than actual breakdown of the institution itself, are significant.

In part, this new portfolio approach will be provided by the market; as lifestyle marketing has already, in very crude form, attempted to do. The resulting many markets, and segments within them, will though place new demands upon management - with the rapid growth of computer driven database marketing, which aims to simulate a unique, personal relationship between a supplier and each customer, for example.

In the main, however, it will require an increased provision of public, community services. Many of our needs - not least our demand to live in a suitable environment - can only be met by the community. The market simply is not equipped to provide many of these services. The immediate need will be even greater, where these services are precisely those which were vandalised by governments during the crisis decades; though the availability of large numbers of unemployed, and unskilled, workers - the category needed for such support - should aid the recovery.

As was mentioned earlier, perhaps the most potent driver will be, though, the rapidly growing power of women. They, even now, are shaking off the constraints imposed by men and - as their traditional talents, let alone the new skills they are now learning, are already better suited to the demands of the new information society - they are starting to achieve the genuine equality of opportunity that should have been theirs long ago. More important, the whole of the new society - men as well as women - is beginning to accept increasingly ‘feminine’ values - co-operation rather than competition - so that, as claimed earlier, the twenty-first century may justifiably come to be called the women’s century.

global power

Globalisation is bringing a common viewpoint, and much the same set of shared values and aspirations, to peoples around the world. Television now reaches almost all communities; even the slums of Bombay are being wired up for satellite reception. Only the most remote Third World farming communities are as yet beyond its grasp. In this way, television is by far the most potent educative medium for the whole world. This carries its own risks, where the products of Hollywood are all pervasive. Its unreal lifestyles set the standards for impossibly happy family life in the West as much as elsewhere. This poses a degree of responsibility which the commercially driven entertainers ignore. The result is that the dream of many around the world is to live in downtown Los Angeles; a dream which those who have actually visited the place would more readily characterise as a nightmare!

In addition, as I mentioned earlier, redistribution of resources - around the world - should be one of the key features of the next century. Indeed, the new redistribution of political power will encourage a fairer distribution of economic power; and will persuade even governments and corporations in the West to divert rather more of their ever-growing resources to the development of the Third World. This will be for two reasons of considerable self-interest. Wealth increasingly depends upon market demand rather than supplier pressure, and - with more than 90% of the world's population - the Third World will become the main economic driver in the Third Millennium. At the same time, the political power - driven by the same inexorable numbers of population - will also swing to the Third World. Everyone - even the most selfish politician in the West - now understands that it is better to have friends, rather than enemies, holding the reins of power. The same shifts of power will inevitably also lead to a change in the state of mind of the current superpowers - who no longer will be able to dominate global politics. As the pendulum starts to swing the other way, there is likely to be a scramble to put in place genuinely democratic supra-national institutions; ones which will protect the interests of minorities - as the Western powers will become - rather than continue to entrench the interests of the major players as does the United Nations! In any case, the power of the latter is gradually slipping away, as it follows the path of its predecessor - The League of Nations - into obscurity.

Supporters of world government have long been held in as much contempt as UFO spotters - not least by politicians and the media. Yet, it should now be obvious that some form of global regulation is rapidly becoming essential. If the growing globalisation, encouraged by the world-wide networks of communications, were not enough, one has only to look at the way global financial markets - the first to take maximum advantage of the new communications - allow speculators to outwit national governments; and hijack macro-economic strategy.

The first steps are already clearly visible, in the form of the regional groupings; such as the EU and NAFTA. The former is especially important in terms of the power of the idea - of full political union - it encapsulates. The latter is important in terms of the moderation it might bring to the external policies of the US - which is seen to be the one state which will move in the opposite direction to the rest of the world; into increasing, internal, anarchy. There are other, hesitant, steps being taken elsewhere towards such supra-national groupings; especially in terms of the Pacific Rim countries, but also with the Mercosur group in South America. Thus, there is already on the drawing board a three- or four-way split of the world; described - in slightly different nationally based, terms - by Kenichi Ohmae as the Triad. This will undoubtedly shift as the members of the Third World make their own groupings or join those in the First World, but the principle of large economic - and almost inevitably political - groupings of nations is already established; with a seemingly unstoppable momentum. It should not be an unthinkable further step to reach the ultimate goal of a global society; though one which is not totalitarian, but which contains a great diversity of approaches amongst its members. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that world government is already present, in embryo form, as the European Union. The idea, behind what is now a political as well as economic union, is possibly one of the most important shaping the future of the world.

the POLITICAL establishment

Accompanying this social revolution in the position of the individual has been a parallel political revolution; though this has yet to be fully recognised. Politicians in the West have long claimed that democracy, the people's vote, is the best - many of them would claim the only - satisfactory source of government power. It was ultimately this power of the individual, and not capitalism, which defeated the Marxist governments of Eastern Europe.

Yet, whilst claiming to be the guardians of democracy, Western governments themselves have signally failed to recognise the implications which emerge when people like us come to demand that power really is distributed to the individual. The lessons of Eastern Europe, graphically conveyed on television, have since been well learned, not just by those who have thrown of the yoke of Soviet imperialism, but by all of us in the West. They have been leveraged by the move to genuine equality; not least by the remarkably effective feminist movements. Above all, as we have seen, women have come to realise that they are individuals with real power not just dependent members of a family, and are now leading the revolutions. Indeed, it is worth repeating, the 21st century may come eventually to be seen as the century of women!

Individualism has - not least - been seen in our buying power; first - after being freed from subsistence existence - as the conspicuous consumption reflected in our individual lifestyles, but more recently as our responsible buying to protect the green environment. Potentially most important of all, though, it is now being seen in our voter power; our voting out of office, around the world, governments which have long considered that they had a monopoly on power.

At the same time, the spread of power has changed dramatically. For most of the past century it has traditionally belonged to national governments, even where the nation was an artificial construct. Now it is being stretched in two opposing directions. The regions, often 'tribally' or ethnically based, are demanding an increasing say in their own affairs - and below them even separate communities may demand to decide their own future. In the other direction, as globalisation bites - and no part of the globe can any longer isolate itself from the rest, which is now a mere microsecond away on the electronic networks - governments are increasingly being forced into supra-national groupings. These are, for the first time, starting to garner their own powers, which overrule the national powers of their members.

The confusion and uncertainty, caused by these revolutions coming along at the same time, have resulted in a great deal of pain for some of us. Martin Wroe, for instance, catalogues a number of individual's views of the 1990s, when this 'pain' became especially evident; Richard Hoggart - the historian - "The Nineties are a disordered decade"; Andrew Roberts - another historian, but this time from the right wing - "It's not a brave decade but a soul searching decade"; Malcolm Bradbury - the novelist - the "Decade of Disenchantment"; Geoff Mulgan - director of the Demos think-tank - "Insecurity pervades the life of ordinary people"; Matthew Sturgis - author of a study on the 1890s - the "Age of Worry"; Katherine Flett - editor of Arena - "the Nineties, a decade in search of an identity". The seminal event of the decade, described by almost all of them, actually took place at the end of the previous decade - in 1989 - the fall of the Berlin Wall; which signalled, for many of us, the start of a global revolution in politics.

These 'revolutionary pains' are an inevitable accompaniment to the changes which are experienced in any significant revolution - let alone in the number of separate revolutions we are now experiencing. Indeed, it is remarkable, in view of the historical precedents that we are not suffering more pain. It is especially encouraging to note that the social and political revolutions have, in general, been almost bloodless; even that which broke the sway communism held over almost half the world. If this is any evidence, humanity has matured to the point at which we can be trusted to steer our own course to the future. Charles Handy is particularly positive about the outcome of these rapid changes "I believe that discontinuity is not catastrophe, and that it certainly need not be catastrophe. Indeed, I will argue that discontinuous change is the only way forward for a tramlines society, one that has got used to its ruts..."

Even so, it is these pains - the symptoms of revolution - which most of us (and almost all politicians) observe; and it is these on which we focus in our debates about the future. Because we do not look beyond these immediate symptoms, to see the underlying, structural changes which will eventually bring great benefits to most of us in the longer term, we adopt policies which make the position worse. The problem is, thus, exacerbated by the short-sightedness of those of us who should know better.

These short-term pains are the most immediate problem - and the main threat to a positive outcome in the longer term. The main theme of this book is that we can create a better future; a much better one if we want to. The corollary, though, must be that we can also create a worse one!

shaping the future

The first step in creating the optimal future is simply in recognising the alternative futures which might come about. The technique we use in this context is scenario planning: and, accordingly, we have developed a range of approaches which make this much easier to implement[v].

Beyond this, though, there is a need to plan for the longer-term; to produce robust strategies which ensure survival. We have found that the problems for many organisations, just as much as governments, come about because this process is fatally confused with the production of the shorter-term strategies (the 'corporate strategies' beloved of commercial organisations); which aim to optimise current performance. The problem is best illustrated by comparing the two:

‘CORPORATE’ STRATEGY ‘ROBUST’ STRATEGIES

It should be clear, from this table, that the two are potentially in conflict. Fortunately, as we will see in the last chapter (and in the work we have published[vi]), the 'generic robust strategies', which are already in widespread use, minimise the danger. Even so, it is easy to see why short-termism, perhaps the worst legacy of the 1980s, can be so damaging.

Fortunately, a new mood of co-operation - addressing long-term issues of mutual importance - is emerging as the Millennium approaches, and the presence of such a global consensus is especially important where we can now begin to shape our own destiny. As we have seen, the future is no longer constrained by any lack of resources; it is largely shaped by social movements. Despite the earnest efforts of academics, not least amongst economists, to find the exact equations which govern the behaviour of society, the outcomes are typically far more chaotic than they allow for. The solution, however, is remarkably simple. Our research shows that, if you can persuade the members of society involved to agree not just on a desired outcome but on the expected one, it is likely that is exactly what will happen.

In fact, much of society now looks to 'rational expectations' - to misuse a favourite phrase of the later monetarists - to set their personal expectations of what will actually happen. These are outcomes which they are persuaded will inevitably happen given certain inputs. If enough of put us weight behind the same 'rational expectations', and the inputs are observed to happen, we will adjust their behaviour to take account of what is expected; and, lo and behold, the expected outcomes will occur!

The lesson should be clear for all to see. If we can only agree what it should be, the future is ours to shape.

Overall, then, the book describes the future which will come about as a result of current expectations. At the same time, however, it sets in place many of the rules which will allow humanity ultimately to write its own future.

The greater part of this book describes the future. At the same time, as we have already seen, it introduces a number of new concepts - which are small in number, but remarkably powerful in effect. They, by themselves, should enable us to take an active part in the development of our own future.

#1 - The future of humanity is, in general, no longer constrained by any significant shortage of resources.

This is almost a revolutionary assumption, but - as you will see in the chapters which follow - it is a fully justified one. It is revolutionary, therefore, not because it flies in the face of known facts, but because so much of current social, political and economic theory, and policy, assumes exactly the opposite!

#2 - Accordingly, that future is now being progressively determined by social decisions, taken not just by a few leaders but by millions of us, taking billions of small decisions as part of our daily lives.

Thus, our lives are no longer ruled by the harsh logic of economics or the whims of political ideology - but are decided by our own actions.

#3 - The general, longer-term, framework within which these specific, individual decisions is taken is largely provided by our expectations of what the future holds for us.

Man, and woman, has free will; we will ultimately make our own decision, but a major influence on that decision - and often the most important influence - is what we expect the future to be, and hence how it will generally determine the ultimate outcome of our own small decision.

#1 - If you can accurately measure these 'expectations' as to future developments, to a large extent you can as accurately predict the most likely form of that future.

Even if you can just determine the expectations of the opinion-leaders, as the research which underpins this book does, you can still predict, with some degree of accuracy, the major elements currently shaping the future. You can, to put it crudely, see the future which is already written. This is, therefore, what the rest of the book describes.

#2 - If you can shape these expectations, by whatever political or persuasive processes available to you, you can shape that future - and bend it away from the line it is currently following.

This last concept, which is developed further in the last chapter of the book (and in our published work[vii]), is the most powerful of all. It does not say, as many politicians believe, that leaders can decide the future by themselves. What it says is that if you know what the existing expectations are, you can - as a leader - redirect these to some extent, so that the outcomes move closer to what you want to happen. The key point is that there are two stages to this process. The first is simply to establish what are the existing expectations; not least to determine whether you can achieve a suitable outcome. Some expectations simply cannot be shifted to the extent desired. The second stage is that you can then plan how to reposition those expectations

The research work which underpins the material in this book addresses both these points. Our quantified work with individuals accurately pinpoints where their current expectations lie[viii]. Our work with groups, on the other hand, indicates the potential for future shifts in expectations - which our leaders can realistically expect to bring about[ix].

For the first time in history, we - as a civilisation - can now choose our own future. Unconstrained by shortages of resources, we can decide for ourselves what we want for ourselves and for our children. This is a new privilege - but it carries an equivalent responsibility. No longer will we be able to blame others for our history.

The description of the future, which occupies most of the later chapters, is quite simply the result of 'measuring' opinion leaders' expectations of the future; in line with the first of the outcomes listed above. The theory above should, therefore, serve to justify some confidence in the process which led to the conclusions we have reached. For the rest of the book - until the last chapter, where I return to look at the practical uses of the second outcome, you can rest assured that no more theory is to be inflicted upon you!

DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE FUTURE

This book contains descriptions of the great many expected changes our research groups predicted; and supports these with further references from a wide variety of sources. As such, whilst it is undeniably comprehensive, it might be confusing for more general readers; at least in terms of the overall patterns of change which lie behind these details. Accordingly, to help organise these ideas into a more immediately meaningful whole, the material is collected into twelve separate chapters - each of which addresses a set of related issues.

On top of this, though, there is a further framework - chosen to highlight the main alternatives facing humanity - in the form of four main sections; which, between them, contain all the key developments to be expected. In one important respect, these four sections are - in effect - further grouped into two sets. The first three of them (generally titled: 'incremental technology', ‘society’s winners’ and 'a shared world’) are, reflecting the views of our research groups (and most futurists ) focused on generally optimistic outcomes. The fourth scenario ('dark fears’) is, however, much more equivocal; indeed, it could potentially lead to pessimistic outcomes. The overall balance between these scenarios, three 'votes' for optimism to one for pessimism, reflects our own estimate of the most realistic odds on the final out-turn.

INCREMENTAL TECHNOLOGY - this looks at technological developments in general, including those in medicine along with those concerning the development of outer space itself and IT based communications. It reflects the potential already being demonstrated in these fields, which leads to the underlying assumption - of the book as a whole - that humanity's resources are now effectively unlimited. It is the most clearly defined view of the future, as well as being the most optimistic one. It, along with that of 'a shared world’, is incremental in form - the changes will come about gradually - where the other two ('society’s winners' and 'dark fears’) may be subject to major discontinuities.

SOCIETY’S WINNERS - as indicated above, this is a much less certain view; reflecting the, as yet, unknown shape of the society which will finally emerge from the moves to individualism - be it post-modern and/or post-material - and to new forms of community, which in turn are based upon more feminine values. It, too, is an optimistic one, which mirrors the very real benefits arising from the empowerment of the individual, and especially of women.

A SHARED WORLD - again, this reflects a more predictable (incremental) development; as the large populations in the Third World come to receive their fair share of global resources - and ultimately to dominate world-wide economic and political processes. Even though it is - to a degree - predictable, it is an aspect of the future not yet understood by politicians; and just as misunderstood are the accompanying moves to power sharing at different levels - from the community up to supra-national groupings, but always away from nation-states.

DARK FEARS - this is another especially unpredictable view, which will probably not determine the long term future, but will determine the degree of revolutionary pain we will experience on the way to that future. It describes the fragmentation of political certainties and the - futile - struggles of the establishment to retain power against the emerging forces of change.

All of these predicted developments are described in the chapters which follow. Please turn the page and step into the future!

[i] And, where there is insufficient space to include all of these comments, the related footnote gives the source(s) which will provide further material on the subject.

[ii] Including the key papers by David Mercer [l and m]

[iii] Galbraith, Kenneth

[iv] David Mercer [i]

[v] David Mercer [d, d & n]

[vi] David Mercer [ n & m]

[vii] David Mercer [l]

[viii] In terms of the importance of the issue (on a scale of 0, unimportant, to 10, most important) and its (percentage) probability of occurring, as well as the most likely date by which this will happen - all of which are regularly referred to in the book.

[ix] Measured, in this case in terms of the proportion of groups mentioning the issue (along with the overall number of such mentions); again indicated throughout the book, so that you may have a better understanding of the relative potential for each expectation.