[2018] FUTURES RESEARCH

6094 FUTREV 9 - THE DEATH OF NATIONS (9,062 WORDS)

This chapter addresses the new realities of global power, and in particular the relative decline of the nation-state, which is steadily losing its powers; downwards to communities and upwards to the new supra-national groupings. These resulting shifts in power will have an impact on populations around the world.

To start this chapter, however, I will examine the future of the most important individual nations in some more detail. Indeed, many other commentators organise their review of future developments nation by nation - arguing that the character of each nation will be the key to its future. As you will by now be aware, we do not generally subscribe to this view - believing that the forces at work are bigger than nations, and so we generally choose to describe them in global terms. Even so, national characteristics will be, in some key instances, very influential. In particular, the first nation we will examine, the United States of America, can be seen as the exception that proves the rule - its idiosyncratic future is likely to be largely determined by its national characteristics!

UNITED STATES

Thus, though the nation state may in general be weakened, some will still continue to represent major forces in their own right. Of these, the United States will continue to reign supreme for some time to come. Its development will though, be atypical[1]. Almost all our groups saw the development of the US diverging from the path(s) likely to be followed by most of the rest of the world - and most also saw that divergence as a potential source of global conflict. Even so, less than a half of the groups formally predicted that the US will actually decline as a world power; and, though four fifths of individuals foresaw a decline, they did not expect this to happen before 2025.

The viewpoint put forward by the groups was that the US, alone of all countries, has probably gone too far along the road to creating a large, ungovernable under-class. It seems to be the only nation where the gulf between these unfortunates and the other, relatively rich, members of society has become institutionalised - creating two nations, in a way which has rarely been seen in developed countries since Victorian times. This schism is already the most characteristic feature of much of US society[2], and it is likely to develop to dominate the future workings of that society[3]. There is, though, room for a wide range of opinions on the subject. Marvin Cetron[a], much more optimistically, sees that, as a result of his forecast of a move to more progressive taxes and benefits, "The [numbers of] very poor and the very wealthy will decline in American Society"[4]; but this very optimistic view of the US was definitely not shared by any of our groups. In the US the rich are increasingly denying the poor any significant share in the considerable wealth of the country. Further, in the US this represents an absolute reduction in the latter's incomes not just an increase in relative deprivation. As The Economist[g] points out "In both America and Britain, income inequalities are now larger than at any time since the 1930s. But there is one big difference between the two countries: in Britain average real incomes have risen fairly briskly over the past two decades; in America they have risen only slightly. Combined with greater inequality this means that America's poor, unlike Britain's, have grown poorer absolutely in the past two decades[5].

The picture is, unfortunately, even more complex, for as reported in The Economist again, 37% of even working class Americans said that large differences in income, and hence an indefinite continuation of the existence of the under-classes, were necessary  for their own continued prosperity (where only 25% of their British counterparts agreed with this statement, and only 9% of the Dutch). Yet, full of fear for the outcome of their actions, the US rich barricade themselves into fortified ghettos. The poor, on the other hand, set up their own, crime (drug) funded, states within a state. In any case, the US economy as a whole is living on borrowed time - as external assets are run down to pay for the profligate lifestyle its citizens and government can no longer afford. Hamish McRae[b] records that "The figures for savings show that the US saved less than any other large advanced industrial nation during the second half of the 1980s". It should be noted, however, that - as the Brookings Institute[6] has pointed out - this may not be as much of a problem as it might be for weaker countries; since the US can probably continue to run down its assets for a century or more before it is declared 'bankrupt'! Having said that, however, the rest of the world will increasingly look askance at these two aspects of national character - the failure to treat all members of its society fairly, with the consequent emergence of a crime dominated culture, and the refusal to live within its means. This questionable behaviour will probably lose it the political leadership of the world, even of the developed world, which it currently enjoys.

The United States will, therefore, probably come to exemplify the apocalyptic alternative for the future; though less than half our individuals expected to see a ‘fortification of white USA’. As such, indeed, it will offer a useful lesson for the rest of the world; reminding backsliding nations of the dark forces which might also overwhelm them - in a paradoxical reversal of the role in which the US previously cast the communist regimes! In particular, the real fear felt by the mass of its population - in the cities at least - will be conveyed to the rest of the world; and its image, especially on television, will increasingly be created by pictures of its under-class no-go areas burning out of control. This may be an unfair representation of much of the US, of middle-America for instance, but a devastated down-town LA will replace an idealised Beverley Hills as the symbol of the new US[7].

The other side of the coin is shown by the number of US lawyers - at 756,000 in 1990 (compared with 260,000 in 1960 and less than 15,000 in Japan!) - where Hamish McRae[b], again, offers the comment that "...there is some evidence that the number of lawyers in a country is in inverse proportion to its growth rate. Too many lawyers, so it would seem, actually destroy wealth."  The result of this growing gulf is that, again according to Hamish McRae, "Edge cities, and the decline of inner urban areas, are a key feature which will distinguish the US from the rest of the world": a view with which many of our groups would concur. Brave political actions might rescue the situation; but it would have to be a very brave, not to say foolhardy, politician who took these actions, where so many of the electorate already accept this situation as an inevitable price which has to be paid for their own prosperity. During his first term Bill Clinton, for one, learned - the hard way - the impossibility of attempting such radical solutions.

US economic power

Even so, the United States is likely to remain an economic super-power[8], as well as a military one, for the foreseeable future[9]. Despite much of its industry growing uncompetitive on world markets, this will continue to be protected by the almost monopoly access it has to its own domestic markets. In addition, despite the gloomy prognostications in the previous paragraphs, most US citizens will live in acceptable environments[10]. Indeed, there are anomalies behind the otherwise harsh social philosophies held by individuals there. Peter Drucker[b], for instance, reports the surprising fact that "Every other American adult - 90 million altogether - works at least three hours a week...as a volunteer for a non-profit organization..." Above all, though, its leading-edge, high-tech industries will continue to lead the world. The anarchy, which will be tearing the rest of the US apart, will here - in its purest entrepreneurial form - continue to create the great technological innovations of the first half of the 21st century. Its computer corporations will dominate the development of the IT Revolution. Its media corporations will rule the communications world. Even NASA will continue to lead the development of space.[11]

Furthermore, the US will not become, as some fear, irretrievably isolationist; this no longer a viable option. Despite the gulf between it and the rest of the world, it will not be able to avoid the global forces which are sweeping the world. In any case, it is too far down the line with NAFTA (which will probably expand to cover most of North and South America); and its dominant trans-national corporations could never afford for it to withdraw from international affairs and the coming global society.

The growing schism between the rich and the under-classes will increasingly characterise US society. It, and the run down of its economic wealth (not least due the cost of crime), will lose the US the political leadership of the world.

Despite its social problems, the US will remain a powerful economic force; and its high-tech industries will continue to lead the world for the foreseeable future. It will not lapse into isolationism.

japan

This nation is already a leading superpower[12]; and, in many respects, is leading the world into the 21st century - including facing up to the problems caused by its rapidly aging population[13]. Its managerial practices, at least, are seen to offer a model for the rest of the world[14]. It has a very pragmatic blend of government intervention[15] and private sector entrepreneurship - both geared to the long-term. Though MITI (its renowned Ministry of International Trade and Industry) assured us - in our contacts with its senior management - that it now works by encouragement rather than by directive, this amounts to much the same in the Japanese culture and it has proved just as has proved unbeatable in practice; and just as difficult for other nations, immersed in free-market dogma, to copy[16],.

The question which still hangs over its future, though, is the strength of its existing culture[17]. How, for instance, is it to take advantage of the moves to individualism which characterise many of the developments elsewhere? Japanese culture has very effectively emphasised membership of the group; to the extent of demanding conformity from individuals. The definitive saying, endlessly repeated to school-children, is "The nail which stands proud is hammered flat." Will the existing culture, which has similarities with others in the Far East, come to dominate that of the other Pacific Rim countries? On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the upcoming generations in Japan are rejecting the older culture - as a matter of principle not just as the result of the normal generation gap - and wholeheartedly embracing the western model[18]; which will pose rather different tensions within Japan.

Japan will continue to be a superpower, leading the Pacific Rim countries. It is not clear, however, whether it will in effect impose its existing culture on the region, or will also move to the philosophy of individualism which is emerging elsewhere.

European union

In the West, at least, the most dynamic 'nation' will be the European Union (EU)[19]; despite its many setbacks, and the dubious future predicted by some commentators. The EU already has the richest internal market in the world, and will continue to hold this position for some time[20]. It is also a market which still has considerable growth potential within its borders - and, unlike the US, is not in economic retreat. Moreover, it can increase this potential even further by incrementally adding the nations on its borders, especially those to the East. On the other hand, our groups were somewhat schizophrenic about the topic. More than two thirds of them rated it of high priority; but the same number saw  the 'common market failing', and, contrarywise, the same number also looked forward to a 'United States of Europe' '! Our individual respondents were somewhat more positive; with three quarters expecting a ‘United States of Europe’ (coming into being as early as 2020), compared with less than half believing it might disintegrate (by 2025) or become isolationist (once more by 2020). In terms of history, this is a some what paradoxical outcome - since many of its members are ex-colonial powers which should be in the same sort of long-term decline as the United States. Even more paradoxical, perhaps, is that the real strength of the EU is now emerging from an idea rather than from its resources!

Thus, the richness of the idea enshrined in the EU, and its importance for the world as a whole, is the real driver[21]. The EU is the first continental-scale federation to be created by the voluntary decisions of its member states; as opposed to by conquest[22]. There have undeniably been problems with the process, which have been very widely reported - often sensationally so - but these pale into insignificance compared with the scale of its successes. Hundreds of millions of people, in tens of previously independent nations speaking almost as many languages, have peacefully come together to form first an economic union - a major step in its own right - and then to form a political one - an unprecedented step[23]. Thus is emerging not just a major new trading block but potentially the biggest super-power of all; which might ultimately lead the way to true world government. John Rockfellow suggests that "...national parliaments will be discarded in favour of regional and European bodies, with the regional units becoming the key administrative units." I and (just) a majority of our groups (but three quarters of individuals) also foresaw something like this. In view of the problems involved in relinquishing national identities, though, this may be a long process; and our individuals, perhaps realistically, expected it to take at least a quarter of a century[24].

Even so the power of the idea may be such that the progress of the EU, in terms of population coverage at least, will escalate dramatically. It may well take in Russia, to stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific the long way, though almost half our groups (but rather fewer individuals) were still worried about Russian expansionism; more indeed than saw the EU, or at least Germany, focusing on expansion into Eastern Europe[25]. 

On the other hand, the EU may eventually also capture the emerging nations of Africa, which have long had affinities (albeit colonial ones) with individual nations which now belong to the EU; though it should be noted that the EU has only recently started to develop a positive policy for developing its relations with Africa. Previously its only official position was the ‘charitable’, overseas aid, support embodied in the various Lomé agreements.

It might even ultimately take in India, again with colonial links - and an inevitable wish to avoid being outmanoeuvred by China in its own immediate sphere of influence - though it just is possible that India will join Indonesia to form a fourth alternative. In this way, the 'EU' may ultimately come to include as much as a third, perhaps even as much as a half, of the world's population - much of it previously parts of the empires of its members - and to set the pattern for much of the rest.

It is, indeed, arguable that we are - albeit as yet unknowingly - actually seeing, in the EU, the birth of global government. As we will see, later in this chapter, almost everyone (from world leaders, with whom we have argued the point, down to our own scenario groups) is - justifiably - dubious (indeed cynical) that the existing United Nations organization can ever make the transition to a genuinely viable supra-national government. Half our individual respondents even forecast that it will collapse before 2020! The hopes, for something like this, which were widespread at the time of the Gulf War have long since disappeared - indeed, many we have recently talked to, again at all levels (including some world leaders), see the UN eventually going the way of the League of Nations - and in private are actually using those very words! This is a major problem; where much of this book highlights the need for effective supra-national actions on a number of fronts and there are, as yet, no institutions powerful enough to undertake this role; though, even so, half our individuals expected to see a world government formed by 2040 (and, sensibly in view of the dramatic implications, rated this at the level of 7.0 in importance - even though it was one of the issues only having a remote impact on their organisations). But, where the incremental growth of the EU is likely to eventually result in a significant proportion of the world's population being contained within its boundaries, the solution may be to hand!

The inherent power of the EU, with even a quarter of the world's population under its umbrella, will steadily move it towards becoming a de-facto world government[26]. In this context, it is worth noting that half our individuals saw the EU as encompassing a third of the world by 2025. At that point it is quite possible that the Pacific Rim federation, which will probably follow some way behind in terms of political development (though not as an economic superpower), would also recognise the - by then - inescapable logic of joining the putative 'world federation'. The Japanese, at least, are no slouches when it comes to recognising a good thing; and would want to join if only to protect their markets. An India/Indonesia grouping, if it came into being, would probably  be even more likely to join such a 'global federation'[27]. Only the NAFTA group, still dominated by the US, probably won't sign up - in the first instance at least.

The greatest virtue of this approach to world government is that it is incremental. At every stage there is a logic for the EU, or whatever it changes its name to next (perhaps just 'The Federation'), to exist in its current form; and to progress to the next enlargement. Clearly, indeed, the larger it gets the better it is for all members. That idea has already been accepted, which is why it is so powerful. Indeed, the rationale for a progressive enlargement of its boundaries - without any obvious limits - has already been accepted by all its existing. The European Commission is already considering, admittedly not as yet in public or with any great enthusiasm, about incorporating Russia - which has now indicated its wish to join - which will by definition mean that the EU would span more than half the globe. Thus, 'world government' may come about quite naturally, and gently, as the final stage of this growth - and will not demand a massive - and hence almost certainly impossible - leap forward, as all previous proposals have required.

This may perhaps seem to be the most radical suggestion in the whole of this book; and it certainly might be the most important one. The surprising fact is that it has not - as far as I am aware - been discussed by even the most visionary of the leaders of the EU - outside of the Commission itself - at least not in public. Perhaps they consider it too revolutionary for publication. After all the opponents of a federal Europe have long claimed, in the context of defending national sovereignty, that the bureaucrats in Brussels have global ambitions - but it is obvious that even they do not believe this in the literal sense. Perhaps they should, for I hope the argument I have made above shows just how sensible this might ultimately be! This process will, though, be a lengthy one; probably taking a number of decades to reach fruition[28].

The most dynamic growth area, in the West at least, is the European Union. Its existing market is the largest in the world - and this will grow rapidly as new nations - especially to the East - are added. Perhaps even the nations of Africa and India may eventually join. Its greatest strength is the idea it incorporates; an idea which may ultimately - incrementally - lead to a viable form of world government.
 

Third World power

As indicated in the previous chapter, the big change in the distribution of global power - apart from the incremental growth of the EU mentioned above - will be the emergence of the current Third World states - to ultimately become the dominant economic and political force. This is basically a matter of demographics[29]. Surprisingly, in view of the low priority given to the subject by most of the media, more than half our groups commented upon aspects of the Third World/LDCs (Less Developed Countries). Three quarters of individuals predicted that they would achieve ‘take-off’ by 2025, though only two fifths expected them to dominate politics (and even then not until 2035). Most of the general groups also specifically stressed the shift of production to Third World countries, as did more than four fifths of individuals (as early as 2020)[30]. Once again (in terms of supranational issues), though, our groups views were somewhat equivocal - though something like half them foresaw positive development of the Third World in general and (even more surprisingly) of Africa in particular![31]

I have already discussed the changed expectations, in terms of both political and consumer power, created by the much promoted, Western, concept of one man one vote; but, in this context, the impact of these new expectations amongst Third World populations should not be underestimated[32]. Pam Woodall - economics editor of The Economist - sums up the economic impacts as "Over the next 25 years, the world will see the biggest shift in economic strength for more than a century. Today the so-called industrial economies dominate the globe, as they have for the past 150 years or so. Yet within a generation several are likely to be dwarfed by newly emerging economic giants. History suggests, alas, that such shifts in economic power are rarely smooth." The last comment may be a considerable understatement. As yet, few in the 'West' have even considered that their days as 'top dogs' are numbered, and even fewer - if any - have worked out strategies to deal with this dramatic change in their fortunes. The reality may, therefore, come as a considerable shock to many of its leaders. Pam Woodall carries on to detail some of the changes "...by 2020 the rich world's share of global output could shrink to less than two fifths...[and] as many as nine of the top 15 economies will be from today's Third World. Britain might scrape in at 14th place, compared with eighth today."[33]

The Pacific Rim countries have already made their dash for growth, to emerge as major challengers, in economic terms at least, to the 'West'[34]. Two thirds of our individual respondents even expect them to dominate the world by 2030 - which, if you include China and India (as well as Indonesia) amongst their numbers, they probably will! Our contacts in the multi-nationals confirm that the South American countries also are some way along the same road, following the model of SE Asia[35]. This leaves Africa, which is only now starting its own climb out of the abyss; and still seems, at times, perilously close to falling back into it. Of its two main potential economic super-powers, South Africa is, at long last, on its way to full economic development. The other, Nigeria - which is potentially by far the richest on the continent - is, if not quite in a state of civil war, still tearing itself apart economically and politically.

Pam Woodall, along with many other commentator, points out the accelerating pace of development[36] "After the industrial revolution took hold in about 1780, Britain needed 58 years to double its real income per head; from 1839 America took 47 years to so the same; starting in 1885, Japan took 34 years; South Korea managed it in 11 years from 1966; and, more recently still, China has done it [on the grandest scale possible!] in less than ten years." We may thus come to see a relatively prosperous Third World in much less than our lifetime. She adds "...a shrinking gap between the incomes of rich and poor countries is in fact quite natural. Catching up is always easier than being the economic leader."

CORRUPTION

Unfortunately, the Nigerian dilemma, mentioned earlier, illustrates another set of legacies. Reflecting processes also at work elsewhere, it has been the victim of a form of post-colonial corruption indulged in by Western firms. Having achieved independence, the politicians in such - generally very poor - countries have too often been subverted by bribes from overseas companies trying to gain control of their country's resources and markets. It has been argued by some that there have been cultural reasons for this - though the only links seem to be a shared colonial past - but what is beyond doubt is that many Western firms have wholeheartedly joined in such conspiracies (and their culture cannot be blamed for this!). The almost unavoidable temptation this poses was forcibly brought home to me when I learned that one of my friends, a prime-minister who I would never have thought capable of any form of corruption, had been charged with embezzling several million dollars from public funds!

This is a problem for a number of Third World governments[37]; which are now being derisively described, by the multinationals dealing most directly with them, as ‘kleptocracies’! It is not clear if corruption is on the increase world-wide; though the frequency of media reports to this effect would seem to indicate that this might be the case. My own suspicion is that the increased level of reports in fact reflects the very opposite trend. The population in general is becoming more intolerant of such corruption - and are now complaining about practices they would previously have ignored; and, if so, that is the one positive sign in a generally bad picture[38]. Indeed, the parlous position of my friend, the prime-minister, was immediately made public by his own president - and he was thrown into jail - even though, less than a generation ago, such sums were rumoured to be routinely paid to leaders of the Western nations!

Perhaps a slower, stage approach to growth might be less fraught. William Overholt - Managing Director of Bankers Trust in Hong Kong - stresses that, in China, "Deng's initial farm reforms doubled the income of China's farmers, winning the support of a group that comprises over eight hundred million people - not a bad start as a coalition," and a power base which is much less susceptible to corruption. The government of Ethiopia, with which I worked, successfully adopted the same approach - first growing the income of the more than 90 per cent of the population who were subsistence farmers. Its subsequent national plan emphasised the same theme. Its first priority for the country was 'Agriculture led industry'.

migration

Much has been made of the potential problems which might be caused by mass migration from Third World countries to developed nations; especially to Europe - from both East and South. The US is already being inundated with illegal Mexican immigrants. Our groups considered that such migration might increase to the level where it could cause dramatic problems in a number of regions - in terms of the developed nations on the receiving end of it; and three quarters of individuals thought that this would be the case as early as 2020 (rating it as 6.2 in importance)[39]. On the other hand, their optimism - elsewhere - about the future of the Third World might equally point to the situation being defused by the improvements in the home countries of these potential immigrants. John Parker notes the very relevant point - albeit in his case about migration from the countryside to the cities (another major problem area) - "The main reason why cities are pulling in migrants from the countryside is not the lure of the jackpot, but rural unemployment caused by improvements in agricultural productivity. The migrants would rather have the chance of a job in the city than the certainty of unemployment in the country side." Indeed, it has been argued that, very much against what the green lobby might predict, cities in the Third World are ecologically efficient. For instance, they use far less energy per head; and they reduce birth-rates - another child in a farming community is an investment in the future where one in the city is a drain on family resources[40].

The position would be considerably aided if the developed countries themselves increased aid significantly to these countries. Fred Bergsten gives the very relevant example "...the old Federal Republic of Germany realised it could avoid a deluge of East Germans only be paying huge subsidies to induce them to stay at home." This policy certainly worked, at a horrendous cost, but maybe still at a lower cost than the alternative.

The costs may not, in fact, be so high. John Parker, again, adds the footnote that "...most rural migrants...wait until they see a chance of finding work, often with the help of family or friends who are already in the city. A study of migrants from Punjab in New Delhi found that 70% had found jobs within one month of arriving, 94% within two months. Anecdotal evidence from western cities suggests that the same thing is happening there." Indeed, the question to be asked ‘If cities in the Third World are so bad why are so many people clamouring to live in them’?

The improved expectations of the Third World - induced not least by Western propaganda - will continue to drive the emergence of its nations as the coming economic and political powers. This process is already established in Pacific Rim countries, is well under way in South America, and is now also starting in Africa.

Corruption is rife, especially in the Third World - where it holds back economic development, and reported incidents seem to be on the increase - even in the developed world. If this increase is genuine, it will undermine development in all societies. If, as seems at least as possible, it reflects an increasing level of public distaste for corrupt practices we may see bribery and corruption decline; to the great advantage of all. 

china and India

As recently as the 1960s, the nations of Asia were usually thought of as 'basket-cases' by the West[41].Yet China and India, which already dominate their local economies, will soon loom large in world affairs[42], by virtue of the sheer size of their respective populations; despite the individual purchasing power within each country still being low[43]. The great majority, 85%, of individuals quite reasonably thought that China would become the world’s biggest economy by 2030. Indeed, in the form of Hong Kong - which has now become one of its regions - China already has one of the new 'city states' which are going to dominate elements on international commerce in the future. Deyan Sudjic makes the point that, by 2005, the Hong Kong conurbations (including Shenzen) will contain 40 million people; the largest city in the world[44]. William Overholt reports that "...China has grown faster economically than any other large economy in history...At the heart lies Guandong province...Since China's economic reform began in 1979, Guangdong, with Hong Kong management, finance, technology and marketing has achieved an average annual real growth rate of over 12 per cent." He further adds, however, "...Guangdong was to be an airlock through which China dealt with the outside world. Shenzen would be Guandong's airlock to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong the direct window to the outside world." Hence, it has to be recognised that the dramatic results recorded by all these regions are a highly leveraged reflection of China's overall policy. Even so, their dramatic successes cannot be ignored[45].

Hong Kong was even rated the top city in the Fortune 1994 survey[46]. Even so, only a quarter of our general groups highlighted developments in China - though these groups then had a number of points to make, especially in terms of its moves to democracy as well as growing economic strength[47]. All of our expert groups, better appraised of developments, commented - in some detail - on China and the Far East in general and  - as indicated earlier - no less than 85% of individuals, posed the question directly, expected China to be the world’s biggest economy by 2030 (rating this development 7.3 in importance). None, though, commented on the future of India.

Where both of the new superstates, India and China, have a history of producing large numbers of hard-working entrepreneurs[48], albeit that previously these worked their economic magic abroad, their economies will probably be dominated by many small firms; in the short term at least[49]. This will be very different to the picture in the West. In addition, the agriculture sectors will remain relatively large - probably protected by government action.

The two countries share many similarities, even in elements of their approaches to their economies; India has often used the Soviet model, and China has turned a blind eye to incipient capitalism in the country[50]. Yet, India is coming from a colonial, free-market, inheritance and China from a Maoist command economy; though it seems likely that their separate development paths will eventually converge - depending upon which of the federations they choose to join. In fifty years or so they might look very similar. In the meantime, the (cultural) explanations offered to defend their positions - at least - will at least seem to be radically different. It will be interesting to see how each approaches its problems - for there will be lessons to be learned from both ends of this spectrum[51].

All may not be plain sailing, however. William Overholt stresses that "More significant than ethnic strains in China are differences between the more prosperous coastal regions [now, such as Guangdong, rapidly growing ever more prosperous] and the poorer interior regions. Historically, frictions between the coast and the interior have been serious, and indeed such frictions played a big role in the convulsions of China's civil war".[52] Despite the enormous tensions which these changes will engender, however, it seems possible that transformations in both China and India will be achieved relatively peacefully; though 'relative', here, allows for their vast sizes - so there may be a number of local difficulties, each of which would destroy a smaller nation!

As a result of their vast populations, China and India will both become major superpowers; sharing many characteristics of economic development, as they move towards similar mixed-market economies from opposite directions - with relatively few major problems.

Regional Spectrum 

As we saw in the previous chapter, despite the remaining localism, the emerging global culture does offer a unifying force. On the other hand, perhaps the most urgent, and most obvious, global tension is that apparent between the different levels of government which are emerging. Thus, as the previous sections have illustrated, we are still living with the nation states which, one to two centuries ago (in the West), took power from the city states out of which they were formed. Even the new nations in the Third World have largely followed this model. The fact that this form of government has successfully held the main levers of power in many nations for several centuries has come to endow it with the image that it is the natural form.

Indeed, our general groups - as a whole - tended to assume that the nation was the only natural form. Even when the groups made references to international and global issues, but they tended to describe them in terms of their national impacts. Thus, the end of communism was typically seen by them as the fall of a nation; the USSR. Once more, they seemed unable to see the changing structures; which lay behind the symptoms they were describing. On the other hand, when asked the question directly, two thirds of individuals recognised the decline of nation states (over the period to 2025), but - once more in line with their under-rating of structural changes in general - rated this only 6.3 in importance.

Kenichi Ohmae - the renowned Japanese management guru - reflects informed opinion when he says, "...the nation state - that artefact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - has begun to crumble, battered by a pent-up storm of political resentment, ethnic prejudice, and religious animosity...nation states were created to meet the needs of a much earlier historical period, they do not have the will, or political incentive, the credibility, the tools, or the political base to play an effective role in the borderless economy of today...[they] are no longer meaningful units in which to think about economic activity. In a borderless world, they combine things at the wrong level of aggregation."

Thus, in recent decades, as the various social and technological  'revolutions have developed, the position of the nation state - as the only legitimate power centre - has come under increasing challenge. In one direction, the smaller units of government - cities and (increasingly) communities - have demanded (albeit, so far, with little success in the face of the might of national government) that they be given more power. They have claimed, with considerable justification, that this is necessary to deal specifically with local variations in demand for public services; of which there are an increasing number, as the nature of communities becomes more complex. This pressure for decentralisation is likely to increase with the move to individualism - with its clear emphasis on individual needs, which are most effectively dealt with at the local level. This has been compounded by the fact that voters, perhaps trying to implement their own form of power balance (or more obviously recognising that the political requirements are very different at national and local levels), have frequently chosen 'opposition' parties at the local level - almost inevitably promoting a clash between the two levels[53]. Not least, whilst professing a belief in decentralisation, many national governments have tended in practice to consolidate central power - often almost to the exclusion of local power[54].

At the same time, national governments are being increasingly challenged by the larger groupings they have - often under duress - chosen to join. These regional groupings of nations have typically been set up for economic advantage; as recently has been NAFTA, and as was, somewhat earlier, the EEC[55]. Regrettably, for the peace of mind of the leaders of the nation states which belong to them, they have  tended to develop a momentum of their own - leading them to become regional governments in waiting; as the EU now has. Additional stimulation for such agglomeration of nations comes from the increasingly global nature of the forces facing governments[56]. As we have seen, not least are those coming from the financial markets[57]. From a different direction, the single issue groups, too, have become international. Groups like Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Oxfam all now raise their challenges on the international stage just as much as within the nation state.

Not only are governments, in these ways, under siege from both directions, the new, emerging, reality is that government in general (in all its various forms) now operates at a wide range of very different levels - from the local community to global supra-national bodies. It is becoming impossible to pretend that all of these are, in some way, part of national government. Instead, each of these levels should be seen as having its own specific role in the spectrum of political power[58]. The problem, as yet, is that the new natural order has yet to fully emerge. Nation states are still tenaciously hanging on to almost all the powers they have gained over the centuries.

Power is now, increasingly, being distributed between different layers of government; from local to global. Tension arises as national governments, the traditional holders of power, attempt to halt the inevitable trends.

Nation State Institutions

One further problem, which will increasingly result in tension, is that political institutions - at all levels - still tend to be dominated by the traditional supremacy of the nation state and this is reflected, not least, in the political processes across the spectrum[59].

Thus, even at the community level, for example in city government, the processes are typically as yet dominated by exactly the same political parties as at the national level; and these unproductively repeat, at this local level, the battles which rage at the national level. Yet the roles of the two layers of government should demand very different approaches - and, apart from the sheer lust for power (that demands control of the local power base), there would seem to be very little synergy (and, on the other hand, much distraction) to be gained from running the two in tandem.  The increasing recognition of community politics - albeit too often as a new cover for the operations of the national parties - already recognises this trend[60]. 

The problem is even more obvious at the supra-national level. In this political arena, to assuage the fears of the national leaders, the normal democratic processes - enshrined in one man one vote - have been discretely sidelined. This is true at the regional level; the European parliament is still largely powerless, though - setting the agenda for the future -  it is slowly garnering more and more power. The real power is reserved for the Council of Ministers; where policy is thrashed out between representatives of national governments (under the constant threat of their vetoes). Such deference to member states is undoubtedly necessary when the super-state is being created. On the other hand, it seems highly likely, indeed almost inevitable, that the resultant super-states will eventually flex their muscles - against their members[61]. What seems to be essential for the future development of effective political processes in general is the development of co-operative frameworks, which will allow the various layers to efficiently meet the specific roles demanded of them.

Political power is dispersing to different levels; from local to global. The main tension arises where national governments fight to retain their traditional powers against the almost inevitable encroachment of the other layers. It seems likely that new political frameworks will be needed to guide co-operation, rather than confrontation, across these emerging layers.

The United Nations

The problems are most evident, perhaps, in the case of the United Nations; with half of our individuals expecting it to collapse by 2020! Despite its proud title - possibly because of it - and its claimed role, it is anything but united; and much less than the global authority it would wish to be, let alone anything like a global government. Thus, all representation in its assemblies and councils is strictly on the basis of the nation-states - in this aspect exactly as its title implies[62]. In theory, at least, the smallest nations have the same rights to representation as the largest. In reality, the General Assembly, where they are represented, remains largely powerless. Instead, real power - such as it is - is held by the Security Council; which is by any standard grossly unrepresentative - with a small number of nations determining the fate of all[63].

Even when the United Nations does decide to act - and there have been remarkably few occasions when it has done so - its actions may be blocked by individual nations; and, above all, by the United States. After the demise of communism and confronted by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it looked as if the it was, at long last, about to fulfil the role demanded of it by the modern world - and the world, or at least its media, saluted this development. Unfortunately, as subsequent events demonstrated, in Bosnia (where separate members of the UN Security Council held conflicting interests) and Somalia (where they had no worthwhile interest at all) this proved to be an illusion - it only occurred in the case of Iraq because there was a (fortuitous) coincidence of the interests of the United NationsXE "interests of the United Nations" with those of the United States; and the fragmenting Soviet UnionXE "fragmenting Soviet Union"XE "Soviet Union" had retired injured[64]!

One area of conflict, therefore, may well be replacement of, or updating of, the global institutions. New groupings of nationsXE "groupings of nations", especially in the Third WorldXE "Third World"XE " nations in the Third World" - becoming increasingly aware of the power held by its populationsXE "power held by populations" - will clash with the sitting tenants. In particular, it is likely that the United States will - until it recognises the dangers and changes its posture - come into increasing confrontation XE "confrontation "with the rest of the world; a confrontation which poses the one real danger of nuclear warXE "nuclear war" XE "war "(but almost certainly no longer on the global scale).

The existing global institutions, based upon the power of the nation-states, are increasingly failing to meet the demands of globalisation. They are likely to be challenged by new forms of global organisation, and indeed by putative quasi-global governments, and tensions may develop between the new challengers and the defenders of the old order; especially between the United States and the Third World.

Communal Government XE "Government"XE "Communal Government"

At the other extreme, the layer of governmentXE "layer of government" which should be most directly in contact with us is that of community governmentXE "community government"; often characterised as local or city governmentXE "city government"XE " local government". The essence of it is that it is local; indeed, the political processesXE "political processes", and forces, involved are now often described as localismXE "localism". In recent years such local government has too often been forced to play second fiddle to national government - even in its local area - and too often been forced to dance to the latter's tune.  Yet two thirds of our individuals expect some form of new local power to emerge by 2020. Indeed, with the increasing shift to individualism (and to the knowledge society)XE "individualism", it is arguable that the importance of such local government will grow rapidly - albeit in terms of a very different form of politics to that played on the national stage; as maybe it should have done all along[65]. The political interface with usXE "interface with the individual"XE "political interface with the individual", and management of resources to meet our needs, clearly must lie at this level. Fortunately, when allowed to manage their own affairs, those politicians involved in community politics - even some belonging to the national parties - have already proved how well they can rise to the challenge. The only pre-requisite seems to be de-coupling these political processes from national politics. At the local level, the only acid-test needed is how the community, and within it the individual, is affected; and in practice this proves a very easy test for the politicians - and, more important, for their constituents - to apply.

Community politics is already diverging, in many areas, from the agenda set by the national parties - with pragmatic servicing of local community needs becoming the powerful key to local success in the polls. With the changing frameworks of politics - differentiating between local, regional, national and global levels - and the growth of individualism, it is likely that community politics will continue to move away from the national parties towards the individual; for whom local government will become the most direct interface with all the other layers of government.

Global PoliticsXE "Global Politics"

Whilst the trend to multi-state groupingsXE "groupings"XE "multi-state groupings", and even to super-statesXE " super-states", seems clear, the future of global politics is much less clear[66]. What does seem clear is the need; for effective global regulation XE "regulation "and interventionXE "intervention", to counter the global forces impinging upon government XE "government "- not least in terms of macro-economics - and nearly two thirds of individuals expect some form of supra-national control to emerge by 2030, when - they agree - there will be a ‘new world order’[67]XE "macro-economics". The growing excesses, arising from the powers of the over-weaning financial markets,XE "financial markets" XE "markets "which now demand that they have a God-given right to operate - subject only to self-regulation - outside of any law,XE "law " are forcing a recognition around the world that some form of action is needed; and that action must now be at least co-ordinated on a global scale. The very real threat, at present, is that any nation stateXE "nation state" which dares to defy the financial operators will be destroyed by them - a threat which, if made by another nation, would otherwise almost automatically result in a declaration of warXE "war"XE "declaration of war"!

The imponderables unfortunately begin when we come to consider how such global governmenXE "global government"tXE "government", for that is what is needed, is to come about in practice. As we have seen, despite the very real advantages to be gained, the politicians in existing nation-states are loath to hand power even to the multi-state groupings - with which they should share very obvious common interests - to which they have already committed themselves. It is difficult to see when such processes might be extended  to nations with very different interests; and which have often been the subject of centuries-long enmities! Just bringing together Israel XE "Israel "and its Arab XE "Arab "neighbours has proved near impossible, even when they should share very clear common interests.[68]

Having issued that caveat, however, global government - in the form of co-ordinated global actions - has already worked a number of times in the past. The allies in the Second World WarXE "allies in the Second World War" put aside all their differences and worked well together - and with the politically very different USSR XE "USSR "- across two quite different theatres of war. To a lesser extent, something similar happened in the Korean and Gulf WarsXE "Korean War". Perhaps more important, since it is a peace-time example, the stability afforded by the Bretton WoodsXE "Bretton Woods" system has been credited - most recently perhaps by the ILO XE "ILO "in its 1995 report on World Employment - with underpinning the golden age of growth between 1950 and 1973.

A separate problem is the presence of the existing global institutionsXE "institutions"XE "global institutions". Unfortunately, these institutions - most notably the United NationsXE "United Nations", but also the World BankXE "World Bank" and IMF XE "IMF "(also part of the Bretton Woods agreements, but more or less independent of UN policy since 1973) - are largely designed to bolster existing national differences (or at least those of the super-powers and founder members). They do not meet the needs of most of the world and - where government XE "government "is increasingly possible only by agreement with those governed - that means that these existing institutions are becoming less and less effective[69]. Their legitimacy XE "legitimacy "is under constant threat -especially as they have come to be seen as vestiges of Western colonialismXE "Western colonialism" XE "colonialism "- and it is now not unusual in my experience for even well-respected government leaderXE "government leaders"s XE "leaders "to talk in private about 'the end of the United Nations'!

It seems likely that global politics will have to change significantly, to meet the changing needs of global government. The existing global institutions do not meet these needs - and will need, at least, to be drastically reformed.

reactionsXE "western reactions" to change

The pressure for changeXE "pressure for change" XE "change "will, however, mount. Put in a more general context, the problem is that the existing global institutionsXE "global institutions" XE "institutions "offer a massive leverage to the most powerful nationsXE "leverage to the most powerful nations". This is why - despite the regular protests about their bureaucracies - they are tolerated by the Western powerXE "power"sXE "Western powers". As the power balance changes, however, this leverage will increasingly come to operate against those Western powers.

Thus, in the modern worldXE "modern world" (and especially in the post-modernXE "post-modern" one) power follows the people; and, in particular, the numbers of people. As we have already seen, when - by 2025 - more than 90% of the world's population will belong to the nations currently categorised as being in the Third World the small minority (10% or less) in the current Western blocXE "Western bloc" will probably lose not just most of their influence but all of it. The global power leverage XE "leverage "patterXE "power leverage patter"nXE "global power leverage pattern", now kept in place by the latter, will then come to work against them with a vengeance. Changes will come when the Western powers recognise the inevitability of this process. Then, and only then, will they decide in their own (increasingly minority) interestXE "minority interest" to put in place more democratic processesXE "democratic processes"; especially ones that, for the first time, carefully protect minorities (such as they will by then have become!).

Unfortunately, at present the internal political processes of the Western powers put the priority on the short term, and discourage strategies for the longer term. In addition, it is not clear how rapidly the United StatesXE "United States" will recognise, let alone come to terms with, the loss of its global empire. This,XE "global empire" perhaps, may be the deciding factor in the West's response. Thus, when the changes will come about is unpredictableXE "unpredictability". Whether they will come about in time for the Western powers to sue for more favourable terms, before punitive ones are gleefully imposed by their erstwhile colonists, is also questionable.

Paradoxically, whatever the political outcomes, the West will already have given one important gift to the new world; its languageXE "language". As Joseph Coates[b] forecasts, with a considerable degree of probability (certainly most of our groups agreed with the proposition) "English will remain the global languageXE "global language"XE "English, global language"." This fact should not be dismissed as peripheral - since language contains a great deal of, hidden, cultureXE "culture". Whatever else happens, the west will determine, in this way, much of the cultural inheritance of the future.

When - or even whether (in the short to medium term) - the changes to global institutions will happen depends, to a large extent, on when the Western powers recognise that the leverage of global power is moving against them.

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